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ABSTRACT 
This  s tudy  e x p l o r e s  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  non-fuel  
m ine ra l  markets  of t h e  r a p i d  growth of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  t h e  mining and 
p roce s s ing  of m ine ra l s  i n  t h e  l e s s  developed c o u n t r i e s  (LDC). 
The f i r s t  p a r t  d e f i n e s  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e ,  and q u a n t i f i e s  i t s  p r eva l ance  
and growth i n  LDC minera l  i n d u s t r i e s .  The p a r t i c u l a r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of s t a t e  
e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d ,  and t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e i r  behav ior  f o r  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  m ine ra l  markets  a r e  analyzed.  I n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  t h r e e  hypotheses  a r e  
formulated and a s se s sed .  
1) S t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  l e s s  f l e x i b l e  t han  p r i v a t e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  i n  
a d j u s t i n g  c a p a c i t y  through t h e  d i f f e r e n t  phases  of t h e  bus ine s s  cyc l e .  The 
i n c r e a s i n g  importance of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  t h e r e f o r e  r e s u l t s  i n  g r e a t e r  
p r i c e  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  minera l  markets .  
2) S t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  can d i s r e g a r d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r i s k  o f  e x p l i c i t  o r  
cove r t  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n .  C e t e r i s  p a r i b u s ,  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of s t a t e  en t e r -  
p r i s e  t h e r e f o r e  r e s u l t s  i n  more investment  and c a p a c i t y  expansion i n  m ine ra l  
r i c h  LDCs  t h a t  a r e  cons idered  e s p e c i a l l y  " p o l i t i c a l  r i sky"  by t h e  mining 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s .  Over t i m e ,  t h i s  w i l l  l e a d  t o  a  c l o s e r  geographica l  f i t  
between geo log ica l  p o t e n t i a l  and mineral  e x t r a c t i o n .  
3) Takedvers by s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  of minera l  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  LDCs e n t a i l s  
a  s u b s t a n t i a l  se t t ing-up  and l ea rn ing  cos t .  The widespread n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s  
of t h e  1960s and 1970s have t y p i c a l l y  been followed by extended pe r iods  of 
l e s s e r  e f f i c i e n c y ,  cha rac t e r i zed  by higher  c o s t  l e v e l s ,  and i n a b i l i t y  t o  ope ra t e  
t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  a t  f u l l  capac i ty  o r  t o  e s t a b l i s h  new capac i ty .  Output has  
been lower and p r i c e s  higher  dur ing  t h i s  l e a r n i n g  per iod  than they would have 
been under an un in t e r rup ted  p r i v a t e  mu l t ina t iona l  regime. 
The second p a r t  of t h e  s tudy cons iders  t h e  support  f o r  t h e  above hypotheses 
provided by t h r e e  d e t a i l e d  case s t u d i e s  of na t iona l i zed  minera l  indus t r ies - -  
Indonesian t i n ,  Venezulean i r o n  o r e ,  and Zambian copper. These cases  cover a  
range of experience i n  terms of minera ls ,  con t inen t s ,  and l e v e l s  of economic 
development i n  hos t  count r ies .  
The t h i r d  and f i n a l  p a r t  of t h e  s tudy reviews t h e  hypotheses i n  t h e  
l i g h t  of t h e  empi r i ca l  work presented.  Conclusions a r e  formulated and general-  
i z a t i o n s  derived from o t h e r  coun t r i e s  and minerals .  
This  manuscript on t h e  r e c e n t  growth of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  t h e  minera l  
s e c t o r  of developing coun t r i e s  and t h e  consequences f o r  world minera l  markets 
i s  one of fkve r e sea rch  e f f o r t s  c u r r e n t l y  supported by t h e  IIASA Mineral Trade 
and Markets P ro j ec t .  The au tho r ,  we l l  known t o  s c h o l a r s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  
economics of mineral  i n d u s t r i e s ,  is a  Senior  Research Fellow a t  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  
f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic S t u d i e s  of Stockholm Univers i ty .  
This  ve r s ion  of t h e  s tudy  w i l l  s e rve  a s  t h e  background document f o r  a  
IIASA workshop on "S ta t e  E n t e r p r i s e  i n  t h e  Mineral Sector ' '  t o  be he ld  i n  
Laxenburg on 17-19 October 1983. Following t h a t  meeting i t  w i l l  be r ev i sed  and 
then reviewed f o r  pub l i ca t ion .  Consequently, i t  should be t r e a t e d  a s  a  pre- 
l iminary  d r a f t ,  and quoted only  a f t e r  r ece iv ing  t h e  permission of t h e  au thor .  
For t h e  same reason,  comments, c r i t i c i s m s ,  and sugges t ions  f o r  improvement a r e  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  welcome. 
John E.  T i l t o n  
Research Leader 
Mineral Trade and Markets P r o j e c t  
This  paper was o r i g i n a l l y  prepared under t h e  t i t l e  "Modelling 
f o r  Management" f o r  p r e s e n t a t i o n  a t  a  Nate r  Research Cent re  
(U.K. ) Conference on "River  P o l l u t i o n  Con t ro l " ,  Oxford, 
9 - 1 1  A s r i l ,  1979. 
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CHAPTER 1 .  INTRODUCTION 
Over t h e  p a s t  few decades  t h e r e  has  been an  e x p l o s i v e  growth of 
s t a t e  ownership i n  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s '  metal  minera l  i n d u s t r i e s .  
Most of t h e  ou tpu t  of t h e s e  i n d u s t r i e s  i s  expor ted .  The purpose of 
t h e  p r e s e n t  book i s  t o  exp l o r e  how t h e  new owner group i n f l u e n c e s  
and changes t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  metal  minera l  markets .  
The focus  provided by t h e  p reced ing  paragraph must be f u r t h e r  
s p e l l e d  o u t .  The book i s  about  metal  minera l s .  Mineral  f u e l s  l i k e  
petroleum and c o a l  a r e  l e f t  o u t  of c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  There i s  a s p e c i a l  
i n t e r e s t  i n  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  developing c o u n t r i e s .  Although p u b l i c  
ownership i n  t h e  minera l  i n d u s t r i e s  i s  i n  no way l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  Thi rd  
World, t h e  a t t e n t i o n  devoted t o  such e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  i s  
sm a l l .  The c e n t r a l  theme of t h e  book i s  how t h e  emergent s t a t e  involve-  
ment i n  t h e  minera l  i n d u s t r i e s  a f f e c t s  t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
markets.  The g o a l s  and behav i o r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of state-owned minera l  
f i r m s  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  s t u d i e d w i t h  a  view t o  c l a r i f y  what changes t hey  w i l l  
b r i n g  t o  such market v a r i a b l e s  a s  c o s t s  and p r i c e s ,  i n d u s t r y  concen t ra -  
t i o n ,  v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  o r  t h e  o v e r a l l  volume and geographica l  a l l o c a -  
t i o n  of inves tments  i n  new produc t ion  c a p a c i t y .  S t a t e  ownership i n  t h e  
mineral  i n d u s t r i e s  w i l l  obvious ly  have a  number of o t h e r  impac ts ,  
n a t i o n a l l y  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y ,  b u t  t h e s e  w i l l  r e c e i v e  on ly  a  cu r so ry  
t r e a t men t  o r  none a t  a l l .  
The reasons  f o r  w r i t i n g  t h i s  book a r e  e a sy  t o  fo rmula te .  Although 
f o r  some time t h e r e  ha s  been a wide awareness of t h e  f a s t  expansion of 
s t a t e  ownership i n  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s '  minera l  p roduc t i on ,  through 
n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of e x i s t i n g  capac i t y  and government i n  
new ven tu re s ,  t h e  a c t u a l  in format ion  on t h e  t o t a l  e x t e n t  of s t a t e  involve-  
ment h a s  a t  b e s t  been fragmentary.  The p r e s e n t  book t r i e s  t o  respond 
t o  t h e  need f o r  an o v e r a l l  p i c t u r e  of t h e  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  phenomenon. 
This  is  done through a  d e t a i l e d  d i s cus s ion  of t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  measures 
t h a t  can b e  employed t o  quan t i fy  s t a t e  ownership,  and through t h e  compila- 
t i o n  of d a t a  sets f o r  t h e  major minera l  i n d u s t r i e s ,  on which t h e  measures 
a r e  then  app l i ed .  Furthermore,  t h e  c u r r e n t  governmental  ownership 
p o s i t i o n s  a r e  pu t  i n t o  a  temporal con t ex t ,  showing how they evolved i n  
t h e  p a s t  and c o n j e c t u r i n g  about t h e i r  l i k e l y  importance i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
A more important  reason ,  however, is  t h a t  a l though  t h e  growing 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  of p u b l i c  ownership i n  mineral  i n d u s t r i e s  i s  g e n e r a l l y  admi t ted ,  
t h e  s p e c i a l  behav io ra l  p a t t e r n s  of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  seldom recognized 
when worldwide minera l  markets  a r e  analyzed.  Recent s t anda rd  works on 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodity i s s u e s  r e g u l a r l y  subsume t h a t  a l l  market agen t s  
behave l i k e  p r i v a t e  p r o f i t  maximizers. The conc lus ions  of such works 
w i l l  have doub t fu l  v a l i d i t y  i f  i n  f a c t  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p ropo r t i on  of t h e  
s u p p l i e r s  have behav io ra l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  d e v i a t e  from t h a t  s t anda rd .  
I n  t h e  few c a s e s  where t h e  dev i an t  behavior  i s  noted ,  i t s  consequences 
f o r  t h e  func t i on ing  of t h e  commodity market s t u d i e d  t y p i c a l l y  have 
t h e  form of i n t u i t i v e  hunches wi thout  suppor t ing  t h e o r e t i c a l  o r  emp i r i ca l  
a n a l y s i s .  The p r e s e n t  book has  t h e  ambit ion t o  s t r a i g h t e n  up a  few of 
t h e s e  d e f i c i e n c i e s .  Thus, some of t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  approaches conta ined  
i n  t h e  gene ra l  l i t e r a t u r e  on s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  a r e  combined w i th  c l o s e  
emp i r i ca l  obse rva t i ons  t o  i d e n t i f y  those  behav io ra l  f e a t u r e s  of s t a t e -  
owned minera l  f i rms  t h a t  d i s t i n g u i s h  them from t h e  p r i v a t e  mu l t i na t i ona l  
mining co rpo ra t i ons .  These i n s i g h t s  a r e  then employed f o r  a  sy s t ema t i c  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of t h e  changing c o s t ,  p r i c e  and investment p a t t e r n s  i n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  minera l  markets where state-owned u n i t s  account f o r  a  sub- 
s t a n t i a l  p ropor t i on  of o v e r a l l  supply. 
The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  mineral  markets t r e a t e d  i n  t h e  fo l lowing  chap te r s  
a l l  have an o l i g o p o l i s t i c  s t r u c t u r e  on t h e  supply s i d e .  A s  appears  from 
t a b l e  1 .1 ,  t h e  capac i ty  of t h e  b igges t  f i r m  i n  each mineral  t y p i c a l l y  
accounts  f o r  10 % o r  more of t h e  Western World t o t a l .  ' I n  a l l  c a s e s  
l i s t e d ,  t h e  t e n  l a r g e s t  f i rms  c o n t r o l  more t han  50 % of o v e r a l l  c apac i ty .  
For most mine ra l s ,  t h e  number of l a r g e  s u p p l i e r s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  small 
t o  make each b e l i e v e  ( a )  t h a t  h i s  economic f o r t u n e s  a r e  p e r c e p t i b l y  
in f luenced  by t h e  market a c t i o n s  of o t h e r  i nd iv idua l  s u p p l i e r s ,  and 
(b) t h a t  t h e s e  s u p p l i e r s  a r e  i n  t u r n  a f f e c t e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  by h i s  own 
a c t i o n s .  These a r e  t h e  cond i t i ons  which, according t o  Scherer ,  charac-  
2  
t e r i z e  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  markets.  O l i g o p o l i s t i c  market cond i t i ons  do n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  imply h igh  monopolis t ic  p r i c e s  and p r o f i t s .  For ,  a s  Scherer  
p o i n t s  o u t ,  o l igopoly  does no t  p rec lude  a  sha rp  r i v a l r y  among t h e  s u p p l i e r s  
i n  a  market ,  pushing p r i c e s  down t o  t h e  l e v e l  of marginal c o s t  of t h e  
i ndus t ry .  
Given t h e  short-run i n e l a s t i c i t y  of o v e r a l l  demand f o r  most' m ine ra l s ,  
a  producer account ing f o r  10 % o r  more of o v e r a l l  c a p c i t y ,  has  s u b s t a n t i a l  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t o  push up t h e  p r i c e  by reducing h i s  supply.  I n  t h e  
absence of producer coo rd ina t ion ,  t h e  p r i c e  improvement w i l l  l a s t  on ly  
u n t i l  h i s  compet i to rs  have expanded t h e i r  own output  t o  compensate f o r  
t h e  i n i t i a l  s h o r t f a l l .  The t i m e  requi red  f o r  t h i s  t o  happen w i l l  be  
q u i t e  l i m i t e d  i n  a  r eces s ion  when t h e r e  i s  spa re  capac i ty  t h a t  can be 
employed, bu t  may involve 4-5 y e a r s  o r  more when a d d i t i o n a l  ou tput  
1) Western World i s  used throughout t h e  book t o  denote  t h e  world o u t s i d e  
t h e  c e n t r a l l y  planned economies of Eas te rn  Europe, Asia  and Cuba. 
2) F. M. Scherer ,  I n d u s t r i a l  Market S t r u c t u r e  and Economic Performance., 
Rand McNally, Chicago 1980, p. 1 1 .  
~ m c o  - m m  03-a m  a 
. . .  . . .  . a .  
 me e e e  m m m  m  o 
7 m  
a m -  m m o  m e -  m  - 
. . .  . . .  . . .  s.02 a m m  e m m  N a 
m  
7 ? 2  
m m m  
F - 
m m o  
. . .  
m  m  m  
r equ i r e s  t h e  cons t ruc t ion  of new capac i ty .  Maintenance of p r i c e s  above 
t h e  marginal c o s t  i n  t h e  indus t ry  w i l l  be e a s i e r  wi th  some coord ina t ion  
among producers ,  though even then  t h e  producer ga ins  w i l l  be  d i l u t e d  
over time through s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n  favor  of o t h e r  m a t e r i a l s .  
A c e r t a i n  degree of producer coord ina t ion  has  been common i n  many 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  mineral  markets ,  wi th  r e spec t  t o  both market supply,  and 
even more t o  capac i ty  expansion. Expressions of such coord ina t ion  inc lude  
t h e  prevalence of producer p r i c e s  f o r  a number of mine ra l s ,  and t h e  sub- 
s t a n t i a l  share  of capac i ty  expansion t h a t  has  t he  form of j o i n t  ventures  
between many producers.  Producer coord ina t ion  has  been temporari ly  
weakened s i n c e  the  mid-1970's by t h e  sharp reduct ion  i n  demand growth 
f o r  many minera ls .  With t h e  ensuing excess c a p a c i t i e s  t h a t  have emerged, 
t h e r e  has  been much more of a f ree- for -a l l ,  wi thout  concern f o r  t h e  
indus t ry  a s  a whole, a s  i nd iv idua l  producers have t r i e d  t o  su rv ive  
through t h e  low-pr i c e  per iod . 
The o l i g o p o l i s t i c  s t r u c t u r e  of mineral  markets has  been a f f e c t e d  
by t h e  en t ry  of state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s ,  because t h e  n a t i o n a l  take-overs 
have involved changes i n  t h e  degree of i n d u s t r i a l  concent ra t ion .  However, 
t h e  impact appears  t o  have been both ways, reducing t h e  degree of con- 
c e n t r a t i o n  i n  some markets ,  and inc reas ing  it i n  o t h e r s .  The ol igo-  
p o l i s t i c  conduct i n  mineral  markets has  been weakened by t h e  e n t r y  of 
new and inexperienced s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  which needed t ime t o  acquain t  
themselves wi th  and develop r e l a t i o n s  t o  t h e i r  compet i tors .  Once they 
have done s o ,  however, t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  reason t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  
state-owned u n i t s  w i l l  have a t t i t u d e s  t o  producer coo rd ina t ion  t h a t  
d i f f e r  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  from those  of t h e  p r i v a t e  mu l t ina t iona l  mining 
f i rms .  Hence t h e  cont inued a n a l y s i s  i s  based on t h e  premise t h a t  t h e  
in t roduc t ion  of s t a t e  ownership has not  caused a permanent change i n  
t h e  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  s t r u c t u r e  o r  conduct i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  mineral markets,  
and t h a t  a  degree of producer coord ina t ion  p r e v a i l s  d e s p i t e  t h e  a l t e r e d  
ownership s t r u c t u r e .  
The book c o n s i s t s  of t h r e e  p a r t s .  The f i r s t  p a r t  p r e s e n t s  a  genera l  
pe r spec t ive  t o  t h e  i s s u e s  t r e a t e d .  Thus chap te r  2 makes heavy use  of t h e  
genera l  l i t e r a t u r e  on s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  order  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  concept ,  
t o  exp la in  t h e  emergence of s t a t e  ownership of i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e ,  
and t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of state-owned corpora- 
t i o n s .  In chap te r  3 t h e  v i s t a  i s  narrowed t o  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  t h e  
mineral  s e c t o r .  Af t e r  a  d i scuss ion  of a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches t o  
quan t i fy ing  t h e  e x t e n t  of s t a t e  ownership i n  t h e  mineral  i n d u s t r i e s ,  a  
number of s t a t i s t i c s  a r e  presented t o  d e p i c t  t h e  growth and p re sen t  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e  state-owned s e c t o r  i n  t h e  product ion of d i f f e r e n t  
metal minerals .  Chapter 4 i s  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  e n t i r e  s tudy.  S t a t e  mineral  
e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  d iv ided  i n t o  a  few key c a t e g o r i e s ,  and t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
behaviora l  p a t t e r n s  of each a r e  d i scussed  i n  d e t a i l .  Based on t h i s  
d i s cus s ion ,  a  s e t  of hypotheses about t h e  market impact of t h e  growing 
inpor tance  of s t a t e  ownership i n  mineral  i n d u s t r i e s  a r e  formulated.  
The second p a r t  of t he  book, comprising c h a p t e r s  5, 6 and 7 ,  
c o n s i s t s  of d e t a i l e d  c a s e  s t u d i e s  of t h r e e  state-owned mineral  i n d u s t r i e s  
i n  developing c o u n t r i e s .  The purpose of t h e s e  s t u d i e s  i s  t o  provide 
some empir ica l  evidence i n  support  of t h e  hypothesesput  forward i n  
chap te r  4. 
The t h i r d  p a r t  (chapter  8) p u l l s  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  t h r eads  t oge the r ,  
and examines t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which the  empir ica l  f i n d i n g s  contained i n  
t h e  ca se  s t u d i e s  a r e  i n  agreement with t h e  hypotheses  about  market 
impact. The r e s u l t s  a r e  then gene ra l i zed ,  and t h e  l i k e l y  changes i n  
t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  minera l  markets,  consequent upon the  emergence of a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  and i n c r e a s i n g l y  mature state-owned e n t e r p r i s e  group a r e  
descr ibed .  
The resources  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  ca r ry ing  ou t  t h e  r e sea rch  t h a t  u n d e r l i e s  
t h e  p re sen t  book d i d  no t  s u f f i c e  f o r  undertaking more than t h r e e  c a s e  
s t u d i e s .  A few words need t o  be  s a i d  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of 
PT Timah ( t i n )  i n  Indonesia ,  Ferrominera ( i r o n  o re )  i n  Venezuela,and 
ZCCM (copper) i n  Zambia f o r  c l o s e r  s c r u t i n y .  A number of f a c t o r s  
con t r ibu t ed  t o  t h i s  choice .  Thus, I wanted t h e  ca se s  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  a  
v a r i e t y  of minera l s ,  geographical  r eg ions  and l e v e l s  of economic develop- 
ment i n thes t a t e -owned  companies' home coun t r i e s .  I a l s o  d e s i r e d  t h e  
ca se s  t o  provide a  v a r i a t i o n  i n  terms of t h e  l eng th  of per iod  of s t a t e  
ownership. To avoid  confusing matters, I wanted t h e  ca se s  t o  involve 
companies whose a c t i v i t i e s  were dominated by mining and process ing  of 
a  s i n g l e  mineral  and where t h e  s t a t e  ownership arrangements were reasonably 
c l ea r - cu t .  After t r y i n g  t o  s a t i s f y  a l l  t h e  above f a c t o r s ,  t h e  f i n a l  
choice  was a l s o  in f luenced  by my persona l  c o n t a c t s  and acquaintances 
w i th in  t h e  mineral  i ndus t ry .  The one circumstance t h a t  may provide an 
un rep re sen t a t i ve  b i a s  t o  t h e  c a s e  s t u d i e s  sample i s  t h a t  two of t h e  
t h r e e  companies a r e  l oca t ed  i n  OPEC c o u n t r i e s .  Both i n  Indonesia  and 
Venezuela t h e  pub l i c  s e c t o r  f i n a n c i a l  cond i t i ons  were very re laxed  
through most of t h e  1970's. One should keep t h i s  i n  mind when drawing 
conc lus ions  and g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  from t h e  c a s e  study sample, e s p e c i a l l y  
wi th  regard  t o  m a t t e r s  t h a t  r e l a t e  t o  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of f inance .  
P e r t i n e n t  f a c t s  about t h e  companies t r e a t e d  i n  t h e  t h r e e  c a s e  
s t u d i e s  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  t a b l e  1.2 .  Timah is  t h e  o l d e s t  under government 
ownership. In  1980 it was by f a r  t h e  most p r o f i t a b l e  one,  both i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  funds employed and t o  turnover .  ZCCM i s  much l a r g e r  than 
t h e  two o t h e r s .  I t s  cap i t a1 , t u rnove r  and employment a r e  s e v e r a l  t imes 
t h e  s i z e  of Timah and Ferrominera.  The Venezuelan i r o n  o r e  company i s  
t h e  most c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  of t h e  t h r e e .  I n  1980 i t s  4400 employees 
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Tab le  1 . 2  The Three  S t a t e  Minera l  companies Compared. 1980 
P T Timah, 
I n d o n e s i a  
S t a t e  owned s i n c e  1950 
T o t a l  c a p i t a l  funds  m$ 414' 
S a l e s  m$ 410 
Pre- tax  p r o f i t s  m$ 192 
Employment, number of p e r s o n s  27650 
T o t a l  c a p i t a l  f u n d s  p e r  14980 
employee, $ 
S a l e s  as a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  
GDP i n  home c o u n t r y  
S a l e s  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  of  
e x p o r t s  i n  home c o u n t r y  
Employment i n  p e r c e n t  of 
working a g e  p o p u l a t i o n  
(15-64 y e a r s )  i n  home 
c o u n t r y  
Fer rominera  , 
Venezuela 
ZCCM 
Zambia 
Source:  Chap te r s  5 ,  6 and 7; World Development Repor t  1982, 
The World Bank; Bank of Zambia Annual Repor t  1981. 
had an average of c a p i t a l  a s s e t s  worth c l o s e  t o  US d o l l a r s  95,000 each a t  
t h e i r  d i sposa l .  
ZCCM s t ands  ou t  among t h e  t h r e e  companies i n  t h a t  i t  dominates 
t h e  Zambian economy i n  s e v e r a l  r e s p e c t s .  This  company's s a l e s  i n  1980 
corresponded t o  one t h i r d  of Zambia's GDP and accounted f o r  more than 
95 % of t h e  coun t ry ' s  expor t s .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  on ly  2 % of Zambia's working 
age popula t ion  was employed i n  t h i s  c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e  mining and mineral  
p rocess ing  corpora t ion .  The corresponding measures f o r  t h e  o t h e r  two 
companies show t h a t  Timah and Ferrominera a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  
i n  a l l  t h r e e  r e s p e c t s  i n  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l  economies. 
A l l  t h r e e  companies a r e  very heav i ly  o r i en t ed  towards t h e  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  market,  bo th  i n  t h e i r  s a l e s  and i n  t h e i r  purchases  of c a p i t a l  
equipment. For t h i s  reason ,  b u t  a l s o  because t h e  p re sen t  s tudy  is  
concerned wi th  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  markets ,  a l l  va lues  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  
companies, a r e  presen ted  i n u s d o l l a r s  obtained by conver t ing  t he  
n a t i o n a l  cu r r enc i e s  a t  a c t u a l  exchange r a t e s .  The u s e  of an i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  currency c r e a t e s  anomalies i n  t h e  s e r i e s  of va lues  t h a t  a r e  
mainly n a t i o n a l l y  based. Thus, a  deva lua t ion  of t h e  n a t i o n a l  currency 
w i l l  tend t o  r e s u l t  i n  a  d i s c r e t e  reduc t ion  of t h e  c o s t  o r  of t h e  
owner c a p i t a l  i n  t h e  company, when expressed i n  US d o l l a r s .  However, 
t he se  anomalies would u s u a l l y  be of l i m i t e d  du ra t i on ,  s i n c e  deva lua t ions  
a r e  t y p i c a l l y  preceded and/or  followed by h ighe r  r a t e s  of i n f l a t i o n  i n  
t h e  currency t h a t  i s  devalued. And i n  any ca se ,  t h e  u se  of an  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
currency i s  necessary f o r  comparisons both among t h e  t h r e e  companies s t u d i e d ,  
and i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e i r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  compet i to rs .  
Where r e l e v a n t ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  d o l l a r  va lues  a r e  converted i n t o  cons t an t  
1981 d o l l a r s .  The World Bank's Manufactured Exports  Unit  Value 
Index CIF, expressed i n  US d o l l a r s  ( formerly known a s  t h e  World Bank 
Index of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n f l a t i o n )  i s  used a s  t h e  d e f l a t o r  t o  o b t a i n  
t h e  cons t an t  d o l l a r  s e r i e s .   his index i s  used i n  p re fe r ence  
to a domestic US series like the US producer price index, because it 
gives a better measure of the international value of the dollar. For 
instance, the dollar may appreciate internationally, despite domestic 
inflation in the US. Its international purchasing power will then rise, 
despite the fall of its domestic value. And since the international 
contacts of the companies studied are not restricted to the US, it is 
the international and not the US domestic purchasing power of the dollar 
that is relevant. The index (1981=100) is presented in table 1.3 below. 
It should immediately be added that while the deflator chosen appears 
appropriate for the purposes of the present study, it is not very 
meaningful for some other objectives. For example, while a time series 
of unit labor costs expressed in constant dollars gives one measure of 
the international competitiveness of the company studied, this series 
does not say much about the changes in welfare and consumption standards 
of the labor force. Local currency and local price indices would be 
needed to obtain the latter. The metric ton is the almost exclusive 
Table 1.3 The World Bank's Manufactured Exports Unit Value Index 
CIF, Expressed in US Dollars, 1981=100 
Source: World Bank Commodity Trade and Price Trends, 1982183 edition, 
updated and revised according to information received from 
the World Bank in April 1983. 
weight measure employed in this study. The only exception is that 
following the predominant practice of the trade literature, unit 
prices and costs of tin and copper are given per lb (454 grams). 
The present book makes no claim of presenting any definitive 
treatment of the subject chosen. To avoid exaggerated expectations 
and disappointments among readers, it is necessary to underline 
already in this introduction that the findings and conclusions of 
this study are highly tentative. As will appear in the next chapter, 
there is at present very little of established theory on state enter- 
prise in general, and the empirical support for the different theses 
that have been forwarded is typically scattered and unorganized. The 
above characterization of the state of the art certainly applies to 
the particular subject of state enterprises in the mineral industries. 
To my knowledge, work in this wide area is limited to the few contri- 
butions by Gillis, Labys, Mikesell and Vernon. 1 
The dearth-of earlier research by necessity makes the hypotheses 
formulated later in the present book highly preliminary. The limited 
data on state mineral enterprises makes empirical testing difficult. 
The three state corporate portraits presented in part I1 provide a 
1) M. Gillis, "Allocative and X-efficiency in State-owned Mining 
Enterprises", Harvard Institute for International Development, 
April 1979; 
M. Gillis and R.E. Beals, Tax and Investment Policies for Hard 
Minerals, Public and Multinational Enterprises in Indonesia, Ballinger 1980; 
W. Labys, "The Role of State Trading in Mineral Commodity Markets: 
Copper, Tin, Bauxite and Iron Ore", Les Cahiers du CETAI, No. 79-06, 
Montreal 1979; 
R.F. Mikesell, New Patterns of World Mineral Development, British 
North -American Committee, London 1979; 
R. Vernon, "State-owned Enterprises in Latin American Exports", 
in W. Baer and M. Gillis, Export Diversification and the New Protectionism, 
University of Illinois Press 1981; 
R. Vernon, "Uncertainty in the Resburce Industries: The Special 
Role of State-owned Enterprises", draft, Center for International Affairs, 
Harvard University, Jan 1982; 
R. Vernon and B. Levy, "State-owned Enterprises in the World Economy, 
The Case of Iron Ore", in L. Jones et al, public Enterprises in  evel lop in^ 
Countries, Oxford University Press 1982. 
narrow and not always clearly conclusive support to the hypotheses. 
Further research in this area is certainly warranted. Such research, 
based on a wider and longer evidence may well lead to an alteration 
of some of my findings and conclusions. Until such further research 
has been completed, however, the results of the present work constitute 
at least a preliminary step to a better understanding of the consequences 
of the recently established state ownership positions for international 
mineral markets. 
PART I . THE I S  SUES 
CHAPTER 2 .  THE NATURE OF STATE ENTERPRISE 
Def in i t i on  of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  
Economic a c t i v i t y  can be pursued by d i f f e r e n t  types  of agents .  
S t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i s  one such agent .  The concept"s ta te  e n t e r p r i s e '  
may mean d i f f e r e n t  t h ings  t o  d i f f e r e n t  people. The loose  d e f i n i t i o n  
1 given below fol lows c l o s e l y  t h a t  of G i l l i s ,  and i d e n t i f i e s  s t a t e  
e n t e r p r i s e  by th ree  key c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  The f i r s t  one c l a s s i f i e s  
t h i s  agent a s  p a r t  of t he  o v e r a l l  publ ic  a c t i v i t y  i n  soc ie ty .  I n  
the  second and t h i r d ,  t h i s  agent i s  d i s t ingu i shed  from o t h e r s  i n  
t h e  publ ic  s e c t o r  by i t s  e n t e r p r i s e  na ture :  
a .  The ownership/control  func t ion  
The government should be p r i n c i p a l  owner of t he  e n t e r p r i s e ,  
o r  otherwise have t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  exe rc i se  c o n t r o l  over t h e  broad 
p o l i c i e s  followed by t h e  e n t e r p r i s e ,  and have power t o  appoint  
and d ismiss  management. The ownership func t ion  unambiguously 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  from p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  The 
c o n t r o l  func t ion  a l s o  i d e n t i f i e s  a s  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  those 
opera t ions  where t h e  government does not  have formal majori ty 
ownership but  over which i t  exe rc i se s  po l i cy  and managerial 
con t ro l .  Such r i g h t s  t o  c o n t r o l ,  implying a  d i l u t i o n  of t h e  
p r i v a t e  ownership r i g h t s ,  may fo l low from l e g i s l a t i o n  o r  from 
nego t i a t ed  agreements with the  formal owners. 
b. The a c t i v i t y  func t ion  
The e n t e r p r i s e  should be engaged i n  t h e  production of goods 
and s e r v i c e s  f o r  s a l e  t o  the  pub l i c  o r  t o  o t h e r  e n t e r p r i s e s .  The 
a c t i v i t y  func t ion  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  from publ ic  
1 )  M. G i l l i s ,  "The Role of S t a t e  En te rp r i se s  i n  Economic Development", 
Harvard I n s t i t u t e  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Development, Discussion Paper No. 
83 ,  Feb. 1980. 
undertakings like courts, police, defence and fire protection, where 
outputs have far-reaching external effects. This renders them a 
character of public goods, and makes them unsuitable for direct 
sale to users. 
c) The revenue/cost function. 
This characteristic underlines the basically commercial 
nature of state enterprise. As a matter of policy, the sales 
revenues of the enterprise should bear a reasonably strong 
relation to cost. Thus, the postal services, or a subsidized 
public transport system, which differentiate their charges 
according to the costs of services rendered, would be classified 
as state enterprise. On the other hand, a public hospital charging 
a flat fee from its patients irrespective of the treatment require- 
ments, would not. 
Most literature on state enterprise starts out from the 
standard micro-economic paradigm on profit maximization, and seeks 
to identify the deviations from that paradigm characteristic of 
state-owned firms. Two categories of deviations are usually considered. 
The first one pertains to goals. State enterprise is often seen 
to pursue a broader set of goals than strict firm-related profit 
maximization. This may involve the inclusion of external effects in 
the objective function. Or else, profit maximization is pursued 
subject to the attainment of other objectives, e.g. in the fields 
of employment, income distribution or regional development, or in 
the rectification of existing market distortions. 
The second one pertains to the organizational structure 
typical of state enterprise. Thus, it is claimed that state 
enterprise will be less efficient than private enterprise in 
striving towards whatever goals it has chosen to pursue, be- 
cause of greater complexity of these goals, of the unclear 
principal-agent relationship, and of the lower pressure to 
minimize costs. More on this follows below. 
An alternative approach to the study of state enterprise 
would be to start out at a more basic level and to construct 
a paradigm specifically for state enterprise, independent of 
that which applies to the private profit maximizing firm. The 
literature on political science or on the grants economy 1 
might provide the building stones for this alternative construct. 
In what follows I propose to simplify my task by adopting 
the first approach. Thus, I will study state enterprise in terms 
of its deviations from the standard micro-economic private enter- 
prise paradigm. Apart from the desire to simplify, there are two 
reasons for this choice. First, the main thrust of the present 
work is in applied economics and not in the development of new 
theory that would be required for the establishment of an alternative 
paradigm. And second, the "deviations from profit maximization 
approach" appears especially appropriate for the task set out, 
namely to identify the differences between particular sets of 
state and private enterprises that operate in a given market. 
1) See for instance K. Boulding, The Economy of Love and Peace: A 
Preface to Grants Economics, Belmont, Wadsworth, California 1973. 
~otivations for the establishment of state enterprise 
State ownership of factors of production is the rule in 
socialist economies. No special motivations are needed to set up 
state enterprises in such economies. This section, therefore, is 
relevant only to market economies. In such economies private enter- 
prise is presumed to satisfy the need for production and distribution 
of goods and services in an economically efficient way. Only where 
private enterprise fails to accomplish this task, or where non- 
economic goals must be satisfied in the course of the production 
process, can there be a motivation to set up state-owned enterprises. 
In the following I propose to list and discuss briefly the 
various reasons used to justify the setting up of state enterprise 
in general, as discussed in the literature. The motives brought up, 
while pointing to problems that are not automatically attended to by 
private enterprise, do not imply that state enterprise provides the 
first best solution. Nor do they afford any definite assurance that 
state enterprise will actually function in the beneficial way suggested 
by theory. 
Market failure motivations for state enterprise 
When certain circumstances prevail, private enterprise in 
1 
competitive markets will attain Pareto optimal conditions. Under 
these conditions it is impossible to improve the utility of any agent 
in the market without reducing the utility of some other agent. I de- 
fine market failure as a circumstance where the market when left to 
itself fails to attain a Pareto optimum. Public action is then 
1) For the necessary preconditions see any standard micro-economic 
text, e.g. P.R.G. Layard and A.A. Walters, Microeconomic Theory, 
McGraw Hill, New York 1978. 
needed to rectify the detrimental consequences of the failure. 
The appropriate public action can take different forms. Setting 
up a state enterprise is one of several alternatives. 
Market failure can occur in the static and the dynamic sense. 
I start out by listing some of the static failures used to motivate 
the establishment of state enterprise. I then continue by discussing 
a few dynamic market failures. 
One kind of static market failure is where the Pareto optimal 
conditions are not attained because of uncompetitive market structure. 
Economies of scale constitute a common cause to oligopolistic or 
monopolistic market conditions. Other causes of market concentration 
include appropriable managerial, organizational, technical and na- 
tural resources, e.g. an established marketing and distribution 
system, patents or ownership of rich mineral reserves. Lack of 
competition may exist among sellers as well as among buyers in a 
market. The result of the market power may be a restriction of pro- 
duction, with excessive output prices or depressed input prices. 
Alternatively, the consequence could be internal inefficiency in 
some firms, resulting either from restricted access to technological, 
managerial and organizational inputs, or from lacking competitive 
pressure in the output market. 
The government can induce oligopolistic producers to behave 
competitively by entering the market and announcing that it will 
react to the private agents' output restrictions by expanding its 
own output, thereby driving prices to the competitive level. Or 
else, a more efficiently operating public enterprise can be set 
up to provide a yardstick for feasible improvements in the opera- 
tional standards of the private firm. 1 1 
1) F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 
Rand McNally 1980, p. 486 and 487. 
Alternatively, the government may decide to nationalize 
the entire sector and operate the state enterprises so as to 
avoid the socially undesirable output restrictions and excessive 
price and profit levels reaped by private oligopoly or monopoly. 
Instances of such state intervention are found in the field of 
utilities, telecommunication, some modes of transport, as well 
as in natural resource exploitation which derives high rents 
from rich intramarginal mineral deposits. State enterprise may 
be a less efficient tool in overcoming the deterimental effects 
of market failure, where the private monopoly is based on managerial 
or technical superiority obtained from sources internal to the 
firm and not available to the government. 
Another type of static market failure follows from economic 
externalities in a given production activity. Private enterprise 
will not attain the socially desirable output level where there are 
substantial positive externalities, and will exceed that level in 
the case of negative externalities. Production under public ownership 
or control, which takes account of social costs and benefits, can 
rectify the shortcomings of private enterprise in that case. 1 1 
Even where private enterprise can attain Pareto efficiency in 
the static sense, there may be an argument for the establishment of 
state enterprise, because of a dynamic market failure, where private 
firms are unable to realize potential future opportunities. 
Perhaps the most important dynamic market failure follows from 
excessive risk aversion and short-sightedness of private entre- 
1) F.L. Pryor,'Tublic Ownership: Some Quantitative Dimensions", in 
W.G. Shepherd, Public Enterprise, Economic Analysis of Theory and 
Practice, Lexington, London 1976. 
preneurs, which prevent them from entering into new acti- 
vities of which they have no experience, and which take a long 
time to mature. State involvement in setting up infant industries 
can be motivated where these circumstances prevail. 
Other features characterizing private entrepreneurship can 
lead to similar dynamic failures. In developing countries, habits may be 
difficult to change after independence, if, as has been common, the 
former colonial dominance restricted private national enterprise to the 
small scale sector only, and prevented it from endeavors in high technology 
ventures, or compelled the firms involved in exports and imports to trade 
with the colonial power only. On account of the colonial background, 
private entrepreneurs in developing countries may lack the inter- 
national outlook required to locate appropriate sources of techno- 
logy. Due to their small size and limited experience the entre- 
preneurs may also fail to strike reasonable bargains with foreign 
firms about essential input supplies. In such cases, the establishment 
of new state enterprises, backed up by the government's resources, and 
less tied down by colonial tradition, may be the fastest, or even the only, 
way to improve the nation's bargaining position, to establish large-scale 
or technically sophisticated activities, or to seek remunerative 
diversifications in the foreign trade relationships. 
Political motivations for state enterprise 
Even in market economies where private enterprise is seen to 
manage its tasks reasonably, and where, therefore, there are 
neither ideological nor economic pressures for wholesale natio- 
nalization, a number of cases can be singled out where state enterprise 
is established in response to particular political situations 
or because there is a perceived need for it as a tool in the 
pursuit of specific political aims. 
One such political condition has to do with national economic 
emancipation from colonial bonds following political independence. 
By far the most common circumstance in which state enterprise was 
established in developing countries has been the takeover of foreign 
ownership, with-no obvious national claimant to the assets in the 
private sector. This circumstance is not exclusive to the developing 
countries, however. In industrialized countries confiscation of foreign 
enterprise has taken place on many occasions, and especially after 
the great wars. In some cases the confiscated assets have remained 
permanently in government ownership. 
A political case for the establishment of state enterprise, 
both in industrialized and developing countries is often made where 
the economic activity appears to be so important that decisions 
taken by private enterprise could compromise the independence and 
freedom of action of the political system. Frequent examples of 
industries nationalized for this reason include weapons, airlines, 
and postal services. Many more examples can be found in developing 
countries, where individual enterprises in industries with scale 
economies regularly become so large in relation to the national 
economy as to constitute a potential political threat. 1 > 
Another related political motivation for the establishment 
of state enterprise is where the government is the major or even 
the sole buyer of the industry's output. Weapons and pharmaceutical 
1) F.L. Pryor, op.cit. 
products are two examples. Here, too, the political rationale 
is to reduce dependence on private enterprise decisions ,' but 
economic arguments based on advantages of vertical integration 
may add further support to the motivation for state ownership. 2 
In circumstances where for some reason the appropriate set 
of taxes and subsidies is not feasible, state enterprise is often 
established to provide a second-best tool for pursuing political 
and social goals like regional balance, promotion of the interests 
of suppressed racial groups, employment or redistribution of 
i n ~ o m e . ~  Such goals are related to but broader than the economic 
externalities discussed under the market failure heading above, 
and are not automatically attained by profit maximizing private 
enterprises in competitive markets. Thus, regional policies are 
pursued in many countries by directing the state-owned railway 
system to impose below-cost charges for transport in sparsely 
populated areas. An important aspect of labor market policies 
in some countries has been to protect the employment of failing 
private firms by government takeover and continued operations 
supported by public subsidies. 
1
Not many generalizations can be made about state enterprise, 
1) F.L. Pryor, op.cit. 
2) L. Jones and E.S. Mason, "The Role of Economic Factors in 
Determining the Size and Structure of the Public Enterprise Sector 
in Mixed Economy LDCs", in L. Jones et al, Public Enterprises in 
Developing Countries, Oxford University Press 1982. 
3) I.B. Sheahan, "Public Enterprise in Developing Countries", in 
W.G. Shepherd, editor, Public Enterprise, op.cit.. Also see 
S. Holland, "State Entrepreneurship and State Intervention", in 
S. Holland, editor, The State as Entrepreneur, Widenfelt and 
Nicholson, London 1972. 
a s  d i s t i n c t  from p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  Numerous except ions  a r e  
quoted i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  t o  most' of t h e  s ta tements  on t y p i c a l  
f e a t u r e s  of s t a t e  owned f i rms .  The fol lowing s e t  of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
condi t ions  under which s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  working, and t h e  
ensuing l i s t  of behaviora l  p a t t e r n s  have been s e t  ou t  t o  provide 
a  clear-cut  c o n t r a s t  w i th  p r i v a t e  p r o f i t  maximizing co rpo ra t ions .  
In  t h e  r e a l  world i t  w i l l  be found t h a t  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  c o n s t i t u t e  
a  continuum, with forms q u i t e  ak in  t o  p r i v a t e  co rpo ra t ions  a t  
one end, and e x h i b i t i n g  t h e  f u l l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o u t l i n e d  below, 
a t  t h e  o t h e r  extreme.. 
A common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i s  t h a t  
i t s  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  l e s s  c l e a r l y  s p e c i f i e d  than i s  usua l  
wi th  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  State-owned f i rms do not  e x i s t  s o l e l y  
t o  maximize p r o f i t s ;  they  have mul t ip l e  o b j e c t i v e s  r e f l e c t i n g  
c o n f l i c t i n g  p u b l i c  needs and p o l i t i c a l  p re s su re s .  These have 
a l r eady  been touched upon i n  t h e  preceding s e c t i o n  and may involve 
a  v a r i e t y  of s o c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  i nc lud ing  cons ide ra t ion  of 
e x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  concern wi th  e n t e r p r i s e  o r  n a t i o n a l  employment, 
income d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  r eg iona l  e q u a l i t y  and n a t i o n a l  sovere ignty .  
Ex i s t i ng  c o n f l i c t s  and t r a d e o f f s  between t h e  goa ls  have usua l ly  
not  been f u l l y  s o r t e d  ou t .  
Another f e a t u r e  t y p i c a l  of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i s  t h e  unc lear  
2 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between top  management and t h e  owner. I n  many 
1 )  Y .  Aharoni, "Managerial Discret ion1 '  i n  R. Vernon and Y .  Aharoni, 
"State-Owned En te rp r i s e  i n  t h e  Western Economies, Croom Helm, London 1981. 
2) i b i d .  Also s e e  D. Coombes, ?, 
Allen  and Unwin, London 1971. 
cases, the owner cannot be clearly identified, and certainly 
does not speak with one voice. The state commonly exerts its owner- 
ship rights through a variety of individuals and institutions. 
Different government departments or even individual politicians 
may attempt to extract political benefit by pressuring the state 
enterprise to interpret its objectives in a particular way, and to 
transact its business accordingly. Power politics in which manage- 
ment takes an active part, rather than corporate constitution, in 
many cases determine the broad policies pursued by the enterprise. 
There is a general tendency for state enterprise to operate 
under less stringent financial constraints than comparable private 
1 
units. Access to capital on advantageous terms can take a variety 
of forms: low cost credit made available by the ministry of 
finance; government guarantees for loans obtained from private 
sources; or the permission to issue tax-free bonds. State enterprises 
also commonly benefit from outright reductions in the normal tax 
burden and from a low pressure for dividends on equity.* Such 
arrangements obviously increase the cash flow. Simultaneously, the 
access of state enterprises to the purely commercial markets for 
risk capital is often restricted. This may result from the statutes 
under which they are operated, or from the less stringent requirements 
about returns on the capital that they employ. It follows that in the 
supply of capital to state enterprises, political factors will play 
a greater role and commercial considerations a smaller one, as compared 
to the situation in private profit maximizing corporations. 3 
1) W.S. Vickery, "Actual and Potential Pricing Practices Under 
Public and Private Operations", in W. Baumol, editor, Public and 
Private Enterprise in a Mixed Economy, Macmillan 1980. 
2) M. Gillis, "The Role of State Enterprises in Economic Development", 
op. cit . . 
3) Ibid. 
In the government, state enterprise regularly has a savior 
1 
of last resort. This constitutes a further distinction from private 
enterprise. Even if governments have frequently saved large private 
enterprises from bankruptcy and provided support for their continued 
life, there has never been any assurance that such support would be 
forthcoming. State enterprise in distinction, can be reorganized, 
merged or sold, but is in practice hardly ever allowed to default. 
Undercapitalization resulting from loss-making operations is regularly 
remedied through new financial infusions. 
Related to the survival assurance for state enterprise is the 
survival assurance granted to its management. Security of tenure for 
the top management in publicly owned firms is not absolute, but typically 
much greater than in private corporations. Contributing to this are the 
formal conditions providing job security to public servants, the govern- 
ment protection against discontinuation of activities through default, 
and the great difficulty to establish managerial failure when several 
goals are pursued at the same time. When managers are sacked, it is usually 
because they have fallen out of political favor, or broken some formal 
rules for public employee behavior. 
The five features characteristic of state enterprise identified 
above, viz a complex and blurred goal structure, an unclear relation- 
ship between top management and the owner, favorable access to financial 
supply, a virtual survival guarantee by the government, and managerial 
security of tenure, permit the derivation of specific state enterprise 
behavioral patterns in several fields. 
First, the combination of blurred objectives and unclear owner- 
ship roles provides the management with much greater discretion in 
1) M. Gillis, "The Role of State Enterprises in Economic Development", 
op.cit.. 
determining enterprise objectives than what is common in the private 
sector. Given the complexity of goals, and the variety of views 
among owner representatives on the weights to be attached to each, 
the management often finds considerable scope for delineating the 
goals to be pursued by the state-owned enterprise. Managerial 
discretion is further elhanced by the virtual impossibility of 
measuring performance, when goals are complex and the desired trade- 
offs between them remain unidentified. 1 
Second, and consequent on the above, there is typically much 
less pressure in state enterprise to minimize costs. This follows 
from the removal of profit maximization as the overriding objective 
of enterprise activities. The pressure towards cost minimization 
will be particularly low in the many natural monopolies where state 
enterprise activity is common. More generally, a blown-up cost level, 
or even an inability to cover costs with the sum total of sales re- 
venues and politically determined subsidies can always be justified by 
the pursuit of one or other social objective. If there are both legitimate 
and illegitimate reasons for the high costs, and no clear-cut way for 
distinguishing between the two, then an inadequate cost performance 
can always be excused. The knowledge that in the end almost any losses 
will be covered by the government budget to assure survival adds to 
the permissive view on costs in state enterprises. 
1) Y. Aharoni, "The State Owned Enterprise: An Agent Without a Principal", 
in L. Jones et al, Public Enterprises in Developing Countries, Oxford 
University Press, 1982. 
2) H. Leibenstein, "X-Efficiency and The Analysis of State Enterprise", 
in L. Jones et al, Public Enterprises in Developing Countries, Oxford 
University Press 1982. 
A third behavioral feature typical of state enterprises 
is that they operate under bureaucratic systems, ' where adherence 
to formal rules becomes more important than goal achievement, 
maximization of budget support or of operations replaces the 
2 
maximization of profit, and where decision-making and decision 
implementation tend to be slow.3 The bureaucratic characteristics 
would be most evident in those state enterprises which operate in 
shielded markets without competition. The emergence of such 
characteristics can partly be seen as a result of the control and 
supervision problems experienced by the owners. When measurement 
of performance is hard or impossible to undertake, there is a tendency 
to impose bureaucratic rules and procedures to assure that the acti- 
vity does not go completely astray. The bureaucratic climate tends 
to lead to a self-selectionin the managerial cadres. Efficient 
managers want to be judged and rewarded on the basis of their per- 
formance. When performance is difficult to measure, managerial 
reward will be based on other criteria, resulting in an exodus of 
4 the most efficient among them. Given the corporate climate, the 
ones who stay will, on average, have a stronger preference for 
political manipulation, a skill intensively used in state enter- 
prise, and a lesser cost consciousness, than managers in private 
enterprise. 
1) L. Jones and E.S. Mason, op.cit. 
2) W.A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine 
Atherton, Chicago 1971. 
3) A. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, Little Brown, Boston 1967. 
4) Y. Aharoni, "The State-Owned Enterprise: An Agent Without a 
Principal", op.cit. 
Considering t h e  above behaviora l  p a t t e r n s ,  t h e  f i n d i n g  t h a t  
s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  t y p i c a l l y  l e s s  p r o f i t a b l e  than  p r i v a t e  en t e r -  
1 
p r i s e s  i n  s i m i l a r  c ircumstances,  should no t  be  s u r p r i s i n g .  But it 
needs under l in ing  t h a t  t h e  l e s s e r  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  depends on two f a c t o r s .  
The f i r s t  and d e s i r a b l e  one i s  t h a t  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  may be per- 
forming some u s e f u l  s o c i a l  func t ion  f o r  which they a r e  not  f u l l y  
c r e d i t e d  i n  t h e i r  accounts .  The second and undes i r ab le  one i s  t h a t  
t hese  e n t e r p r i s e s  ope ra t e ,  on average,  a t  a lower l e v e l  of i n t e r n a l  
e f f i c i e n c y .  
A f o u r t h  behaviora l  p a t t e r n  of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  is t h a t  
production i s  commonly c a r r i e d  ou t  a t  a  h ighe r  l e v e l  of c a p i t a l  
i n t e n s i t y  than i n  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  This  ho lds  p a r t l y  because 
s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  tends  t o  be concent ra ted  i n  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  
s e c t o r s ,  where market f a i l u r e s a r e  more common. But even when 
t h e  same types  of a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  compared,the l e v e l  of c a p i t a l  
i n t e n s i t y  i s  t y p i c a l l y  h igher  i n  t he  state-owned u n i t s .  The 
heavy use of c a p i t a l  can be seen a s  a  r a t i o n a l  
adjustment by s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  t o  t h e  low c o s t  t h a t  they a r e  
charged f o r  i t .  I n  p a r t ,  however, t h e  h igh  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  
can be seen a s  an a t tempt  by management t o  i nc rease  i t s  
d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power. The government owners' a b i l i t y  t o  inf luence  
and d i r e c t  i s  g r e a t e s t  when the  f i r m  r e q u i r e s  a d d i t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  
i n fus ions  t o  cover ope ra t ing  l o s s e s .  A high  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y ,  
reducing t h e  r e c u r r e n t  c o s t  l e v e l ,  w i l l  diminish t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  
1)  H.G. Can and G. Dutto, "Financial  Performance of Government 
Owned Corporat ions i n  LDCs" IMF S t a f f  Papers ,  March 1968. 
2) M. G i l l i s ,  "The Role of S t a t e  En te rp r i s e s  i n  Economic Develop- 
ment", op . c i t .  
that such losses occur. The need to apply to the government 
for additional funds will consequently be less frequent. Politicians 
are often quite willing to play along in this game. Decisions about 
additional capital allocations to rescue or expand public enterprise 
activities are easier to take and render more political prestige than 
the painful and laborious task of assuring a more efficient utilization 
of the resources already at the state owned firms' disposal. 
A fifth and related behavioral feature of state e<terprise is 
that more capacity will be established than in private enterprise under 
similar circumstances. This follows, again, from the low cost of ca- 
pital, but also from the bureaucratic tendency of management to maxi- 
mize the volume of operations rather than profits. 
The function regularly assumed by the government as savior 
of last resort along with the security of tenure of management might 
lead one to deduce that state enterprise executives would be more willing 
to take risks than executives in private firms. Even though examples 
of extreme risk taking can be quoted (for example Pertamina in Indonesia), 
the bureaucratic tendencies and the ensuing managerial selection process 
pull in the opposite direction, and make the managements of state enter- 
prise more risk averse. No general conclusion can be drawn about the 
net impact of these opposing tendencies. 1 
In summary, then, the typical patterns of state enterprise be- 
havior include 
1. substantial managerial discretion in delineating enterprise goals; 
2. low pressure to minimize enterprise costs; 
3. bureaucratic-type organization; 
4. high capital intensity in operations; and 
5. overinvestment in capacity. 
1) M. Gillis, G.P. Jenkins and D.R. Lessard, "~ublic Enterprise Finance 
in Developing Countries: Towards a synthesis1', in L. Jones et al, 
Public Enterprises in Developing Countries, Oxford University Press 1982. 
However, it needs repeating that the characteristic feature of 
state enterprise, discussed earlier in this section, and the 
behavioral patterns summarized above, constitute an extreme 
case. In many instances, state enterprise goals will be strongly 
focused on profit maximization, cost consciousness will be high 
and access to capital will be only on commercial terms. At the 
same time several of the behavioral patterns typical of state 
enterprise, will tend to emerge also in private corporations in 
particular circumstances. For instance, the very large and well 
established private firms, with widespread ownership and substantial 
power over the markets in which they operate, frequently develop 
petrified bureaucratic organizational structures. The monopoly 
power of such firms permits their managements to relax cost control 
and to pursue objectives other than maximum return on employed 
capital. This suggests, first, that public ownership many not be 
the only factor conducive to the development of the traits identified 
as typical of public enterprise. Second, in the real world, the 
distinction between public and private firms is unlikely to be as 
sharp-edged as made out in the above discussion of the state enter- 
prise archetype. 
CHAPTER 3. STATE MINERAL ENTERPRISES I N  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
DEFINITIONS AND QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT 
The l a s t  chapter  began by providing a  broad d e f i n i t i o n  of 
s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  The p re sen t  chapter  has  two r e l a t e d  purposes.  
The f i r s t  i s  t o  narrow down the  above d e f i n i t i o n ,  and t o  make i t  
ope ra t iona l  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  s t a t e  mineral e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  developing 
count r ies .  The second i s  t o  employ t h a t  d e f i n i t i o n  i n  a  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
assessment of t he  prevalence and importance of such e  n t e r p r i s e s  . 
1. D e f i n i t i o n  of s t a t e  mineral  e n t e r p r i s e :  What i s  ownership 
and con t ro l ?  
The d e f i n i t i o n  of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  g iven  a t  t h e  o u t s e t  of t h e  
preceding chapter  had t h r e e  components. Two of them a r e  q u i t e  
unambiguous when it  comes t o  s t a t e  mineral  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  
developing coun t r i e s .  Without except ion,  such e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  
engaged i n  t he  product ion of goods and s e r v i c e s  f o r  s a l e  t o  t he  
pub l i c  o r  t o  o t h e r  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  and t h e i r  s a l e s  revenues do  bear  
a  reasonably s t rong  r e l a t i o n  t o  cos t .  It i s  i n  t h e  t h i r d  component, 
t h a t  of ownership and c o n t r o l ,  t h a t  ambigui t ies  a r i s e .  
Take the  concept of con t ro l  f i r s t .  This i s  c r u c i a l  f o r  the  
t a s k  a t  hand, s i n c e  c o n t r o l  r a t h e r  than formal ownership i s  t he  
key t o  t he  hypothesized d i f f e r e n c e  i n  behavior between s t a t e  and 
p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  The con t ro l  concept r a i s e s  some d i f f i c u l t  
d e f i n i t i o n a l  i s s u e s .  F i r s t ,  how does one draw the  l i n e  between 
t h a t  content  and degree of po l icy  and managerial  con t ro l  exercised 
by t h e  s t a t e  which warran ts  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  a s  s t a t e  mineral  e n t e r p r i s e ,  
and t h a t  which does n o t ?  Most developing country governments have become 
more economically i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  i n  t h e  p a s t  couple of decades. 
This  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  l a r g e  resource  p r o j e c t s  
w i th  a  heavy weight i n  t he  n a t i o n a l  economy. Does t h e  above 
economic po l i cy  t rend  imply t h a t  a l l  mineral  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  t h e  
most i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  developing coun t r i e s  should be r e c l a s s i f i e d  a s  
s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  even where they  cont inue  t o  b e  wholly p r i v a t e l y  owned? 
Even i f  t h e  answer t o  t h e  above were t o  be negat ive ,  t h e  implica- 
t i o n s  of t h e  gene ra l  po l i cy  change would be t o  b l u r  t h e  d i s t i n c -  
t i o n  i n  t h e  behavioral  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  between s t a t e  owned and 
p r i v a t e l y  owned e n t e r p r i s e .  
A second i s s u e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  concept of con t ro l  i s  t h a t  t h e  
degree of con t ro l  w i l l  be ve ry  hard t o  observe. One must d i s t i n g u i s h  
between t h e  degree of formal con t ro l  and t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which it i s  
exercised i n  p r a c t i c e .  Even where t h e  g w e r w e n t  has i n s t i t u t e d  
far-reaching r u l e s  t o  assure  i t s  i n f luence  over the  mineral  a c t i v i t y ,  
it may be unwi l l ing  o r  l ack  the  a b i l i t y  t o  exe rc i se  t h a t  in f luence  
i n  p r a c t i c e .  I n  some cases  t h i s  would be e a s i l y  no t i ceab le ,  f o r  
i n s t ance  where most of t he  c o n t r o l l i n g  powers have been handed over 
t o  a  p r i v a t e  corpora t ion  through a  management con t r ac t .  I n  most 
cases ,  however, t h e  determinat ion of t he  e x t e n t  of government con t ro l  
would r e q u i r e  in-depth s t u d i e s  of i nd iv idua l  mineral  e n t e r p r i s e s .  
For these  reasons ,  a  q u a n t i t a t i v e  assessment of s t a t e  en t e r -  
p r i s e ,  p r imar i ly  based on t h e  concept of con t ro l  would be q u i t e  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  undertake. It i s  t h e r e f o r e  no t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  most 
such assessments a r e  based on t h e  e x t e n t  of g w e r m e n t  equ i ty  
ownership r a t h e r  than of con t ro l .  The presumption i s  t h a t  there 
e x i s t s  a  c lo se  c o r r e l a t i o n  between ownership and con t ro l .  
The d e f i n i t i o n  of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  on the  b a s i s  of t h e  
government' s e q u i t y  holding, a1  though inf i n i t e l y  s impler  than 
that based on the concept of control, is not without complications. 
Owners are not always easily identified. For instance government equity 
may be held by institutions not unambiguously recognized as part of the 
state. Another problem arises in the common case where the mineral enterprise 
is jointly owned by private and public interests. One way to tackle this 
ambiguity is to define as state enterprise only those firms where govern- 
ment holds more than half of total equity. Another is to allocate capital 
assets, capacity, employment or production of each enterprise to the state 
and private sectors respectively, in accordancewiththeshares of the equity 
held by each. Depending on the choice of definition, there will be two 
different measures of the size of the state mineral sector. 
While inclusion of only majority-owned firms in the state enterprise 
category may seem too restrictive, the split-up of enterprises into state 
and private parts suggested in the preceding paragraph is somewhat un- 
satisfactory for the purposes of the present study. The basic hypothesis 
of this book is that there is a difference in the behavioral patterns 
between state and private enterprises. This hypothesis requires that each 
enterprise should be clearly identifiable as belonging to either of the 
two categories. 
Yet a third way to use equity ownership for enterprise classification 
is to include all enterprises with 'significant' government equity interest 
into the state enterprise category on the assumption that even a minority 
holding of equity along with the government's powers to design and implement 
general economic policies assures it of a high degree of influence and 
control over the enterprise. Even where the government does not use its 
powers overtly, its ownership involvement is sometimes seen to constitute 
a signal of interest, and intent to intervene when the need arises. The 
response of the private equity holders in such cases may be to accommodate 
the government in order to avoid confrontations that they know they could lose- 
3 4 
The full influence of the government may be completely covert in such 
cases. An equity holding of 5-10 % and upward is often considered 
'significant' in this context. 
This method, like the others, encounters problems. Thus, the degree 
of government involvement in a mineral enterprise where a 'significant' 
equity position is held by the public authorities, both overt and covert, 
may vary from complete to none at all, depending on the government's atti- 
tudes and competence. The degree of government involvement will also 
depend crucially on who the other equity holders are. Its ability to control 
will be greater where the equity is widely disbursed among the general public 
at home or abroad as compared to a situation where the majority is held by 
a powerful and experienced multinational mining corporation. 
The presumption of a close correlation between public ownership and 
exercise of control is not always valid. For instance, although the govern- 
ment holds some 20 % of the equity in the Bougainville copper mine in Papua 
New Guinea, more than one third of the equity in the uranium mines of Niger, 
' and around 50 % of the Lamco iron ore venture in Liberia, in none of these 
cases have the authorities exercised overtly their ownership powers to in- 
fluence the policies and operational modes of the three mineral firms. This 
contrasts with the case of Jamaican bauxite, where the government has been 
heavily interventionist even with the enterprises in which it holds less than 
10 % of the equity. But the difference in government behavior could of course 
also be due to the fact that the companies' foreign owners have chosen po- 
licies of accomodation in the first case, and of confrontation in the second. 
The conclusions of the above discussion are easily stated. 
The appropriate criterion to distinguish between state and private 
enterprise from the point of view of this study would be the 
extent of government control. The ambiguities of the gwernment 
control concept, and the immense measurement problems, make this 
criterion less suitable for quantitative assessments of state 
enterprise in the mineral sector. The measurement problem 
becomes much s impler  when gove rwen t  equ i ty  i s  used a s  the  
c r i t e r i o n  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  s t a t e  from p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  Even 
then ,  however, a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches can be used f o r  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
assessments,  and n e i t h e r  of them i s  f r e e  f r a u  ambigui t ies .  The 
s i z e  of t h e  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  universe  w i l l  v a r y  depending on 
whether i t  i s  def ined t o  inc lude  (a )  only t h e  f i r m s  t h a t  a r e  
100 % owned by government, (b) those where government holds  a  
ma jo r i t y ,  ( c )  a l l  t h e  u n i t s  i n  which i t  has  a  ' s i g n i f i c a n t '  e q u i t y  
p o s i t i o n ,  o r  (d) t h e  propor t ions  of i nd iv idua l  e n t e r p r i s e s  corre-  
sponding t o  t h e  gove rwen t  equ i ty  sha re  i n  each case .  
2. Some q u a n t i t a t i v e  assessments 
This s e c t i o n  p r e s e n t s  q u a n t i t a t i v e  assessments of t h e  s ign i -  
f i cance  of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  a  few important  minera l  markets.  
Most of t h e  f i g u r e s  provide a  snapshot view from a recent  yea r ,  
but  t he re  i s  a l s o  some d iscuss ion  of t h e  growth of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  
over time. Only t h e  Western World capac i ty  o r  product ion,  a s  t h e  
case  may be ,  i s  considered i n  t h e  assessments.  
~awi t e / a lumina /a luminum 
------------------I- 
Table 3.1 l i s t s  a l l  bauxi te  producing companies wi th  s i g n i f i -  
can t  government ownership. I t  w i l l  be seen t h a t  45 % 6f Western 
World capac i ty  has s i g n i f i c a n t  government ownership, bu t  t h a t  
t h e  share  drops t o  23 %, i f  only the  e n t e r p r i s e s  w i t h  ma jo r i t y  
government ownership a r e  included i n  t h e  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  
category. 
S t a t e  ownership i s  heavi ly  concentrated i n  t he  t h i r d  world. 
With the except ion of Yugoslavia, a l l  the  companies l i s t e d  i n  
Table 3.1 S ign i f i can t  Government Ownership i n  Western World Bauxite C a ~ a c i t v  1980 
Tota l  cap. Cov. equi ty  Cov. cap. Cap. v i t h  gov. equi ty  
000 tons share  X 000 tons above 50 X ,  000 tons 
Overall  Western World Capacity 92500 
(of which indeveloping countr ies)  (54000) 
Capacity v i t h  s i g n i f i c a n t  government equity:  
Country Company 
Afr ica  
Ghana B r i t i s h  A l .  Co. 
Guinea Guinea Baux. Co. 
Fr iguia  
Kindia Bauxite Off ice  
Asia 
-
Ind ia  Bharat A1 Co. 
Ind ia  A l .  Co. 
Madras A l .  Co. 
Indonesia Aneka Tambang 
Lat in  6 Central  America 
Braz i l  CB A 
Hineracao Rio Norte 
Guyana Guymine 
Jamaica Jamalcan 
Jamalco 
Kaiser Bauxite Co. 
Reynolds Baux. Co. 
Europe 
Turkey 
Yugoslavia 
Tota l  of above 41870 
(of which i n  developing countr ies)  (38370) 
Capacity with s i g n i f i c a n t  government equ i ty  
a s  a share of ove ra l l  Western World capaci ty  45.3 Z 
Source: UNCTAD TD/B/C,l/PSC/l9. August 1981 
t a b l e  3.1 a r e  l oca t ed  i n  developing coun t r i e s .  Out of t o t a l  
baux i t e  capac i ty  i n  t h e  t h i r d  world (54 m i l l i o n  tons)  s t a t e  
e n t e r p r i s e  accounts f o r  7 1  % on the  ' s i g n i f i c a n t '  ownership 
b a s i s ,  41 % on t h e  e q u i t y  propor t ion  b a s i s ,  and 33 % on t h e  
major i ty  equ i ty  b a s i s .  
The importance of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  t h e  baux i t e  i ndus t ry  
has c e r t a i n l y  been growing over time. Two f o r c e s  have been in- 
volved. F i r s t ,  t h e  state-owned s e c t o r  has  been expanded through 
t o t a l  o r  p a r t i a l  government takeovers .  Thus, a  complete nat iona-  
l i z a t i o n  of baux i t e  product ion i n  Guyana occurred i n  1971, while 
t he  government takeover of ma jo r i t y  sha re s  i n  Ka i se r ' s  and ~ e y n o l d s '  
bauxi te  opera t ions  i n  Jamaica d a t e s  back only t o  t h e  mid-1970's. 1 
As l a t e  a s  1970, the  indus t ry  was f u l l y  p r i v a t e l y  owned 'in both 
coun t r i e s .  The second f o r c e  explaining t h e  growing importance of 
s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  baux i t e  i s  t h a t  s eve ra l  of t he  c o u n t r i e s  with 
state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s  have had a  very  f a s t  expansion of t h e  
indus t ry .  This  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  of Guinea whose capac i ty  
increased about s i x f o l d  from 1972 till 1980, and f o r  Braz i l  where 
the  Rio Norte p r o j e c t  i n  Trombetas s t a r t e d  product ion a s  r e c e n t l y  
a s  1979, and i s  planned t o  expand capac i ty  from 3.4 m i l l i o n  tons  i n  1980 
t o  8  m i l l i o n  by 1983. 
Tables 3.2 and 3 . 3  l i s t  s t a t e  ownership i n  t h e  Western 
World alumina r e f i n i n g  and aluminum smelt ing i n d u s t r i e s  i n  an 
analogous manner. In  both ,  t h e  government shares  a r e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
lower than i n  bauxi te .  I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  case  of baux i t e  where 
s t a t e  ownership i s  by and l a r g e  a  developing country phenomenon, 
one ha l f  o r  more of t h e  s t a t e  owned capac i ty  i n  alumina and aluminum 
i s  loca ted  i n  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  coun t r i e s .  
1)  R. Mikese l l ,  New P a t t e r n s  of World Mineral Development, 
B r i t i s h  North American Committee, 1979. 
Table 3.2 S i g n i f i c a n t  Government Ownership i n  Western World Alumina R e f i n e r i e s  1980 
T o t a l  c a p .  Cov. e q u i t y  Gov. c a p .  Cap. w i t h  gov.  e q u i t y  
000 t o n s  s h a r e  X 000 t o n s  above 50 Z. 000 t o n s  
9 v c r a l l  Wcstcrn World Capac i ty  30792 
(of  which i n  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s )  (6526) 
Capac i ty  w i t h  s i b 1 - i f i c a n t  government e q u i t y :  
Count ry  l ompany 
A f r i c a  
Gu i n e a  F r i g u i a  
Asia  
-
I n d i a  Balco 
I n d a l c o  
Nalco 
L a t i n  & C e n t r a l  America 
Lraz il CBA 
Guyana Guymine 
J a m  i c a  Jamalcan 
Jamalco 
Europe 
FRG VAW 
VAW 
Euroal  lumina ( 1 ) 
-1'-  (2 )  
I t a l y  
Turkev 
Yugoslavia  
S e y d i s e h i r  
T o t a l  of above 
(o f  which i n  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s )  (3586) 
Capac i ty  w i t h  s i g n i f i c a n t  government e q u i t y  
a s  a  s h a r e  o f  o v e r a l l  Western World c a p a c i t y  24.2 X 
Source:  UNCTAD TD/B/C.l/PSC/l9. August 1981 
Table 3.3 S ign i f i can t  Government Ovnership in  Western World Aluminium Smelters 1980 
- .- 
Total  cap. Cov. equi ty  Gov. cap. Cap. v i t h  g o ~ .  equity 
000 tons share  X 000 tons above 50 X ,  000 tons 
Overall  Western World Capacity 14042 
(of vhich i n  developing coun t r i e s )  (2189) 
Capacity v i t h  s ign i f i can t  government equi ty :  
Country Company 
Africa 
E ~ Y  P t Egyptalum 
South Africa Alusaf 
Asia 
-
hahrain Alba 
Dubai Dubal 
India  Balco 
Indalco 
Nalco 
I ran I r a l c o  
Lat in  8 Central  America 
Brazil  CBA 
Venezuela Alcasa 
Venalum 
Europe 
Aust r ia  
ERG 
I t a l y  
Norway 
Spa i n  
Turkey 
Yugoslavia 
Raushof en 
VAW 
SAVA 
AL SAR 
ALUMETAL 
ASU 
Norsk Hydro 
DNN 
Endasa 
Alugasa 
A1 Espanol 
Seydisehir  
Total  of above 3198 
(of which i n  developing c o u n t r i e ~ )  (1320) 
Capacity v i t h  s ign i f i can t  government equ i ty  
as a share of ove ra l l  Western World capaci ty  22.8 X 
Source: UNCTAD TD/B/C.l/PSC/19, August 1981 
The r e l a t i v e l y  complex technology i n  a lumina r e f i n i n g  h a s  
p e r m i t t e d  t h e  aluminum m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  t o  keep a  f i r m e r  g r i p  o v e r  
t h i s  s t a g e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  a s  compared t o  b a u x i t e  mining and 
aluminum s m e l t i n g  .' This  e x p l a i n s  why government ownership i s  
a t  i t s  lowes t  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  of aluminum p r o d u c t i o n .  
I n  aluminum s m e l t i n g  t h e r e  i s  a s u b s t a n t i a l  s t a t e  ownership 
i n  Western  Europe. Some of  t h e  s t a t e  involvements  i n  t h i s  r e g i o n ,  
e . g .  i n  t h e  West German VAW, were  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  
p e r i o d  j u s t  a f t e r  t h e  second world  war .  I n  Norway, t h e  government 
became t h e  owner of t h e  ASU p l a n t s  i n  t h e  l a t e  1940 ' s  as a r e s u l t  
o f  c o n f i s c a t i o n  o f  German p r o p e r t y .  I n  I t a l y ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  
s t a t e  ownership a r o s e  o n l y  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1970 ' s  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n .  2 
Very s u b s t a n t i a l  l o c a t i o n a l  s h i f t s  have o c c u r r e d  i n  aluminum 
s m e l t i n g  d u r i n g  t h e  1970 's .  The o i l  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s  have induced 
t h i s  i n d u s t r y  t o  move on a l a r g e  s c a l e  t o  new l o c a t i o n s  where 
cheap energy cou ld  b e  a s s u r e d  f o r  t h e  h i g h l y  energy i n t e n s i v e  
i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  Many of  t h e  new s m e l t e r s  have been e s t a b l i s h e d  
under  government ownership.  T h i s  i s  t r u e  o f  t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  
i n  Egypt,  South A f r i c a ,  Bahra in ,  Dubai, I r a n  and Turkey,  l i s t e d  
i n  t a b l e  3 . 3 .  No s m e l t i n g  c a p a c i t y  e x i s t e d  i n  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  
1970. I n  Venezuela,  t h e  l a r g e - s c a l e  s m e l t i n g  c a p a c i t y  w i t h  heavy 
government p a r t i c i p a t i o n  d a t e s  back t o  1968 f o r  t h e  f i r s t  s m e l t e r  
(Alcasa)  and t o  1978 f o r  t h e  second one (Venalum). C l e a r l y ,  t h e  
state-owned aluminum s m e l t i n g  c a p a c i t y  has  exper ienced  a  f a s t  
growth s i n c e  t h e  l a t e  1960 ' s .  
1 )  R.G. Adams, ' S t r u c t u r a l  Change i n  t h e  World Aluminum I n d u s t r y ' ,  
p r e s e n t a t i o n  t o  t h e  Chase European Aluminum Seminar,  Zur ich  16 June  
1981. 
2 )  P r i v a t e  communication w i t h  Arne Axnas of GrZnges Aluminium, 
S u n d s v a l l ,  Sweden. 
A further boost to state ownership in the bauxite/alumina/aluminum 
industry occured in 1981, and is not reflected in tables 3.1-3.3. This 
was the nationalization of Pechiney-Ugine Kuhlman in France, one of the 
six leading multinational companies in the industry. In 1977, this com- 
pany owned 4.9 % overall bauxite capacity, 8.6 % of alumina capacity and 
6.8 % of aluminum capacity in the Western World. These figures include 
PUK'S proportionate shares of capacity in joint ventures. 1 
COEEI: 
Tables 3.4 through 3.6 provide the state ownership picture at three 
consecutive stages in Western World copper production. The differences 
between the alternative measures are much smaller in the case of copper 
than in aluminum. The state owned sector accounts for roughly one third 
2 
of copper mining and about one quarter of copper refining, irrespective 
which of the three measures is used. 
In line with conditions in bauxite, but in contrast to the situ- 
ation in alumina refining and aluminum smelting, state ownership at all 
stages of copper production is an almost exclusive developing country 
phenomenon. Finland and Yugoslavia are the only countries outside the 
developing country group with significant copper production under state 
ownership. The dominance of developing countries in the state-owned 
copper sector, in conjunction with the falling importance of the third 
world at the consecutive stages of. copper processing explains the mildly 
declining share of the industry under government ownership as one moves 
from mining to smelting and refining. 
1) Mineral Processing in Developing Countries, 
United Nations, New York 1980, Sales No. E.80.II.B.5. 
2) The Yugoslavian copper industry has been classified as state owned, 
though, strictly speaking, it is owned by its employees. 
Table 3.4 S ign i f i can t  Government Ownership i n  western World Copper !Lining Capacity,  end 1981 
T o t a l c a p .  ~ o v . e q u i t y  Gov.cap. C a p . w i t h g o v . e q u i t y  
000 tons share  Z 000 tons above 50 Z. 000 tons 
Overall  Western World capacity 7824 
(of which i n  developing countr ies)  (4118) 
Capacity v i t h  s i g n i f i c a n t  government equity:  
Country Company 
ALrica 
Botsvana S e l i b i  Pikve 
Morocco :'a ri ous 
Zaire Gecamines 
Sodimiza 
Zambia ZCCM 
Asia 
-
India  Iiindustan Copper 
Malaysia Mamu t 
Latin America 
Bol iv ia  Comibol 
Brazi l  Bras i l iana  de Cobre 
Min Sul Vicosa 
Codelco 
Enarni 
Macocosac 
Mexicana del Cobre 
Mina de Cananea 
Centromin 
Chile 
Mexico 
Peru 
Mineropen 
'Sceania 
Papua New Guinea Bougainville 
Europe 
Finland Outokumpu oy 
i s r a e l  T i w a  
Spain Apisa 
Turkey Black Sea 
Etibank 
Yugoslavia RTB Bor. Kapaonik, 
RB Bucim 
Other countr ies  
( a l l  developing countr ies)  
Tota l  of above 3170 
(of which i n  developing countr ies)  (3006) 
Capacity with s i g n i f i c a n t  government equi ty  
as  a share  of ove ra l l  Western World capaci ty  40.5 Z 
Source: CIPEC 
Table 3.5 Significant Government Ownership in Western World Copper Smelting end 1981 
Total cap. GOV. equity Gov. cap. Cap. with gov. equity 
000 tons share % 000 tons above 50 %. 000 tons 
Overall Western World capacity 8783 
(of which in developing countries) (3344) 
Capacity with significant government equity: 
Countq Company 
Africa 
Zaire Gecamines 
ZCCM Zambia 
Asia 
-
India Rindustan Copper 
Latin America 
Chile Codelco 
Enami 
Min. de Cananea 
Various 
Cent romin 
Mexico 
Peru 
Europe 
Finland 
Portugal 
Turkey Black Sea 
Etibank 
- - Murgul 
Yugoslavia RTB Bor 
Total of above 2691 
(of which in developing countries) (2524) 
Capacity with significant government equity 
as a share of overall Western World capacity 30.6 % 
Source: CIPEC 
Table 3.6 S ign i f i can t  Government Ownership i n  Western World Copper Ref iner ies  end 1981 
Total  cap. Gov. equi ty  Gov, cap. Cap. with gov. equi ty  
000 tons  share  X 800 tons above 50 Z, 000 tons  
Overall  Wcstcrn World capaci ty  9120 
(of which i n  developing countr ies)  (2578) 
Capacity with s i g n i f i c a n t  government equi ty :  
Country Company 
Afr ica  
Zai re  Gecamines 
Zambia ZCM 
Asia 
-
India  Hindustan Copper 
Lat in  America 
Chile Codelco 
Enami 
Mexico Colere de  Mexico 
klin de cananea 
Peru Centrornin 
Mineroperu 
Europe 
Finland Outokumpu oy 
Yugoslavia Rudarsko. Bor 
Tota l  of above 2365 
(of which i n  developing coun t r i e s )  (2130) 
Capacity with s i g n i f i c a n t  government equi ty  
as a share  of ove ra l l  Western World capaci ty  25.9 X 
Source: CIPEC 
The recency and f a s t  growth o f  t h e  s ta te  owned copper  
s e c t o r  i s  e a s y  t o  document: 
"At t h e  beg inn ing  o f  t h e  (1960's)  copper  p r o d u c t i o n  
i n  which government h e l d  any s o r t  of i n t e r e s t  d i d  n o t  
amount t o  more t h a n  100,000 t o n s  p e r  y e a r ,  o r  2.5 p e r  
c e n t  o f  c a p a c i t y  i n  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  ' f r e e  w o r l d ' .  By 1970, 
t h i s  t o t a l  had r i s e n  t o  some 2.25 m i l l i o n  t o n s ,  o r  a b o u t  
43 p e r  c e n t  o f  c a p a c i t y .  More t h a n  a q u a r t e r  o f  t h e  
w o r l d ' s  copper  was b e i n g  produced by mines t o t a l l y  owned 
by government, 12 p e r  c e n t  by companies i n  which t h e  S t a t e  
had a m a j o r i t y  i n t e r e s t ,  and 5  p e r  c e n t  by companies i n  
which government had m i n o r i t y  i n t e r e s t s " .  - 11 
Major f e a t u r e s  i n  t h i s  change, c ~ r o n o l o g i c a l l y  a r ranged ,  i n c l u d e  z 
(a)  t h e  complete  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  i n  1967 of Gecamines i n  
Zaire 
(b) t h e  5 1  % government t a k e o v e r  i n  1969 of t h e  ~ a m b i a n  
c a p a c i t y  and o f  t h e  l a r g e  mines  (Codelco) i n  C h i l e  
(c )  t h e  complete  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  i n  1971 o f  t h e  l a r g e  
mines (Codelco) i n  C h i l e  
(d )  t h e  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  i n  1974 of Cerro  de  Pasco i n  Peru ,  
subsequen t ly  renamed Centromin. 
( e )  t h e  s t a r t u p  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  1977 of  Cer ro  Verde 
(Mineroperu) a new s t a t e  owned mine i n  P e r u  
( f )  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  1979 of  t h e  government e q u i t y  s h a r e  
flrom 51  % t o  60 % i n  Zambia 
(g) t h e  s t a r t u p  of p r o d u c t i o n  i n  1980 i n  t h e  La Car idad  
mine (Mexicana d e l  Cobre) i n  Mexico, i n  which t h e  government 
h o l d s  44 % of  t o t a l  e q u i t y .  
1/ R. P r a i n ,  Copper,, Mining J o u r n a l  
- 
Books L td .  , London, 19 75. 
2 )  Based on M. Rade tzk i ,  ' copper  Dependent Development1, 
uNCTAD/LDC/~~, 12 June  1980; and CIPEC in format ion .  
Iron ore 
-------- 
The data on the iron ore industry state ownership that I have 
been able to find are less detailed than in the case of aluminum 
and copper. Table 3.7 contains figures on state ownership in the 
Western World. Only countries with government ownership have been 
listed. The percentages pertain to the government share of national 
production in 1981, and do not indicate the government share of 
equity in individual enterprises. The data therefore do not permit 
a quantification of production accounted for by units in which govern- 
ments hold a majority of the equity. 
The state-owned proportion accounts for 40 % of the Western 
World total, if production is apportioned to the governments in 
accordance with their equity holdings, about the same as in bauxite, 
but considerably higher than in the case of copper. The state-owned 
share, measured in the same way, amounts to 62 % when production in 
developing countries only is considered. 
The growth of importance of state owned enterprise in iron ore 
mining over time is illustrated by table 3.8 reproduced from a recent 
paper by Vernon and Levy.' The focus of this table is on the large 
and export oriented state owned firms. The Liberian operations have 
been 50 %-owned by the government since their establishment in the 
early 1960's. The Latin American and Mauretanian companies listed 
were transformed into state enterprises through nationalizations in 
the 1970's. The Brazilian CVRD has strongly expanded its share of 
world output by more than doubling its capacity in the course of 
the past decade. 
1) R. Vernon and B. Levy, 'state-owned enterprises in the world 
economy, the case of iron ore', in L. Jones it al, Public Enterprises 
in Develo~ing Countries. Oxford University Press 1982. 
Table 3.7 Western World I ron  Ore Gwernment Ownership 1981 
Government owner- 'Gwernment 
Product ion s h i p ,  sha re  of share '  of produc- 
m i l l i o n  tons ,  n a t i o n a l p o -  t ion ,  m i l l i o n  tons ,  
a c t u a l  w e i ~ h t  duc t ion .  % a c t u a l  weight 
Overa l l  TJcs t e r n  
World product ion  543.0 
(of which i n  
developing c o u n t r i e s )  (2 16.9) 
Countr ies  wi th  s ig-  
n i f i c a n t  government 
ownership : 
Afr i ca  
Alger ia  
L i b e r i a  
Mauretania 
S. Af r i ca  
Ind ia  40.0 5 0 
L a t i n  America 
Braz i l  
Chi le  
Peru 
Venezuela 
France 
Norway 
Aus t r i a  
Sweden 
Spain 
Turkey 
Pugoslavia  
Others  with s t a t e  
ovnership 5.9 
(of which i n  
developing c o u n t r i e s )  (2.4) 
Sum t o t a l  of above 301.8 
(of which i n  
developing coun t r i e s )  (205.4) 
Sum t o t a l  of above a s  
a  share  of o v e r a l l  55.6 % 
Western World product ion 
Source: Malmexport AB, Stockholm 
Table 3.8 Principal State-owned Ventures Exporting Iron Ore, actual weight 1978 
Date Established Iron Ore 
Name of as Production, 1978 
Establishment State Enterprise (in Thousands of Tons) Country 
Brazil Companhza Vale do 1942 
Rio Doce (CVRD) 
Luossavaara-Kiiru- 19071 1957 1/ 
navaara AB (LKAB) 
Sweden 
South African Iron 19 28 
& Steel Industrial 
Corporation (ISCOR) 
South Africa 
Lamco Joint Venture 1960 2/ Liberia 
Bong Mining Company 1963 2' 
India 3 / National Mineral 1958 
Development Corpor- 
ation (NMDC) 
Venezuela 
Chile 
C.V.G. Ferrominera 1974 
Orinoco S.A. 
~ompacza de Acero 1971 
del Pacifico S.A. 
(C.A.P.) 
Mauritania SociGtG Nationale 
Industrielle et 
Minisre (SNIM) 
Empresa Minera 
del Peru 
Peru 
1/ The Swedish government held 50 percent of the company's shares 
back in 1907; in 1957 the government took over the company entirely. 
21 The Liberian government has not attempted to exercise any control 
over these projects, which are effectively controlled by foreign partners. 
3 /  Along with the export operations listed here, iron ore mines captive 
to state-owned steel companies mine about 12 million tons of ore annually. 
Sources: Vernon and Levy, op.cit. 
Tin  
--- 
Even though I have  been  u n a b l e  t o  o b t a i n  d e t a i l e d  d a t a  on p u b l i c  
ownership i n  t h e  t i n  producing e n t e r p r i s e s ,  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  state p a r t i -  
c i p a t i o n  i n  t h i s  i n d u s t r y  i s  impor tan t  and growing. Tab le  3.9 
r e v e a l s  t h a t  f o u r  c o u n t r i e s  s i n c e  long dominate  world p r o d u c t i o n  
of t i n  c o n c e n t r a t e s .  These c o u n t r i e s '  s h a r e  of Western  World 
o u t p u t  was 81.0 % i n  1950 and 77.6 % i n  1980. 
Table  3 .9  P r o d u c t i o n  o f  T i n  Concen t ra tes .  
Thousand t o n s  of t i n  m e t a l .  
1950 1980 
Malaysia  58.5 61.4 
Thai  1 and 10.5 33.7 
Indones ia  32.6 32.5 
Bo 1 i v  i a  31.7 27.5 
T o t a l ,  4  c o u n t r i e s  133.3 155.1 
T o t a l  Western  World 164.5 199.8 
Source: M e t a l l g e s e l l s c h a f t .  
I n  t h e  former y e a r  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  p roduc t ion  c a p a c i t y  i n  t h r e e  of 
t h e  f o u r  c o u n t r i e s  was i n  p r i v a t e  hands.  The e x c e p t i o n  was I n d o n e s i a  
where t h e  Dutch c o l o n i a l  government was a m a j o r i t y  owner of t h e  
t i n  i n d u s t r y .  Impor tan t  s t r u c t u r a l  changes have o c c u r r e d  s i n c e  
t h a t  t i m e .  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  was t h e  1952 n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of t h e  
t h r e e  major t i n  mining g roups  i n  B o l i v i a .  Comibol, t h e  s t a t e  
t i n  company h a s  s i n c e  t h e n  accounted f o r  between two t h i r d s  and 
I t h r e e  q u a r t e r s  of t h i s  c o u n t r y ' s  o u t p u t .  I n  I n d o n e s i a ,  t h e  e n t i r e  
i n d u s t r y  was n a t i o n a l i z e d  i n  t h e  1950s,  and even though some p r i v a t e  
1 )  J .  Thoburn, ' P o l i c i e s  f o r  T in  Expor te r s ' ,Resources  P o l i c y  
June  1981; and J. Thoburn, M u l t i n a t i o n a l s ,  ?lining and Development, 
A Study of t h e  T i n  I n d u s t r y ,  Gower Pub l i sh ing  Co., 1981. 
e n t e r p r i s e s  have reemerged. in t h e  1970s, t h e  s t a t e  t i n  corpora t ion ,P .T .  
Timah, accounted f o r  80 % of t he  n a t i o n a l  t i n  output  i n  1980. 1 
I n  Malaysia t he  government has  taken far-reaching s t e p s  i n  t h e  
course of t h e  1970s t o  acqu i r e  important e q u i t y  p o s i t i o n s  i n  t h e  
n a t i o n ' s  t i n  e n t e r p r i s e s .  According t o  Thoburn, t h e  Malaysia 
Mining Corporat ion,  i n  which t h e  government has  a  71 % ownership 
p o s i t i o n ,  c o n t r o l s  over 25 X of t h e  count ry ' s  t i n  output .  Thoburn 
a l s o  no te s  t h a t  t h e  governments of Niger ia  and Za i r e  have r e c e n t l y  
acquired l a r g e  equ i ty  s t a k e s  i n  t h e  formerly f o r e i g n  owned t i n  
3 
mines. These two coun t r i e s '  share  of Wzstern World output  i n  1980 
amounted t o  about 3  2.  
The above f i g u r e s  suggest  t h a t  s t a t e  ownership i n  Western 
World t i n  i n d u s t r y  increased  from c l o s e  t o  n i l  i n  1950 t o  a t  l e a s t  
30 X i n  1980. 
Other minera ls  
----------- 
I n  terms of va lue ,  t h e  fou r  minera ls  t r e a t e d  above r ep resen t  
two t h i r d s  o r  more of t h e  v a l u e  of a l l  metal  minera ls  i n  t h e  
world economy. Though t h e r e  i s  no scope f o r  making t h e  p re sen t  
survey exhaus t ive ,  a  few i n d i c a t i o n s  w i l l  be given about t h e  
condi t ions  i n  some a d d i t i o n a l  metal  minera l  i n d u s t r i e s .  
Cobalt  p re sen t s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  case  with a  very h igh  sha re  
of ou tput  accounted f o r  by s t a t e  owned f i rms .  Western World pro- 
duc t ion  i n  1978 amounted t o  21,800 t o n ~ . ~  The f o u r  coun t r i e s  
1)  See chapter  5.  
2) J. Thorburn, Mul t ina t iona l s ,  ~ i n i n g  and Development ..., 1981, 
op. c i t .  
3)  J .  Thoburn, P o l i c i e s  f o r  Tin Exporters ,  Resources Pol icy ,  
June 1981. 
4) US Bureau of Mines, Mineral Fac ts  and Problems 1980 e d i t i o n .  
l i s t e d  i n  t a b l e  3.1Q, a l l  wi th  ma jo r i t y  owned s t a t e  companies 
producing t h e  metal ,  accounted f o r  80 % of t he  t o t a l .  The s t a t e  
owned sha re  was a s  high a s  66 % even when only t h e  f i r m s  t h a t  a r e  
100 % s t a t e  owned a r e  included. The except iona l ly  h igh  s t a t e  s h a r e  
fo l lows  from t h e  unique p o s i t i o n  of Za i r e  which accounts f o r  
Table 3.10 Government Ownership i n  Cobalt  Product ion i n  Some 
Countr ies  
1978 output  Government e q u i t y  
thousand tons per cen t  share  
Za i r e  
Zambia 
Finland 
Morocco 
100 
51 ( increased  t o  60 Z 
i n  1979) 
8  1 
100 
Sources: US Bureau of Mines, Mineral I n d u s t r i e s  of Af r i ca ,  1976. 
US Bureau of Mines, Mineral F a c t s  and Problems, 1980 e d i t i o n .  
Outokumpu Annual Report, 1981. 
more than  h a l f  of Western world output ,  a l l  through a  s i n g l e  company, 
Gecamines, t h a t  was f u l l y  na t iona l i zed  i n  1967. 
I n  lead and z inc  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  has  been assessed  t o  account 
- -
1 f o r  20-25 % of o v e r a l l  equ i ty .  This  r e l a t i v e l y  low s t a t e  involve- 
ment i s  p a r t l y  explained by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a  v e r y  l a r g e  share  of 
Western World capac i ty  i s  l oca t ed  i n  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s .  
S t a t e  ownership i s  a l s o  q u i t e  l imi t ed  i n  n i c k e l ,  where about 
85 % of Western World output  i s  accounted f o r  by p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  
No n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  has occurred i n  t h i s  i ndus t ry  a f t e r  the  one i n  
Cuba i n  1960. About ha l f  of t he  t h i r d  world 's  n i c k e l  ou tput  comes 
from the French t e r r i t o r y  New Caledonia,  where t h e r e  i s  some French 
1) S. Har r i s ,  'The Comodi t i e s  Problem and the  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic 
Order: What Rules of What Game?', i n  M.P. Oppenheimer, e d i t o r ,  
I s sues  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economics, O r i e l ,  London 1980. 
government participation. A government enterprise in Indonesia, 
Aneka Tambang, accounts for about 5 % of total Western World out- 
1 put. Also, governments have taken some equity in a few smaller 
ventures in developing countries that went into production in the 
late 1970's. In chromium and molybdenum, likewise, publicly owned 
production units play a limited role, with private enterprise 
accounting for about three quarters of overall production in the 
Western World. 2 
The results summarized 
------------------ 
Though highly incomplete and somewhat ambiguous, the data 
contained in this section clearly point to at least three general 
conclusions. First, state equity ownership is very substantial in 
the Western World mineral industries. Second, it appears that 
state ownership is most prevalent in the developing countries. 
In several minerals, state enterprises constitute the dominant 
component of third world capacity. And third, the data show that 
state ownership has been fast expanding over the past decades. 
It has grown from relative insignificance in the early 1950's to 
the important position it holds 30 years later primarily through 
a combination of nationalizations of existing privately owned 
firms and substantial government participation in joint ventures 
with mining multinations in the development of new capacity. 
1) R. Mikesell, New Patterns of World Mineral Development, 
British North American Committee, 1979. 
2) Ibid. 
CHAPTER 4.  STATE ENTERPRISE I N  THE MINERAL SECTOR: DISTINGUISHING 
BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS AND HYPOTHESES ON MARKET IMPACT 
S t r u c t u r e  of chap te r  
The purpose of t he  p re sen t  chapter  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of chapter  2,  
i . e .  t o  d e l i n e a t e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a t u r e s  of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  But 
whi le  chap te r  2 d e a l t  w i th  t h e  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  phenomenon i n  gene ra l ,  
t he  themes t o  be pursued p r e s e n t l y  a r e  pinpointed s p e c i f i c a l l y  a t  t h e  
s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  t h e  mineral  s e c t o r s  of developing coun t r i e s .  
The chapter  proceeds as  fol lows.  I s t a r t  ou t  by b r i e f l y  d i s -  
cussing the  mot iva t ions  f o r  the  es tab l i shment  of s t a t e  mineral  en t e r -  
p r i s e s .  The subsequent s e c t i o n  analyzes t h e  behaviora l  p a t t e r n s  of such 
e n t e r p r i s e s .  To provide a r e f e rence  po in t ,  i t  begins by c l a r i f y i n g  
some of t h e  key behaviora l  f e a t u r e s  of p r i v a t e  mu l t ina t iona l  mining 
companies. The mature s t a t e  minera l  f i rms  and t h e  new and inexperienced 
ones a r e  then t r e a t e d  i n  turn .  The r e s u l t s  and conclusions of t h i s  dis-  
cuss ion  a r e  used a s  an inpu t  i n  t h e  l a s t  s e c t i o n  where some hypotheses 
on the  market impact of t he  emergence and growth of s t a t e  ownership i n  
t h e  mineral  i n d u s t r y  a r e  formulated. 
Motivat ions f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  s t a t e  mineral  e n t e r p r i s e  
Severa l  bu t  no t  a l l  of t h e  motivat ions f o r  s e t t i n g  up s t a t e  en t e r -  
p r i s e s i n  market economies, analyzed i n  chapter  2, a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  
emergence of s t a t e  ownership i n  t h e  mineral  s e c t o r  i n  developing 
coun t r i e s .  These w i l l  be  p r e s e n t l y  discussed.  It needs r epea t ing  t h a t  
t h e  establ ishment  of state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s  does not  n e c e s s a r i l y  
r ep re sen t  the  f  i r s t - b e s t  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  problems which i n i t i a l l y  moti- 
va t ed  p u b l i c  ac t ion .  It must a l s o  be underl ined t h a t  even where t h e  problems 
experienced can i n  p r i n c i p l e  be tackled  wi th  the  h e l p  of state-owned 
e n t e r p r i s e s ,  t h e r e  i s  no guarantee  t h a t  p u b l i c  ownership w i l l  i n  
p r a t i c e  lead  t o  t h e  d e s i r e d  so lu t ions .  
The s i z e  and importance of t h e  mineral  s e c t o r  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
economy i n  many cases  c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  major motivat ion t o  t h e  wave 
of n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s  of mineral  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  deve,loping coun t r i e s  
i n  t h e  1955-1975 per iod .  Frequent ly,  n o t  only t h e  minera l  s e c t o r ,  
bu t  a l s o  t h e  leading e n t e r p r i s e s  p f  which i t  was composed were s o  
l a r g e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  GNP t h a t  fo re ign  ownership and c o n t r o l  appeared 
p o l i t i c a l l y  i n t o l e r a b l e  t o  t h e  r e c e n t l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  independent govern- 
ments. Na t iona l i za t ion  became a  key man i f e s t a t ion  of t h e i r  increas ing  
economic emancipation. 
I n  p r i n c i p l e ,  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  could have involved the  t r a n s f e r  
of fo re ign  ownership i n t o  e i t h e r  p r i v a t e  o r  p u b l i c  n a t i o n a l  hands. 
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  s h i f t  almost i nva r i ab ly  involved t h e  s e t t i n g  up o f .  
pub l i c  e n t e r p r i s e  t o  run t h e  na t iona l i zed  minera l  i ndus t ry .  Two 
f a c t o r s  exp la in  t h e  p re fe rence  f o r  t h e  pub l i c  so lu t ion .  F i r s t ,  a t  
t h e  t ime of n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i n  developing coun t r i e s  
r egu la r ly  lacked the  en t r ep reneur i a l  t r a d i t i o n  and exper ience  requi red  
t o  t a k e  on t h e  complex t a s k s  of managing t h e  mineral  ventures .  S t a t e  
ownership was seen  t o  provide b e t t e r  prospec ts  f o r  l i m i t i n g  t h e  tech- 
n i c a l  i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  a f t e r  takeover .  The second f a c t o r  has t o  do with 
p o l i t i c a l  i deo log ie s .  S o c i a l i s t  l ean ings  have been q u i t e  common 
among developing country governments during t h e  per iod .  The p o l i t i c a l  
goa ls  f r equen t ly  encompassed t h e  c r e a t i o n  of a  s t rong  p u b l i c  s ec to r .  
Publ ic  ownership of t h e  na t iona l i zed  mineral  i n d u s t r i e s ,  t he re fo re ,  
f i t t e d  we l l  i n t o  t he  p reva len t  p o l i t i c a l  philosophy. 
The desire to pursue socio-political goals with the mineral 
enterprises as instruments has constituted another motivation for 
state ownership. 'Nationalization has often been justified by the 
insensitivity of the private owners to a variety of social needs. 
Public ownership has been seen as a necessary prerequisite for the 
pursuit of policies to enhance employment, reduce income inequalities 
and promote the development of backward regions, because such objec- 
tives, though considered of high social benefit, did not enhance the 
mineral enterprises' profits as traditionally measured. This motiva- 
tion has been quite important even where the mineral sector has been 
small in relation to the national economy. For although the national 
impact of the mineral firms' policies would be limited in such cases, 
the typical geographical concentration of the mineral ventures makes 
their policies overwhelmingly important at the regional level. 
Uncompetitive market conditions have pr0vided.a further motiva- 
tion for state ownership in developing countries' mineral sectors. 
Two distinctly different cases of absent competitiveness have been 
common. The first one pertains to the monopsony power of the firm(s) 
as buyer of inputs in the domestic market. The importance of the 
mineral sector in the overall economy and its highly specialized needs 
have often made it a dominant and sometimes sole buyer of many domes- 
tic supplies. The argument applies not only to physical inputs but 
also to the specialized labor used by the mineral firms. Transfer of 
ownership into public hands has then been seen as a measure to over- 
come the depressed input prices that result from the buyers' market 
power, or alternatively to let the government benefit from the monop- 
sony profits. 
The second case is less general and pertains to the.absence of 
competitiveness on the selling side. In the longer run it does not 
apply to the unintegrated mineral producer who faces a fierce rivalry 
from other producers of the same commodity in the world market, and 
from substitute products. In contrast, the output and pricing decisions 
for mines in developing countries belonging to vertically integrated multi- 
national resource companies are internal to the firms and may run 
counter to the interests of the nation. Such circumstances provide a 
rationale for putting the units in the developing countries under public 
national ownership. 
A final motivation for state ownership is that sizable mineral 
rents frequently arise from mineral exploitation. In principle, the 
rents could be taxed away from the private owners. In practice such 
rent appropriation is often difficult and the private owners may use 
the rent that accrues to them for purposes contrary to the government 
wishes. State ownership is then seen as a means to assure the govern- 
ment of full control over the use of rent proceeds. 
The above discussion has been primarily concerned with the moti- 
vations for state takeover of existing foretgn-owned mineral enter- 
prises in developing countries. But the same arguments apply in equal 
measure as motivations for public ownership, exclusively or partially 
through joint ventures, in the new projects that have been launched 
since the mid-1960's. 
The behavioral patterns of state mineral enterprises in developing 
countries 
The purpose of this section is to identify the major behavioral 
features that distinguish state-owned mineral enterprises in developing 
countries from the private mining multinationals. Systematic empirical 
evidence on state-owned mineral e n t e r p r i s e  i s  scarce .  One of the  major 
purposes of the  p resen t  book i s  t o  provide some such evidence. This i s  
done i n  the  following chapters  which contain p o r t r a i t s  of t h r e e  pub l i c  
mineral corporat ions domiciled i n  the  t h i r d  world. I n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  
of t h i s  m a t e r i a l ,  t he  present  sec t ion  summarizes my i n s i g h t s  and con- 
c lus ions  on the  i s s u e  a t  hand, gained both from studying e x i s t i n g  
l i t e r a t u r e  on t h e  s u b j e c t ,  and from c lose  observat ion over  a  number 
of years  of the opera t ions  of the mineral  indus t ry  i n  p r a c t i c e .  
To ob ta in  a  po in t  of depar ture  f o r  the  ana lys i s  of the  pub l i c ly  
owned u n i t s ,  I s t a r t  out by b r i e f l y  describing the  key c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
and opera t ional  modes of the  p r i v a t e  mining mul t ina t iona l s .  I then 
continue by analyzing the behaviora l  p a t t e r n s  of the  mature s t a t e  
mining corporat ions and of the  r e c e n t l y  e s t ab l i shed  inexperienced ones, 
respect ive ly .  
Like i n  chapter  2 ,  the  approach adopted i n  t h i s  sec t ion  i s  t o  
de l inea te  the archetype of the  p r i v a t e  and state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s  
r e spec t ive ly ,  thereby providing a maximum con t ras t  between them. 
Empirical observat ion i s  l i k e l y  t o  show t h a t  such extremes a r e  uncommon 
and t h a t  numerous mineral  e n t e r p r i s e s  combine t r a i t s  from both arche- 
types. 
The p r i v a t e  mul t ina t iona l  mineral f i rm 
---- ............................. 
The overr iding ob jec t ive  of the p r i v a t e  mul t ina t iona l  mineral 
f i rm i s  long run p r o f i t  maximization subjec t  t o  avoidance of excessive 
r i s k s .  This ob jec t ive  i s  t o l e r a b l y  clear-cut ,  and can be  i n t e r p r e t e d  
i n  opera t ional  terms without undue d i f f i c u l t y .  
The l i n e s  of cormnand and the  r e l a t ionsh ips  between management 
and owners i n  the mul t ina t iona l  mining corporat ions a r e  commonly 
reasonably s t ra ight forward .  The management i s  h i r e d  t o  ensure t h a t  
the  f i rm ' s  objec t ives  a r e  a t t a ined .  Remuneration of managerial personnel 
and i t s  s e c u r i t y  of tenure i s  r e l a t e d  t o  p r o f i t  performance. This assures  
a  downward pressure  on cos t s .  The f i rm t y p i c a l l y  has acquired 
considerable experience i n  mining and mineral processing long before it 
developed i n t o  a mul t ina t ional .  I ts  personnel cadres include the 
exper t i se  required f o r  the  e f f i c i e n t  development of mines, running of 
mineral production operat ions and world-wide marketing of the  output.  For 
these  reasons; i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  i n t e r n a l  t o  t h e  f i rm would usual ly  be l imi ted ,  
and most.of the  f e a s i b l e  mineral r e n t  would emerge a s  before-tax p r o f i t .  
However, the mul t ina t ional  na tu re  of the  e n t e r p r i s e  o f f e r s  considerable scope 
f o r  a  geographical separa t ion  between the  p r o f i t s  and the  a c t i v i t y  from 
which they a r e  derived. 
The ob jec t ive  of p r o f i t  maximization implies capaci ty  u t i l i z a t i o n  
up t o  the l eve l  where marginal cos t  equals p r i ce .  Capacity u t i l i z a t i o n  
w i l l  be high during booms when p r i ces  a r e  e levated ,  bu t  w i l l  be reduced 
during recess ion i n  consequence of f a l l i n g  p r i ces .  The higher the  pro- 
port ion of  va r i ab le  c o s t ,  the  g r e a t e r  w i l l  be the  optimal output reduc- 
1 t i o n  i n  response t o  a  f a l l  i n  p r i ce .  Quite frequently,  the  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  
mineral industry i s  o l ' igopo l i s t i c ,  and the re  i s  some t a c i t  understanding among 
major producers t h a t  a l l  w i l l  benef i t  from production cuts  during 
recessions.  In  such cases ,  t h e  mul t ina t ional  mining f i rm would a d j u s t  
output even f u r t h e r  downward, t o  the  l e v e l  where marginal cos t  equals 
a  not ional  marginal revenue derived on the  assumption t h a t  i t s  major 
r i v a l s  ad jus t  output i n  a  coordinated way. 
Cur ta i led  capacity u t i l i z a t i o n  involves a propor t ional  reduc- 
t i o n  i n  a l l  va r i ab le  c o s t s ,  except where the recession i s  deemed t o  
be temporary, and the  s t a r t u p  cos t s  of c e r t a i n  functions a r e  so  high 
1)  F. M. Scherer,  I n d u s t r i a l  Market S t ruc tu re  and Economic Performance, 
Rand McNally 1980, pp.205-209. 
that it is more economical to keep them operational throughout the 
recession. For instance, unskilled workers will be more readily 
dismissed, but skilled personnel may be maintained in view of the 
spending on their training, and the risk that they may not return 
once they have been fired. 
The flexibility of the multinational firm to adjust capacity 
utilization in response to variations in demand may be. reduced by 
government legislation that restricts the freedom to lay off workers 
or by selective government subsidies provided to keep the capacity 
fully operational. Such government measures will be most common 
where the mineral activity weighs heavily in the region of its location. 
The firm's investments are constrained by its financial capacity. 
A heavy investment program will strain the:'financial resources, 
increase the debt-equity ratio, and raise the cost of obtaining 
additional debt financing. Apart from this rise in the cost of 
finance, there will be a reluctance internal to the firm, to allow 
the debt-equity ratio to increase above some threshold level because 
of the mounting risk of financial failure involved in high debt- 
gearing. 
Potential mineral investment ventures with expected after-tax discounted 
cash flow (DCF) rates of  return on equity above some "normal" .return on 
capital in industrialized countries, will be ranked according to their 
respective return levels. Priority will be given to the ones with 
the highest after-tax return, with some side-conditions to satisfy 
the avoidance-of-risk criterion. For instance, in calculating the 
rate of return for individual ventures, the company may adjust down- 
wards the anticipated revenue from projects in developing countries, 
to account for the political risk of nationalization, of a s.udden 
and drastic change in the fiscal regime or of other political measures 
t h a t  reduce i t s  product ion and supply c a p a b i l i t y .  To reduce the  d e t r i -  
mental imp l i ca t ions  t o  i t s e l f  of such p o l i t i c a l  r i s k ,  t h e  f i r m  w i l l  
f avo r  a  wide geographical  spread of i t s  investments i n  developing 
coun t r i e s .  I n  a  ranking of p o t e n t i a l  ven tu re s ,  t h e  downward adjustment 
of a n t i c i p a t e d  revenues i s  l i k e l y  t o  be e s p e c i a l l y  l a r g e  f o r  those  
loca t ed  i n  developing coun t r i e s  where t axes  a r e  high,  p o l i t i c a l  condi- 
t i o n s  a r e  deemed uns tab le ,  and where the  company a l r eady  has substan- 
t i a l  investment involvements. S imi l a r ly ,  t h e  company would tend t o  
make an upward adjustment i n  t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  revenues from p r o j e c t s  
t h a t  i n c r e a s e  t h e  e x t e n t  of i t s  v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n .  This  i s  because 
such i n t e g r a t i o n  i s  seen t o  involve  t h e  b e n e f i t  of secur ing  downstream 
markets,  and hence of reducing t h e  commercial r i s k  of marketing. This 
may exp la in  t h e  prevalence of v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  i n  mu l t ina t iona l  
mining f i rms .  
I n  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  mineral  markets ,  t he  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  
f i rm  w i l l  a s  a  r u l e  a l s o  be  cons t ra ined  i n  i t s  investment programs by 
a  t a c i t  understanding t h a t  i t s  competi tors  a r e  s i m i l a r l y  cons t ra ined  
i n  a  j o i n t  e f f o r t  t o  r e s t r i c t  long-run supply t o  a  l e v e l  a t  which 
p r i c e s  cover  c o s t s  and provide an adequate r e t u r n  on equ i ty  t o  t h e  
marginal  venture.  This ,  of course,  does not  preclude aggress ive  
behavior  by ind iv idua l  f i rms i n  t h e  process  of expanding t h e i r  market 
sha re s .  
Even where such t a c i t  understanding i s  absent ,  t h e  expansion 
of t h e  indus t ry  a s  a  whole w i l l  be cons t ra ined  by the  f i n a n c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  concerned about problems of debt  repayment i n  a  s i t u a t i o n  
of oversupply and low p r i c e .  
The mature state mineral firm 
........................... 
This sub-section discusses the seasoned state mineral firm 
that has been in business for a long period of time and that does not 
suffer from inefficiency due to inexperience. Examples of mature 
state-owned mineral corporations include CVRD in Brazil, Codelco in 
Chile and PT Timah in Indonesia. The newly set up state companies 
with limited experience in the mineral business are discussed in the 
following sub-section. 
Like the private multinational, the experienced state owned 
corporation would have built up an in-house availability of techno- 
logical and managerial competence for the operation of existing mineral 
projects and for the development of new ones. The availability of such 
competence, however, does not assure a degree of efficiency within the 
firm, equal to that found in private enterprises. On the contrary, 
features considered typical of state mineral firms, like the blurred 
goal structure, the security of tenure of managerial personnel and the 
unclear relationship between the owners and the management are often 
claimed to result in a lower performance efficiency as compared to that 
accomplished by the private multinational mining corporations. Why this 
may be so, is explored in the following paragraphs. 
Starting out from the reasonable assumption that economic and 
social progress is the overriding goal of the national government, 
one could envisage one of two alternative ways in which it utilized 
the control over the mineral firms under its ownership. One approach 
would be to require the firms simply to maximize their profits. The 
government could then spend the revenues from the mineral sectors to 
accomplish its social benefit goal in ways it thought most fit. An 
alternative approach would be to require the mineral firms to deviate 
from the simple profit maximization objective in order to make a greater 
d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  economic and s o c i a l  p rogress .  The r a t i o n a l i t y  
of t h e  l a t t e r  approach i s  impingent upon the  s u i t a b i l i t y  and e f f i c i e n c y  
of t h e  minera l  f i rms  a s  instruments  t o  pursue t h e  broader  ob jec t ives .  
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  governments . in developing coun t r i e s  almost 
i n v a r i a b l y  choose t h e  l a t t e r  approach. Judging from o f f i c i a l  s t a t e -  
ments, t h e  state-owned mineral  f i rms  a r e  r equ i r ed  t o  pursue t h e  p r o f i t  
o b j e c t i v e ,  bu t  s imultaneously a l s o  t o  g i v e  s p e c i a l  cons ide ra t ion  t o  t h e  
d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  con t r ibu t ion  from t h e i r  ope ra t ions  t o  t he  na t ion ' s  
fo re ign  exchange income, t o  n a t i o n a l  va lue  added, t o  employment and s k i l l  
c r e a t i o n ,  t o  technologica l  p ro f i c i ency  and t o  gene ra l  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  
i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy. 
A c a s u a l  observer  might ge t  t h e  impression t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
of t h e  s t a t e  mining f i r m s i s a n  i n c o n s i s t e n t  p u r s u i t  of maximization of 
these  g o a l s  a l l  a t  t h e  same t i m e .  On f u r t h e r  r e f l e c t i o n  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  a  
multi-goal s e t  of t h i s  kind can a t  l e a s t  i d e a l l y  be f u l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  
t h e  s i n g l e  o b j e c t i v e  of maximizing t h e  s o c i a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  on t h e  
n a t i o n ' s  c a p i t a l  ou t l ays  f o r  t h e  mineral  a c t i v i t y .  Thus, maximization 
of t he  p r o f i t  of t h e  f i r m  may be taken a s  a  f i r s t  approximation of 
t h e  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t  ob j ec t ive .  But s i n c e  the  shadow p r i c e  of f o r e i g n  
exchange i s  commonly h igher  and t h e  shadow wage f o r  l abo r  lower than 
t h e  r a t e s  charged i n  t h e  market,  t h e  p u r s u i t  of n a t i o n a l  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t  
w i l l  r e q u i r e  t h a t  g r e a t e r  importance should be  a t t ached  t o  t h e  earn ings  
of fo re ign  currency and t o  employment than when t h e  goa l  pursued i s  
simple p r o f i t  maximization. The concern about c r e a t i o n  of  s k i l l s  and 
technologica l  p ro f i c i ency  even beyond what can be motivated by p r o f i t  
maximization i s  warranted by the  p o s i t i v e  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  of t hese  
f a c t o r s .  And t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  on l o c a l  i npu t s  o r  domestic process ing  
- even when p r i v a t e l y  unpro f i t ab l e ,  may be a r a t i o n a l  approach i n  t h e  
dynamic p u r s u i t  of s o c i a l  b e n e f i t ,  s i n c e  it w i l l  speed up the  estab-  
l ishment of a  broad and d i v e r s i f i e d  i n d u s t r i a l  base  i n  t h e  na t ion .  
I n  p r i n c i p l e ,  a l l  t he  above cons ide ra t ions  could be caught i n  a  
dynamic-programming model t h a t  would spec i fy  t h e  ope ra t iona l  modes 
needed f o r  maximizing the  s o c i a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  from t h e  company's 
opera t ions .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  more pedes t r i an  approach where s e v e r a l  
goa l s  a r e  s imultaneously pursued, and where t h e  t r a d e o f f s  between 
them a r e  n o t  s p e c i f i e d  i n  d e t a i l ,  i s  t y p i c a l l y  adopted. 
The r a t i o n a l  p u r s u i t  of s o c i a l  b e n e f i t  maximization a s  desc r ibed  
he re ,  would imply t h a t  t he  s t a t e  company forgqes some p r i v a t e  p r o f i t  
oppor tun i t i e s  i n  o rde r  t o  a t t a i n  a  h igher  s o c i a l  r a t e o f r e t u r n  from 
t h e  n a t i o n ' s  c a p i t a l  ou t l ay  on minerals .  Hence, it would be wrong t o  
judge the  company's performance s o l e l y  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  ~ r i v a t e  
p r o f i t  c r i t e r i o n .  
The above obviously i s  an idea l i zed  p i c t u r e .  A number of problems 
and complicat ions w i l l  cause r e a l i t y  t o  d i f f e r  from t h i s  idea1,and w i l l  
reduce t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of t h e  state-owned mineral  f i rm ,  both i n  terms of 
s o c i a l  b e n e f i t  and of p r i v a t e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  F i r s t ,  t h e  government can 
choose between a  number of po l i cy  measures f o r  inducing o r  f o r c i n g  t h e  
state-owned mineral e n t e r p r i s e  t o  behave s o c i a l l y  , and some of them w i l l  
be l e s s  e f f i c i e n t  than o t h e r s  i n  a t t a i n i n g  t h e  des i r ed  ob jec t ives .  
Commonly used genera l  c o n t r o l s ,  e.g. a  p r o h i b i t i o n  t o  sack workers,  o r  
a  q u a n t i t a t i v e  a l l o c a t i o n  of fo re ign  exchange would t y p i c a l l y  involve 
a  l o s s  i n  e f f i c i e n c y  because t h e  i n f l e x i b i l i t y  of t hese  c o n t r o l s  would 
prevent  t h e  company from a d j u s t i n g  t o  t h e  s o c i a l l y  optimal p o s i t i o n .  
Taxes and subs id i e s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  c o s t s  and p r i c e s  of t h e  company would 
be supe r io r  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  
A second problem will be experienced when government policies are 
not purposeful for the pursuit of national social benefit, and hence 
provide faulty signals to the state-owned mineral firms. Examples 
involve provision of inputs, e.g. capital or energy to publicly owned 
units at rates that are far below their social opportunity cost.' The 
interesting, almost philosophical question then arises whether the 
state-owned companies should disregard the signals resulting from 
misdirected public policies, and work instead towards what they perceive 
as the "true" social goals. 
A third problem is due to the fact that the social benefits resulting 
from the state-owned companies' activities, are exceedingly difficult to 
quantify. This too has important efficiency implications. 
Thus, the very complex goal of social benefit maximization lends 
itself to differing interpretations. The ensuing unclarity of company 
goals makes it generally difficult to judge managerial performance. 
Efficiency of management is also affected by the policies of recruitment 
and dismissal. Recruitment is often restricted to the national market. 
International managerial talent would then typically be unavailable to 
the state-owned mineral firm. Security of tenure for managerial personnel 
is commonly greater than in private enterprise. This would tend to 
attract the less enterprising, more security-conscious managers. Since 
dismissal of managers is less common, the state-owned firm would experience 
greater difficulty in getting rid of inefficient or unsuitable staff. 
Survival of the firm is more assured, because the government regularly 
assumes the role of savior of last resort in cases of threatened bank- 
ruptcy. These factors in combination seriously reduce the pressure on 
management to minimize costs. 
1 )  For instructive examples see M. Gillis, "Allocative and X-Efficiency 
in State-owned Mining Enterprises", Harvard Institute for International 
Development, April 1979. 
Simi l a r  e f f e c t s  fo l low from t h e  d i f fused  ownership s t r u c t u r e  
commonly found i n  state-owned mineral  e n t e r p r i s e s .  D i f f e r e n t  owner- 
s h i p  i n t e r e s t s ,  e.g.  i nd iv idua l  m i n i s t e r s ,  p r o v i n c i a l  governors e t c . ,  
o f t e n  can impose t h e i r  w i l l  on the  e n t e r p r i s e  and d e f l e c t  i t s  preoccupa- 
t i o n  from n a t i o n a l  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t  proper.  
The i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  d i scussed  here  can t ake  a  v a r i e t y  of forms. 
Both t h e  management and t h e  owners can g e t  away wi th  p o l i c i e s  aimed a t  
increas ing  t h e i r  own p r i v a t e  b e n e f i t  by a l l u d i n g  t h a t  such p o l i c i e s  a r e  
i n  f a c t  needed t o  maximize the  s t a t e  f i rm ' s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  s o c i a l  
welfare .  Le isure  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  a l l  employees, b u t  i n  p r a c t i c e  
used predominantly by t h e  top management belong t o  t h i s  category.  The 
excessive use  of t he  company f o r  reg iona l  development promotion can 
be presented a s  having a  va luab le  s o c i a l  o b j e c t i v e ,  whi le  t h e  major 
purpose of t h e  a c t i o n s  may be t o  c r e a t e  a  p o l i t i c a l  power base  f o r  l o c a l  
pa r ty  bosses .  Unnecessar i ly  l a r g e  labor  f o r c e  o r  c a p i t a l  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  
can add t o  t h e  managerial  ea se ,  but  the  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of goa l s  would 
make it d i f f i c u l t  t o  p i n  down what t he  s o c i a l l y  opt imal  l e v e l s  should 
be. I n e f f i c i e n c i e s  of t h i s  kind a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be most f r equen t ly  found 
i n  p r o j e c t s  wi th  p a r t i c u l a r l y  l a r g e  mineral  r e n t  p o t e n t i a l ,  whose pro- 
f i t a b i l i t y  w i l l  be  deemed acceptab le  even a f t e r  management and owner 
i n t e r e s t s  have taken t h e i r  due. 
The d i scuss ion  so  f a r  can be summarized i n  two po in t s .  F i r s t ,  
because of t h e  l e s s e r  p re s su re  on management, and of t h e  b lu r r ed  
principal-agent relationship, i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  and o rgan iza t iona l  s l ack  
would be common i n  state-owned mineral e n t e r p r i s e s ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  whether 
performance i s  measured i n  terms of p r i v a t e  p r o f i t s  o r  of a  broad s e t  
of s o c i a l  o b j e c t i v e s .  Second, on account of t h e i r  broader  g o a l s ,  one 
would expect  t h e  p r i v a t e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of s t a t e  mining f i rms  t o  be lower 
than that of similar operations carried on by private multinationals, 
even in the absence of the above inefficiencies. 
Inefficiencies apart, one important market consequence of the broader 
goals for the operating modes of state-owned mineral firms is a lesser degree 
of flexibility in terms of capacity utilization. Some costs that are clearly 
variable to the firm in isolation, will prove to be by and large fixed when 
social benefit rather than private profit is the objective. This may 
for instance be true of the cost of labor where alternative jobs are 
not available. With a lower share of costs in the variable category, 
the state-owned enterprise will be less amenable to reducing its capa- 
city utilization when prices fall, since the remaining variable costs 
will be covered even at very low prices. Where the shadow rate of 
foreign exchange lies above the private rate, the social revenue 
from export sales will be higher than the private revenue, and for 
this reason the state-owned firm may find it rational to continue 
full capacity operations where the private multinational would not. 
In the common case where the state-owned mineral firm is a dominant 
foreign exchange earner, a decline in demand and price will tend to 
raise the differential between the shadow and official rate of exchange, 
reducing the price at which capacity reductions become socially warranted 
even further. The implicit or explicit consideration of externalities, 
irrespective whether government imposed or due to managerial decision, 
will thus tend to make state-owned mineral firms less willing to reduce 
capacity utilization in consequence of declining demand and price. 
Apart from the dissimilarity in deriving the marginal revenue and 
marginal cost schedules under private and social evaluation respectively, 
there is no reason to postulate any difference in the behavior between 
the experienced state-owned firm on the one hand, and a private multi- 
n a t i o n a l  co rpo ra t ion  on t h e  o t h e r ,  when i t  comes t o  adjustment of ope ra t ions  
t o  t h e  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  cond i t i ons  i n  t h e  world market where t h e  output  i s  
so ld .  Like t h e  p r i v a t e  co rpo ra t ions ,  t h e  state-owned one w i l l  a p p r e c i a t e  
t h e  downward-sloping demand f o r  i t s  ou tpu t ,  r e s u l t i n g  from interdependence 
and from t h e  ensuing t a c i t  c o l l u s i o n  among s u p p l i e r s  i n  t h e  world market. 
I n  t h i s  c ircumstance,  and a b s t r a c t i n g  from ideo log ica l  i n h i b i t i o n s ,  i t s  
goa l s  w i l l  r e q u i r e  t h a t  marginal c o s t  be equated with marginal revenue 
when determining t h e  volume of ou tpu t ,  even though t h e  marginal schedules  
of t h e  state-owned f i rm  a r e  der ived  on t h e  b a s i s  of s o c i a l  r a t h e r  than  
p r i v a t e  c r i t e r i a .  
Turning from opera t ions  of e x i s t i n g  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  t o  capac i ty  
expansion, i t  should f i r s t  be  noted  t h a t  t h e  broader  goa l s  and t h e  
i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  discussed above apply equa l ly  t o  t h e  choice and execu- 
t i o n  of investment p r o j e c t s .  However, t h e r e  a r e  two f u r t h e r  i s s u e s  
t h a t  r equ i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  exp lo ra t ion .  F i r s t ,  a r e  t h e r e  important ways 
i n  which s t a t e  ownership a f f e c t s  p r o j e c t  s e l e c t i o n ,  and hence the  long 
run s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  i n d u s t r y  worldwide? And second, does s t a t e  owner- 
s h i p  r e s u l t  i n  more o r  l e s s  capac i ty  expansion than p r i v a t e  ownership? 
P o t e n t i a l  minera l  investment p r o j e c t s  i n  developing coun t r i e s  
w i l l  be  d i f f e r e n t l y  eva lua ted  and ranked i n  t h e  investment programs 
of p r i v a t e  mu l t ina t iona l  f i rms  and s t a t e  mineral  e n t e r p r i s e s  r e spec t ive ly .  
The former,  as  a l r eady  noted,  w i l l  be guided by the  a f t e r  tax DCF r a t e  
of r e t u r n  on equ i ty ,  s u b j e c t  t o  a  reduct ion  i n  a n t i c i p a t e d  revenues 
t o  account f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r i s k ,  and with a  cu tof f  r a t e  r e f l e c t i n g  some 
n o t i o n a l  "normal" r e t u r n  on c a p i t a l  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  coun t r i e s  
where they  a r e  domiciled. 
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  where the  mineral  i ndus t ry  i s  run by t h e  s t a t e ,  
ranking of p o t e n t i a l  p r o j e c t s  would i n  p r i n c i p l e  be based on t h e i r  
expected s o c i a l  DCF r a t e  of r e t u r n ,  with t h e  e n t i r e  ( s o c i a l )  revenue 
before  t a x  considered a s  a  b e n e f i t ,  i . e .  wi th  no downward adjustment 
f o r  t a x  o r  p o l i t i c a l  r i s k ,  and wi th  t h e  cu tof f  r a t e  r e f l e c t i n g  n a t i o n a l  
c a p i t a l  s c a r c i t y .  1 
Considerat ion of t he  s o c i a l  i n s t e a d  of p r i v a t e  r a t e  of r e t u r n  
i s  un l ike ly  t o  make an important d i f f e r e n c e  i n  p r a c t i c e .  It w i l l  
s l i g h t l y  improve t h e  ranking of  p r o j e c t s  t h a t  a r e  more l a b o r  i n t e n s i v e ,  
t h a t  can be implemented wi th  a  l a r g e r  propor t ion  of domestic i n p u t s  
and t h a t  have smal le r  nega t ive  environmental consequences than  the  
average of p r o j e c t s  under s c r u t i n y .  
Considerat ion of t h e  e n t i r e  revenue without  deduct ion f o r  t a x  
purposes o r  t o  account f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r i s k ,  i s  l i k e l y  t o  i nc rease  sub- 
s t a n t i a l l y  t h e  r a t e  of r e t u r n ,  and w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  augment t h e  number 
of p r o j e c t s  wi th  expected r a t e s  of r e t u r n  above any given cu to f f  r a t e .  
The inc rease  of the  r a t e  of . r e tu rn  would be e s p e c i a l l y  s t r o n g  i n  t he  
case of p r o j e c t s  wi th  high p o t e n t i a l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  where, a s  i s  common, 
t h e  f i s c a l  l e v i e s  a r e  imposed on p r o f i t s ;  and i n  t h e  case  of coun t r i e s  
where p r i v a t e  mu l t ina t iona l s  experience a  high degree of p o l i t i c a l  
r i s k .  
The cu to f f  r a t e  of p o t e n t i a l  r e t u r n  appl ied  by s t a t e  mineral  
corpora t ions  should i n  p r i n c i p l e  be h igher  than t h a t  of t h e  multina- 
t i o n a l s ,  t o  account f o r  t h e  c a p i t a l  s c a r c i t y  ofdeveloping  coun t r i e s .  
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  the s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  may be j u s t i f i e d  i n  applying a  r a t e  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  used by t h e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  ( f o r  i n s t ance  the  going 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t )  because investment f inance  t i e d  t o  
mineral  p r o j e c t s  i s  o r d i n a r i l y  obta ined  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  market 
a t  such r a t e s .  
Like i n  t h e  case  of t h e  p r i v a t e  mu l t ina t iona l  f i rm,  t he  s t a t e -  
owned mineral  company's investment program w i l l  be  cons t ra ined  by i t s  
1 )  Raymond Mikesel l  has  suggested t h a t  t h i s  may be  the  approach used by 
state-owned mineral  f i rms .  See h i s  The World Copper Indus t ry ,  Johns 
Hopkins 1979.  
capacity to obtain finance. Hence, not all potential projects with 
rates of return above the cut-off will be developed. The resources of 
national financial institutions are usually quite small as compared to 
the needs in modern, large-scale mineral projects. ' The governments 
of developing countries are commonly unable or unwilling to make 
sufficient reallocations in their budgets so as to meet the state 
company's investment needs. Hence, state-owned firms, like the private 
ones, have to make heavy recourse to financial sources in the inter- 
national market, to procure a large proportion of the required invest- 
ment funds. Even though a state mineral company may find it easier 
to incur heavy indebtedness where its owner, the national government, 
is considered credit-worthy, and is prepared to guarantee the loans, 
on the whole, the limitations and constraints on the availability of 
investment finance would tend to affect the private multinational and 
the state mining company quite similarly. This statement is based on 
the realistic presumption that foreign lending is not exposed to the 
political risk of non-repayment akin to nationalization of foreign 
direct investments. When the commercial risks look alike, therefore, 
the lender would be, by and large, indifferent between the private 
multinational and the experienced state mineral enterprise. The 
observation that state enterprise in general has a superior access to 
finance, appears to have limited validity in a comparison of state 
firms and private multinationals operating in the minerals field in 
developing countries. 
The investment behavior of the mature state mining firm operating 
in an oligopolistic world market, like thatofa private multinational, 
is likely to be constrained by a tacit understanding among suppliers 
that price will become unremunerative if production capacity is exp,mded 
1) See M. Radetzki and S. Zorn, Financing Mining Projects in Developing . -
Countries, Mining Journal Books Ltd, London 1979. 
i n  an  uncoordinated manner. State-owned f i rms ,  l i k e  p r i v a t e  mult i -  
n a t i o n a l s ,  may of course have per iods  of aggress ive  behavior ,  dur ing  
which they  expand t h e i r  capac i ty  and market s h a r e  without  much con- 
s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  the  g loba l  consequences t o  t h e  indus t ry ,  provided they  
a r e  a b l e  t o  f i n d  the  requi red  f inance .  
While o l i g o p o l i s t i c  coord ina t ion  i s  probable,  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
cha rac t e r  of the  state-owned f i rms  i n  developing coun t r i e s  would c r e a t e  
some i n h i b i t i o n s  a g a i n s t  d i r e c t  f o r e i g n  investments  i n  a l a r g e  way. Hence, 
both h o r i z o n t a l  and v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  on an  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s c a l e  
would be l e s s  common than under a p r i v a t e  regime. 
The t e n t a t i v e  conclusion t h a t  fo l lows  from t h i s  a n a l y s i s  of 
investment behavior is  t h a t  t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of s t a t e  minera l  f i rms  
i n  developing counC,ries w i l l  change t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of minera l  investment 
p a t t e r n s .  Re la t ive ly  more investments w i l l  be  a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  minera l  
r i c h  developing coun t r i e s  which were out  of f avo r  wi th  the  mul t ina t iona l s  
on account of t h e i r  s eve re  f i s c a l  regimes o r  perceived ' p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t a b i l i t y ' .  This  w i l l  reduce t h e  g l o b a l l y  uneconomical b i a s  aga ins t  
mineral  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  c e r t a i n  developing coun t r i e s  wi th  favorable  
geo log ica l  p o t e n t i a l ,  t h a t  would have followed from a cont inued domi- 
nance of t h e  p r i v a t e  mu l t ina t iona l s  i n  g l o b a l  mineral  a c t i v i t i e s .  
While t he  arguments suggest  t h a t  investments  w i l l  r i s e  i n  
c e r t a i n  coun t r i e s  i n  consequence of t he  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of s t a t e  en ter -  
p r i s e ,  t h e r e  is  much l e s s  reason t o  be l i eve  t h a t  t h e  g loba l  l e v e l  
of investments  w i l l  i nc rease .  Given the  interdependence t y p i c a l  of 
mineral  i n d u s t r i e s ,  expanded investments i n  c e r t a i n  developing 
coun t r i e s  w i l l  tend t o  induce corresponding reduct ions  elsewhere, 
un le s s  i n v e s t o r s  i n  t h e  marginal p r o j e c t s  a r e  prepared t o  accept  a 
lower r a t e  of r e t u r n  on t h e i r  engagements. Furthermore, t h e  f i n a n c i e r s  
would be r e l u c t a n t  t o  extend loans f o r  expanded g loba l  investment pro- 
grams t h a t  would reduce minera l  p r i c e s  and hence t h e  a b i l i t y  of the  
new p r o j e c t s  t o  s e r v i c e  t h e i r  loans. 
The new and inexperienced state mineral firm 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Data presented in chapter 3 have shown that state enterprise on 
a wide scale in developing countries' mineral industries is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. Most of the existing governmental ownership positions 
were built up only since the late 1950's. One can distinguish between 
two types or generations of state-owned mineral firms in developing 
countries. The first, and until the early 1980's by far the most impor- 
tant one,was set up on response to the needs to manage existing mineral 
ventures at the time of nationalization. The transfer of managerial 
responsibilities from the private multinationals to such firms has had 
profound implications for the industry. The following discussion deals 
almost exclusively with this type of state-owned firm. For completeness 
the second generation which emerged mainly in the 1970's in developing 
countries with little previous mineral experience, will be mentioned 
briefly at the end of the section. 
The rationale for devoting ample space to the analysis of the 
inexperienced state-owned mineral firms follows from the extended 
period of between 10 and 20 years that it takes for such firms to 
transform into mature corporations, and from their peculiar behavioral 
features during this interim period. Given the recency of their 
establishment, there are as yet relatively few state-owned firms that 
have attained the stage of maturity. Through the 1960's and 1970's a 
majority of all public mineral enterprises in developing countrie9 haye 
belonged to the inexperienced category. 
In the ensuing paragraphs I discuss the ways in which the behavior 
of new and inexperienced state mineral enterprises deviates from that 
of the mature ones. It is hypothesized throughout that the new state 
mineral firm behaves like the experienced one in other respects than 
those discussed below. It is also hypothesized that the deviations from 
the behavior of the mature state-owned corporations will be reduced over 
time as the new firm gains experience and builds up its own assets of 
managerial and technical competence. 
As noted, the first-generation state mineral enterprises were set 
up to manage existing nationalized operations. The firms usually had a 
difficult start. The former owners in many cases felt dissatisfied 
with the compensation they were offered, and were reluctant in providing 
the managerial assistance and technology needed by the new national 
entities. The state firms were therefore typically required to take on 
wide-ranging responsibilities long before they had had time to acquire 
the necessary expertise for the tasks at hand. A succinct way of 
describing the transition period during which these enterprises are 
being transformed into mature and experienced state mineral corporations 
is that it is characterized by substantial and drawn-out setting-up costs 
There are great differences in the degree of complexity between the 
activities to which mineral corporations normally attend. The greater 
the complexity of the task, the longer will be the time required to 
establish the expertise to handle it efficiently. Observations of the 
real world suggest that it is usually takes less time to acquire the 
skills needed for commercial than for technical operations. On the 
technical side, it is easier to handle simple open-pit operations than 
the more complex underground ones. Management of investments to 
develop new projects, especially on a large scale,seems to be the most 
difficult task of all. Very few state mineral enterprises in developing 
countries have yet acquired the competence to carry out such tasks 
efficiently. 
When the newly set up and inexperienced state-owned firm is 
suddenly put into a position of overall responsibility, the result is 
almost invariably a more or less severe disruption of operations. The 
resulting inefficiency must be distinguished from the organizational 
slack in the mature state-owned firms, as discussed in the preceding 
sub-section. The latter arises from the fact that management or some 
owner interests deflect the firm's operations towards other goals 
than the ones against which efficiency is measured. The present pro- 
blem follows from the fact that the appropriable results of the firm, i.e. 
the residual after normal payment for factor inputs, is reduced by 
lacking managerial competence. Hence, less satisfaction can be accom- 
plished, irrespective whether the results are used to promote private 
profit, social benefit, managerkal convenience or the vested interests 
of some influential group. 
--In the period immediately after takeover, disruption will tend 
to affect all key aspects of the state mineral firm's operations. Thus, 
commercial relations with customers and competitors are frequently 
upset. This may be especially severe where the state takeover ruptures 
a<hkinof vertical integration thereby depriving the nationalized unit 
of its captive markets. The inexperienced management is often unable 
to maintain production at full capacity levels. Input requirements per 
unit of output tend to increase. Capacity expansion comes to a stand- 
still. 
However, with time the new management gains experience, order is 
gradually restored and the inefficiency losses reduced. Commercial 
operations are regularly the first to be normalized, though often along 
different patterns than before nationalization. Arms-length relations 
are developed in place of the former transactions internal to the firm 
in cases where the nationalized units formed part of vertically 
integrated private multinationals. Full capacity utilization is 
eventually restored. The excessive cost levels are reduced. Produc- 
tion capacity remains stagnant for an especially exterldrd period of 
time. The duration and gravity of the disruption will be related to 
the economic development of the country. It will be most severe in the 
least developed countries where the foreign owned mineral activity had 
been carried on within an enclave with limited spillovers on the rest 
of the economy. 
The initial disruption of commercial relations with competitors 
commonly includes a disregard for the oligopolistic collaboration which 
may have restrained global output and capacity expansion. However, this 
disregard is usually of no practical consequence. The initial ineffic- 
iences of the state firm commonly impose a more binding constraint on 
its capacity utilization and capacity expansion than would any tacit 
or overt collaboration with members of a world oligopoly. By the time 
the new state firm becomes a mature and experienced corporation, it is 
likely to have overcome its inhibitions or inability to participate in any 
oligopolistic coordination that may exist in the international market. 
Several factors explain why the state-owned firm would not venture 
1 into the development of new mineral projects during its early life. 
First, its inexperience during that period would lead to a substantial 
increase in investment costs which could turn even very rich mineral 
deposits into privately and socially unprofitable operations. Second, 
the international credit institutions that provide finance for mineral 
investment would be reluctant to extend loans out of fear that the 
inexperienced state mineral company might fail in completing the develop- 
nent task successfully. And third, all the resources of the company are 
likely to be so absorbed in mastering the operational intricacies of the 
1) The Iranian government's decision to manage the development of the 
Sar Cheshmeh copper mine without any direct multinational involvement is 
an exception. The effort ran quite successfully until the fall of the 
Shah, at which time further work to complete the ~roject was arrested. 
nationalized units, that for a long time there will be little willingness 
to undertake new and demanding tasks of which the management has no prior 
experience. For these reasons, the firm would typically defer capacity 
expansion until after it had acquired enough experience for smooth and 
efficient running of the nationalized operations. Only at that time 
would it ordinarily feel in a position to take on the complex task of 
investing in new projects. 
One common way to reduce the inefficiency losses after nationaliza- 
tion has been to hire a management team either from the former owners, if 
they were forthcoming in this respect, or from another multinational min- 
ing firm. From the government's point of view there are several drawbacks 
with a management contract arrangement. First, there is an element of 
monopoly in the supply of managerial services. Compensation of the 
management team therefore regularly absorbs part of the mineral rent. 
Second, even though in principle the ultimate control remains with the 
government, so long as there is no technically competent counter-weight 
in the nation, there is a serious risk that an experienced management 
team hired from a multinational company will take advantage of the 
situation by attaching less importance to the social benefit goals of 
the government, and by looking after its own interests instead. Some of 
the advantages of nationalization are lost as a result. And third, if 
foreign management is employed in a comprehensive way, the state mineral 
company' s activities will be reduced to a holding operation. BY reducing 
the exposure of nationals to the mineral business proper, this has sometimes 
slowed down the process of building up national competence in the mineral 
field. The above explains the governments' ambivalent attitudes to manage- 
ment contract arrangements. Management teams have frequently been hired to 
prevent a collapse in existing operations, but the governments have been 
very restrictive with regard to coverage and duration of the hired teams' 
responsibilities, except as instructors and trainers of a national mnage- 
ment cadre. 
The tentative conclusions to be derived from the above can be 
summarized as follows. The establishment of state enterprise to manage 
nationalized mineral ventures typically involves a substantial setting- 
up cost extended over a long period of time. This cost is likely to be 
most pronounced in the least developed countries. It will be expressed 
through disruptions leading to breaks in commercial relations with 
customers and competitors, reduced production levels, increased input 
requirements per unit of output, and an inability to expand production 
capacity. As the state-owned company gains experience, conditions will 
gradually normalize, and the cost will be reduced. The inability to 
expand capacity will usually take longest to overcome. Management 
contract arrangements can help to reduce the initial disruption after 
nationalization, but they may also slow down the process of building 
up national competence, and so defer the time when the state-owned 
company reaches maturity. 
The emergence of the second generation of state mineral enterprises 
took place predominantly in the 1970's and in very different and much 
more relaxed circumstances. The role that these enterprises have 
played so far in influencing behavior and modes of operation in the 
mineral industry, has been very limited. 
The establishment of the second generation type of firms did not 
involve a transfer of responsibilities for running existing operations, 
since none existed when the firms were created. Instead, the firms 
have been set up as a result of decisions to develop virgin mineral 
deposits into large-scale mining operations. The form under which they 
have usually been established is a joint venture with one or several 
multinational mining companies, in which the government holds a 
significant or majority share of the equity, but where the entire manage- 
ment function is entrusted to one of the privatepartners. Examples in- 
clude the Companie des Bauxites de Guinee in Guinea with a government 
1 
equity of 49% which became operational in 1973, and the uranium mining 
companies Somair and Cominak in Niger, operating since 1971 and 1978 
respectively, and in which the government holds 33% and 31% of the 
equity. 2 
The governmental influence over this type of companies has been 
limited, and their behavior has not deviated significantly from that of 
ordinary private enterprises. With time, however, as the government 
administrations gain. experience of how mineral enterprises are run, they 
can be expected to use it for influencing an increasing number of 
functions, and for gradually changing the goals and operating modes of 
the mineral activity towards the patterns typical of the experienced 
state-owned mineral firm. The shift would typically be gradual and. 
smooth. Thus, the emancipation of this second generation of state 
mineral firms in developing countries is likely to cause far less dis- 
ruption in marketing, production and investment activity, and hence 
involve a much smaller setting-up cost than in the case of the first- 
generation state-owned mineral companies. 
Hypotheses on market impact from state enterprise proliferation 
The hypotheses that will now be formulated are all founded on 
the conclusions about state enterprise behavior, derived from the 
analysis in the preceding section. Each of the hypotheses states the 
1) M. Radetzki and S. Zorn, Financing Mining Projects in Developing 
Countries, Mining Journal Books Ltd., London 1979. 
2) S. Koutoubi and L.W. Koch, 'Uranium in ~iger', in Uranium and Nuclear 
Energy, Mining Journal Books Ltd., London 1980. 
d i f f e r e n c e  of a  market s i t u a t i o n  where s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  account f o r  a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  share  of supply, a s  compared t o  one where p r i v a t e  f i rms  
have a  complete dominance. Each of t h e  hypotheses i s  j u s t i f i e d  by a  
restatement  of t he  r e l evan t  conclusions from t h e  e a r l i e r  ana lys i s .  
(a)  The widespread n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s  of mineral  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  developing 
coun t r i e s  over the  pas t  decades have temporar i ly  r e s u l t e d  i n  lower 
output  and h igher  p r i c e s  t han  what would have preva i led  under an uninter-  
rupted p r i v a t e  mu l t ina t iona l  regime. Takeovers by s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  have 
r e g u l a r l y  involved s u b s t a n t i a l  se t t ing-up  and l ea rn ing  c o s t s ,  expressed 
through reduced e f f i c i e n c y ,  increased  c o s t  l e v e l s ,  and i n a b i l i t y  t o  
ope ra t e  e x i s t i n g  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  a t  f u l l  capac i ty  o r  t o  e s t a b l i s h  new 
capac i ty .  This  market impact i s  of a  t r a n s i e n t  na ture .  It w i l l  be 
reduced a s  t he  s t a t e  owned f i rms  ga in  exper ience  and mature. The 
t r a n s i t i o n  process  i s  q u i t e  extended, however, and may t ake  10-20 years  
i n  each ind iv idua l  case. 
(b) The p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of s t a t e  mineral  e n t e r p r i s e  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  perma- 
nen t ly  higher  product ion c o s t s  and i n  some cases  a l s o  mineral  p r i c e s .  
This fol lows from t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t s  i ncu r red  by mature s t a t e  f i rms  
i n  t h e i r  pu r su i t  of non-profit  o b j e c t i v e s ,  and from t h e  gene ra l ly  l e s s e r  
p re s su re  t o  minimize c o s t s  i n  such f i rms .  The higher  c o s t s  w i l l  normally 
absorb p a r t  of t he  mineral  r e n t  i n  t h e  in t ramargina l  f i rms.  Where s t a t e  
e n t e r p r i s e s  ope ra t e  marginal  ventures ,  and both demand and supply a r e  
i n e l a s t i c ,  t h e i f i n f l a t e d  c o s t s  may e x e r t  an upward push on mineral p r i c e s .  
(c)  The increas ing  importance of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  g r e a t e r  
p r i c e  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  most i n t e r n a t i o n a l  minera l  markets.  This fo l lows  
from t h e  l e s s e r  f l e x i b i l i t y  of s t a t e  minera l  f i rms  t o  a d j u s t  capac i ty  
u t i l i z a t i o n  t o  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  demand. 
(d) The establishment of state enterprises has frequently broken up 
multinational chains of vertical integration. In industries like iron 
ore and bauxite the entry of state owned firms has significantly 
expanded the formerly narrow non-captive markets, thereby contributing 
to price stability in such markets. 
(e) The increasing importance of state mineral enterprise will gradually 
result in a globally more economical allocation of mineral investments. 
Private multinational corporations have tended to avoid involvements in 
high tax areas and politically risky environments. A state owned enter- 
prise, in contrast, can include tax payments in the flow of benefits that 
their activities give rise to, and can disregard the political risk of 
explicit or covert nationalization, so long as it operates within its own 
national territory. The proliferation of state enterprises will there- 
fore result in greater capacity expansion in the low-cost deposits of 
mineral rich developing countries that have high taxes or that are 
considered especially politically risky by the mining multinationals. 
PART 11. THE CASES 
CHAPTER 5. THE STATE TIN INDUSTRY IN INDONESIA 1 
History and structure of Indonesia's tin industry 
Tin mining in Indonesia was initiated by the Dutch in the 
early part of the 18th century.' In the years immediately following 
the second world war, the colonial government of the Netherlands 
East Indies was the sole owner of the largest production center, 
and held majority equity positions in the remaining two production 
units. All three were operated under long-run management contracts 
by Billiton, a private Dutch company named after one of the tin 
producing islands of Indonesia. Billiton also had some equity in 
the two latter units. In 1950, at independence, the equity positions 
held by the colonial administration were taken over by the national 
government. In 1958, the government also acquired Billiton's equity. 
From that year and until 1973, when Koba Tin started production, the 
ownership and management of Indonesia's tin industry remained completely 
in the national government's hands. 3 
To begin with, the three existing production units were operated 
1). The data upon which the analysis is based have been obtained from 
material pubiished in ~ndonesiH and elsewhere, as quoted, and, above 
all from a series of personal interviews with officials of the ministries 
of Mines and Energy and Finance, with managers of the tin enterprises 
and others, conducted during a two-week visit to Jakarta in October 
1981. A list of my interviewees is given in Appendix 5.1. 
21 Tin in Indonesia, undated brochure published by the Public Relations 
Division of PT Timah, the state tin corporation, circa 1977. 
3) W. Fox. Tin, The Working of a Commodity Agreement, Mining Journal 
Books Ltd, London 1974, and interviews with retired officials of the 
Ministry of Mines. 
as separate companies. In 1961, the government established 
"The General Managing Cormnittee of the State Mining Companies", 
which acted as a unifying umbrella for the tin industry. In 
1968, all production operations were merged into a single State 
Enterprise (PN) under the name of PN Tambang Timah. The responsi- 
bilities of this firm encompassed,on a nearly exclusive basis,the 
whole range of activities of the tin industry from exploration, 
mining, processing and smelting through to final marketing. Finally, 
in 1976, the company was reorganized into a Limited Liability Company 
(PT), 100 % owned by the government, with considerably expanded 
1 
commercial independence. The present state owned company, PT Tambang 
Timah, as well as its predecessor PN Tambang Timah will be referred 
to in what follows simply as Timah. 
An important policy change with regard to the tin industry, 
introduced in 1967 by the incoming administration of President 
Soeharto was the opening up of Indonesia's mining sector to foreign 
2 investments. Three new tin ventures with foreign involvements have 
been established as a result. PT Koba Tin, 75 % owned by Australian 
interests, and with a 25 % equity holding by Timah, started its 
exploration program in 1971, and went into production in 1973. In 
1980 this company's production reached 5260 tons of tin in concentrates, 
16 % of the overall national figure. In that year, Koba Tin had about 
2,200 employees on its payroll, of whom 24 were expatriates. 3 
1) Tin in Indonesia, op.cit.. 
2) S. Sigit, Ministry of Mines and Energy, "Mineral Resources for 
the 21 century, challenges and opportunities, an Indonesian view- 
point", contribution to the US Geological Survey International Cen- 
tennial Symposium, Oct 1979. 
3) Indonesia Development News, No. 7, 1981. 
The entire output was sold to Timah, which smelted and marketed 
it along with its own produce. PT Riau Tin Mining, the second 
foreign tin venture, was initiated by Billiton, since many years 
a subsidiary of the Shell Oil Company. Timah holds 10 % of the 
equity in Riau Tin and a further 15 % is to be offered to the 
Indonesian public. Thus, like in Koba Tin, the final foreign 
equity involvement will amount to 75 %. Production started on 
a small scale in 1979, and the 1980 output amounted to 630 tons 
of tin in concentrates. The level of production is expected to 
rise to 1000 tons, as full capacity is reached in the early 1980's. 
In 1980, Riau Tin had 320 employees. The concentrate output was 
smelted by Timah on a toll basis, and the tin metal was subsequently 
marketed by Riau Tin itse1f.l PT Broken Hill Proprietory Indonesia, 
(BHP Indonesia), is the third foreign venture, owned 100 % by 
Australian interests. The property of this company consists of a 
rehabilitated underground mine abandoned in 1941 at the time of the 
Japanese invasion. Production operations started in 1975. By 1980, 
output had reached the level of 520 tons of tin in concentrates. 
Full capacity of about 1000 tons was expected to be attained in the 
early 1980's after completion of further investments. In 1980 BHP 
Indonesia employed 450 persons, of whom some 20 were expatriates. 
The company is itself responsible for marketing its output inter- 
nationally after toll smelting in the UK and Ma1aysia.l Smelting is 
undertaken outside Indonesia because the particular chemical compo- 
1) Information from interview with General Manager of Riau Tin. 
2) Information from interview with Public  elations Department of 
BHP Indonesia. 
sition of the concentrates makes them less suitable as feed 
in the Timah smelter. 1 
Table 5.1 depicts the development of Indonesia's tin out- 
put since 1950, and compares it with the world total. After re- 
construction in the immediate postwar period, a production peak 
of 36.400 tons (18 % of world output) was attained in 1954. Pro- 
duction fell continuously in the following 12 years, to reach a 
minimum of 12.800 tons (6 % of world output) in 1966. There was a 
turnaround in that year, and production has been rising steadily 
thereafter. In 1980, output reached 32.500 tons, almost the level 
of 1950, but representing no more than 14 % of the world total. In 
table 5.2. details are given of the different companies' production 
in the 1975-1980 period. Timah's share of the total declined from 
Table 5.1 Indonesian and World ~ i n e  Production of Tin 
Indonesia, 
thousandtons 32.6 33.9 23.0 14.9 19.1 25.3 32.5 35.3 
World , 
thousand tons 176.9 194.0 188.8 203.7 217.1 218.1 235.0 237.1 
Indonesia, 
share of 18 17 12 7 9 12 14 15 
world, % 
Source: Metallgesellschaft 
100 % in the early 1970's to 96 % in 1975 and 80 % in 1980, as the 
foreign ventures brought their units into production. Timah's share 
1) Information from interview with Timah. 
may fall somewhat further in the 19801s, as these ventures attain 
their full capacity output. But since no further foreign ventures 
Table 5.2. Indonesian Production of Tin by Company, T.ons . 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
- - - - - - - -  
Riau Tin 95 630 
BHP Indonesia 79 210 296 433 469 500 
Koba Tin 867 1,022 1,610 2,914 3,807 5,260 
Timah 24,391 22,203 24,021 24,064 25,164 26,110 
Total 25,337 23,435 25,927 27,411 29,535 32,500 
Share of 
Timah, % 9 6 95 9 3 88 85 80 
Source: Indonesian Mining Yearbook 1979 for 1975 through 1979; 
Company information and Metallgesellschaft for 1980. 
are planned, and since private Indonesian enterprise is prohibited 
from entry into the tin industry,' Timah will continue to dominate 
~ndonesia's tin, both by its high share of mine output and by its 
complete control of domestic tin smelting. 
After this brief historical account of ~ndonesia's tin industry, 
as a whole, the rest of the chapter is devoted entirely to the activities, 
problems and characteristics of Timah, the tin enterprisewholly owned 
by the government. 
The year of 1967, marking the establishment of President Soeharto's 
"New Order'' government, constitutes a clear-cut dividing line in Indonesia's 
state enterprising in tin. Most importantly, the new administration 
1) Information from Timah. 
introduced very  profound changes i n  government po l i cy  towards 
the  t i n  s e c t o r .  I n  add i t i on ,  i t  was not  u n t i l  t h e  l a t e  1960's  
t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  management team of t h e  s t a t e  t i n  e n t e r p r i s e  
had acquired t h e  experience needed f o r  running t h e  ope ra t ions  
wi th  reasonable  e f f i c i e n c y .  For t h e s e  reasons i t  seems appropr i a t e  
t o  subdivide t h e  d i scuss ion  and a n a l y s i s  accordingly.  Thus, t h e  
next  s e c t i o n  dea l s  w i th  t h e  Soekarno e r a ,  s t a r t i n g  a t  independence 
and ending i n  1966. The s e c t i o n  t h a t  fo l lows  focuses  a t t e n t i o n  
on t h e  s t a t e  t i n  i n d u s t r y  from 1967 and onwards. 
S t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  - t h e  e a r l y  per iod  
The n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of t h e  t i n  i n d u s t r y  followed a somewhat 
unusual pa t t e rn .  P r i o r  t o  independence, ma jo r i t y  ownership w a s  
not  i n  p r i v a t e  fo re ign  hands, bu t  was he ld  by t h e  c o l o n i a l  govern- 
ment. S t a t e  e n t e r p r i s i n g  d id  not  begin wi th  t h e  b i r t h  of t h e  new 
na t ion .  Transfer  of t h e  c o l o n i a l  power's e q u i t y  p o s i t i o n s  d id  no t  
involve a  takeover  by purchase o r  con f i sca t ion .  A t  independence, 
t h e  a s s e t s  were simply t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  admin i s t r a t i on ,  
i n  much t h e  same way a s ,  f o r  i n s t ance ,  t h e  ra i lways ,  t h e  p o s t a l  
s e r v i c e  system, and o t h e r  f a c i l i t i e s  run by t h e . p u b l i c  c o l o n i a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s .  I n  1958, agreement w a s  a l s o  reached wi th  B i l l i t o n  
about a  swap i n  which t h e  government took over  t h e  p r i v a t e  company's 
remaining t i n  involvements i n  the  country,  and t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  
B i l l i t o n  a l l  i t s  t i n - r e l a t e d  co rpo ra t e  a s s e t s  o u t s i d e  Indonesia .  1 
The e x i s t i n g  management c o n t r a c t s  he ld  by B i l l i t o n ,  were 
allowed t o  cont inue  u n t i l  t h e i r  expi ry ,  i n  1953 i n  one product ion 
1)  In te rv iew wi th  M r  M. Subroto, former Di rec to r  General i n  t h e  Minis t ry  
of Mines and Energy. 
center, and in 1958 in the other two. The animosity resulting 
from the independence struggle led the Indonesian government to 
decide about a complete nationalization of the management functions, 
when the contracts with Billiton expired, despite the paucity of 
Indonesians with technical and administrative qualifications. 
The period from the latter half of the 1950's and until 1966 
was a difficult one, not only for the tin industry, but for Indonesia's 
economy as a whole. The task of nation building, involving unification 
of a geographically dispersed area with wide ethnic and cultural 
differences took priority over economic management. 
The fall in tin production, from 36,400 tons in 1954 to 12,700 
tons in 1966, or from 18 % to 6 Z of world output, has two major 
explanations. The first one is the inexperience of the national 
management cadre which took over when the Dutch were sent off. In 
the Dutch management period, all higher level positions in the tin 
companies were held by non-Indonesians. The first batches of Indo- 
nesian engineering and geology graduates emerging from the universities 
only in the late 19501s, were put in charge of the installations, 
despite their complete lack of practical experience. This clearly 
reduced the efficiency of operations. The managerial inattention to 
planning and maintenance of installations was particularly detrimental 
for long-run output trends. In the view of one seasoned Indonesian 
observer, it took until the early 1970's for the national management 
teams to acquire technical, administrative and commercial proficiencies 
of an international standard, and to overcome the deficiencies caused 
by managerial neglect in earlier years.' The problems caused by 
1) Interview with Soetaryo Sigit, Secretary General, Ministry of 
Mines and Energy. 
lacking managerial experience could certainly have been 
overcome in some measure by reinforcing the national teams 
with foreign expertise. In the strongly nationalistic mood that 
characterized the country at that time, such measures were 
considered politically inopportune. 
The second reason for the drastic reduction in output was 
that the government drained the industry of funds, in a general 
effort to maximize the immediate resource availability for the 
political task of nationbuilding. Politics came first during 
that period, while economic and social development was considered 
a secondary issue. Most of the state tin companies' records from 
this period are unavailable. Hence, precise statements of how the 
government treated the industry are difficult to make. At times, 
only one quarter of the tin export proceeds were credited to the 
producing enterprises. Furthermore, these credits were made in a 
strongly overvalued local currency.' The consequences for the tin 
industry were highly detrimental. Not only were financial resources 
lacking for investments in expanded production capacity; the govern- 
ment appropriated such a large share of the net cash flow of the tin 
mining enterprises that little was left even for the maintenance of 
existing facilities, or for financing exploration to replace depleted 
2 deposits with new ones. A number of high cost units had to be closed 
down for cannibalization of equipment, and to limit the financial drain, 
and so to permit continued operation of the remaining installations. 
This period saw only one major new investment venture in Indonesia's 
1) Interview with Mr M. Subroto 
2) M. Gillis and R.E. Beals, Tax and Investment Policies for Hard 
Minerals; Public and Multinational Enterprises in Indonesia, Ballinger 1980. 
tin industry, and in that case too, the decision to go ahead 
was taken on political rather than economic grounds. In an effort 
to reduce its dependence on the Netherlands, where most of the 
tin concentrate output was sent for smelting, a decision was taken 
in 1959 to establish a tin smelter in Indonesia. The political 
appropriateness of this decision was confirmed by the emergent 
conflict with the Netherlands about Irian Jaya, resulting in a 
shift of concentrate exports towards the US and Malaysia, and again 
by the conflict with Malaysia in 1963, which forced a new redirection 
of exports, from Malaysia back to the Netherlands. 1 
In 1961, a contract was signed with the Klockner Industries of 
West Germany, to install a smelter of a new design with a capacity 
of 25,000 tons of metallyear, at a cost of US$ 3.6 million. Most 
of this capital was provided as supplier credit. Construction was 
completed in 1967. Technically the venture must be considerd a failure. 
By 1970, after 3 years' trial runs, the annual output did not exceed 
5,000 tons. After considerable technical alterations, output reached 
2 
about 15,000 tons in 1973. The relative inexperience of the technical 
personnel in the Indonesian tin industry at that time undoubtedly 
contributed to the failure. In all likelihood there were also serious 
problems with the technical design offered by Klockner. Similar 
difficulties emerged in Bolivia where a Klockner tin smelter using 
the same technology was established at about the same time. 3 
1) W. Fox., op.cit.. 
2) K.A. Batubara, "Tin Smelting in Indonesia", Paper presented at 
the Indonesian Mining Association Symposium in Jakarta, June 1977. 
3) Private comunication with Malcolm Gillis. 
Ironically, the smelter proved profitable to Timah, despite 
the technical difficulties that were encountered. This was because 
the government itself underwrote the obligations for the supplier 
credit, and simultaneously extended a low interest local currency 
loan to the company, to enable it to finance the investment. Ensuing 
devaluations virtually wiped out the value of this loan. Most of the 
cost for the investment has therefore been incurred by the government. 1 
It is difficult to establish what were the general patterns-and 
rules for the operations of the tin industry during this traumatic period. 
Quite clearly, the government intervened very heavily in the operations 
of the tin enterprises on an ad hoc basis. Production of tin was seen 
as a tool for promoting the government's political goals. Little con- 
sideration was given to the long run consequences for the industry 
following from the interventions. 
State enterprise since 1967 
The activities of Timah are far easier to record and quantify 
in the period from 1967 and onwards. Hence, the present section can 
provide a much more detailed analysis, although it must be mentioned 
that data on Timah have proved more difficult to extract than in the 
case of the state owned mineral companies in Venezuela and Zambia. 
In October 1981, during my visit to Jakarta, the latest annual reports 
available for Timah was that for 1978. 
The present section starts by scrutinizing the mechanisms 
used by the government to control and direct Timah and at the goals 
and objectives of the state owned tin industry. It then turns to an 
analysis of the company's progress in terms of production, sales, costs 
1) Interview with Mr M. Subroto. 
profitability and fiscal contributions. The section ends by 
a brief discussion of the record of investments and policies for 
capacity expansion. 
Direction and goals 
--------- ---- 
Silbject to the current order of Indonesia's President, the Hiriisters of 
Mines and Energy and of Finance share the oversight responsibilities 
over Timah on behalf of the shareholder (government). After hearing 
recommendations, the President appoints the Board of Commissioners 
(3 in number) that supervises the activities of the enterprise; and 
the Board of Directors (one president and four members, each responsible 
for a technical function) that manages Timah on a day-to-day basis. 
The government's formal control responsibility includes the scrutiny 
and approval both by the Board of Commissioners and by the two ministers, 
of the annual budgets that the Board of Directors prepares. Timah's 
accounts, financial dispositions and investment expenditures are 
also scrutinized by special public bodies set up to control all public 
enterprises in these respects. 
Possibly as a result of the devastating experiences of excessive 
government involvement in the earlier years, the administration has 
abstained by and large, in the period studied from direct intervention 
in the operations of Timah. For instance, the Board of Directors' 
annual budget proposals on investments, production and disposition of 
funds are usually accepted without amendments by the two responsible 
ministers. 
Neither the government nor the company itself have ever defined 
the objectives, or outlined the long-term strategy to be followed by 
the publicly owned tin industry, in a clear-cut way. Discussions with 
officials in the Ministry of Mines and Energy and with the 
managers of Timah suggest that the firm pursues a long-run profit 
maximization goal, subject to the fulfilment of a variety of 
social obligations, self-imposed by the management or decreed 
by the government. As an example of the latter, the government 
has asked the tin corporation to provide employment to groups of 
retired army officers. Expansion of the company's activities 
appears to have been determined by short-term considerations on 
an ad hoc basis. 
In a reorganization undertaken in 1976, the profit orientation 
of Timah was given more emphasis, and the company was accorded 
greater freedom in taking up profitable activities even outside the 
tin industry. Also, from that year onwards, inducements have been 
provided to the management and employees, with the purpose of improving 
the company's profit performance. Thus in 1976 and 1977, 20 2 and 
15 % of the after tax profits respectively have been spent on bonuses 
to management and on additional salaries to all other employees. (Prior 
to 1976 bonuses to management and employees were added to the costs of 
the company, and were not related to profits). 
Despite these developments the management expresses the view 
that pressures of public accountability restrict the corporate flexi- 
bility, and slow down decision making. This results in opportunity 
losses and makes the managerial tasks more unwieldy as compared 
with conditions in private enterprises. Timah's internal organization 
is bureaucratic and centralized. All important decisions are referred 
to the directors in charge, and the department heads have quite li- 
mited freedom for independent action. This feature, in some degree 
at least a result of state ownership, also contributes to the 
inflexibility of the enterprise. 
The record of production and sales 
------------ ----------------- 
Table 5.3 provides the production and export figures for 
Timah. In the first eight years of President Soeharto's "New 
Order", the company's output almost doubled, as worn down installations 
were rehabilitated, and new facilities were established. From 1974 
onwards, however, output has varied from year to year, but there has 
not been any upward trend. No more than 5 % of Timah's production is 
domestically consumed. All the rest is exported. Membership in the 
International Tin Council has prevented Indonesia from exporting 
freely at all times. While full technical capacity utilization has been 
Table 5.3 Timah, Mine Yroduction and Exports of Tin, Tons 
Mine production Exports 
1) Preliminary figures 
Source: 1966-1975, Tin in Indonesia, op.cit.. 
1976-1980, Statistics released by Timah in February 1981, 
as reported by the Embassy of Canada in Jakarta. 
maintained through t h e  period covered by the t a b l e ,  p a r t  of the  
product ion has been added t o  inven to r i e s  i n  years  when expor t  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  were imposed by the  Council. The excess of expor ts  
over  mine product ion i n  the  l a t e  1970's i s  explained by Timah's 
marketing of i nc reas ing  amounts of t i n  mined by Koba Tin. 
The p r i c e s  received by t i n  producers throughout t h e  world 
1 
a r e  based on t h e  Penang market quota t ion .  But while  the  major 
s h a r e  of output  from Malaysia,  Thailand and Bol iv ia ,  i s  so ld  e i t h e r  
d i r e c t l y  i n  Penang o r  through d e a l e r s ,  Timah has developed a 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  system of marketing most of i t s  t i n  d i r e c t l y  t o  the  
2 f i n a l  consumers. The con t rac tua l  arrangements wi th  customers a r e  
o r i e n t e d  towards the  long run p r o f i t  maximization goa l ,  and sub- 
o rd ina te  s h o r t  run b e n e f i t s  t o  such ob jec t ives  a s  long run s t a b i l i t y ,  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  and convenience i n  supplying t h e  m a t e r i a l  t o  t h e  
customer. 
P r i c e  developments f o r  t i n  i n  constant  money s i n c e  1960 a r e  
depic ted  i n  c h a r t  5.1. The t r end  has been q u i t e  favorable  from t h e  
producers '  po in t  of view, both by i t s e l f  and i n  comparison wi th  most 
o t h e r  raw m a t e r i a l s .  For in s t ance ,  while  the  index of nominal d o l l a r  
p r i c e s  f o r  t i n  (1960-64 = 100) had reached 400 i n  the  1976-1980 per iod ,  
t h a t  f o r  a l l  minera ls ,  o r e s  and metals ( f u e l  minerals  n o t  included) 
had only a t t a i n e d  2 6 0 . ~  Over t h i s  per iod ,  Timah has c e r t a i n l y  had an  
e a s i e r  time i n  terms of p r i c e s  than t h e  i r o n  o r e  and copper producers 
analyzed i n  t h e  following two chapters .  
1). W. Labys, Market S t r u c t u r e  Bargaining Power and Resource P r i c e  Forma- 
t i o n ,  Lexington Books 1980, p.  125. 
2) I b i d  and information from in terv iew wi th  Timah. 
3) UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity P r i c e  B u l l e t i n ,  1960-1980 Supplement, Apr i l  1981. 
Chart 5 . 1  Tin pr ices ,  constant 1981 US do l lars  per lb  
(Penang Market, annual averages) 
Source : UNCTAD 
Costs and financial results of Timah's o~erations 
.................................... -------- 
Table 5.4 provides a rough outline of the changes in Timah's 
capital structure in the 10-year period 1969-1978. Although the 
debt-equity ratio has risen somewhat, the company's solidity has 
remained quite strong, with loans never constituting more than 
30 % of total funds employed. Most of the loans are of short du- 
ration. The company's long-term debt is insignificant. 
Timah has been a socially highly profitable operation through 
the 1969-1978 period for which full data are available. An export 
levy amounting to about 10 % of sales revenue has been added to cost, 
and the profit that emerged thereafter has been subject to company 
income tax at about 45 %. The after-tax profit, $ 198 million in all, 
corresponded to an average return of 10.7 % on owners' capital. Around 
20 % of after tax profits has been used to provide dividends to the 
shareholder. What remained was more than adequate to finance overall 
gross investments, even without making use of the cash flow from 
depreciation. The amounts of total depreciation in the years under 
scrutiny have been unobtainable. 
The financial returns to Indonesia from Timah's activities should 
rightly include the profit before tax plus the export levy. As may be 
computed from table 5.5, the total of these amounts sums up to almost 
$ 500 million in the ten years and equals an average return of just 
above 28 % on shareholders' funds. 
The favorable social return realized by Timah does not necessarily 
imply that the company was run in a cost-efficient way. A major pro- 
portion of Indonesia's tin output is extracted from some of the world's 
1 
most economical deposits, and this alone should enable the operations 
1) Interview with Soetario Sigit, Secretary General, Ministry of 
Mines and Energy. 


to reap substantial mineral rents. To determine the cost efficiency, 
it is'therefore necessary to probe deeper into the company's acti- 
vities. Before venturing into that exercise, it may be instructive 
to make a comparison of Indonesian (national) cost levels with those 
of other tin producing countries. Table 5.6, mainly based on data 
released by the International Tin Council, provides such a comparison. 
The table basically contains three series of figures, all expressed 
in US centsllb of tin. The first one is the average annual tin price 
in the Penang market. The second compares the production costs in 
Indonesia with an average for all producing member countries in the 
International Tin Council, as reported by each country to the Council. 
It should be noted that from 1973 the Indonesian figure is a weighted 
average of Timah and the foreign operations, even though the state 
company dominates the total throughout the period. The third series 
provides the average cost of producing and marketing tin in Timah, 
recalculated from table 5.5, and originally obtained from this company's 
accounts. It has not been possible to clarify the details of costs 
included to explain the difference between this cost series and that 
reported to the ITC. All figures are expressed in current as well as 
in constant 1981 dollars. 
Table 5.6 shows that until 1979 ~ndonesia's production cost 
was about the average for all producing member countries of the Tin 
Council. This suggests that the ability of Timah to pay high taxes 
and yet to declare high profits is in no way exceptional. A comparison 
of Indonesian cost levels with those in Malaysia, the largest tin 
producer, is revealing. Malaysian average costs have persistently 
been lower, despite the fact that its mines are much deeper and the 

o r e  grades under e x p l o i t a t i o n  much lower than i n  Indonesia .  1 
This  would suggest  t h a t  Timah, t h e  dominant Indonesian producer,  
i s  n o t  a s  e f f i c i e n t  i n  minimizing i t s  product ion c o s t s  a s  i t s  
Malaysian compet i tors .  
The response of Timah's management t o  t h i s  a l l e g a t i o n  
i s  t h a t  t h e  e l eva t ed  Indonesian c o s t  l e v e l  a r i s e s  mainly from 
t h e  s o c i a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  which t h e  company has  v o l u n t a r i l y  taken,  
o r  has  been fo rced  t o  t ake  upon i t s e l f .  These s o c i a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  
p e r t a i n  mainly t o  i t s  l a b o r  f o r c e ,  t o  community development and 
t o  r eg iona l  po l i cy .  
Tota l  employment i n  t h e  company rose  from 25,000 i n  1966 t o  
2 27,000 i n  1968, and has v a r i e d  between 27,000 and 28,000 up t o  1980. 
Output per  employee increased  from 0 .5  tons  i n  1966 t o  0.9 t ons  i n  
1975 and almost 1 t on  i n  1980. Even i n  t he  l a s t  y e a r ,  Timah's labor  
p roduc t iv i ty  is  much lower than  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  t i n  ope ra t ions  i n  
Indonesia.  The management of t h e  s t a t e  co rpo ra t ion  r e a d i l y  admits  
t h a t  t h e  company has more employees than requi red .  For i n s t ance ,  ou t  
of a  l abo r  f o r c e  of 27,652 persons i n  December 1975, 675 were c l a s s e d  
a s  "honorary ~ e r s o n n e l " ,  and 3,904 a s  " e ~ c e s s i v e " . ~  While wages a r e  
lower than those  o f f e red  f o r  s i m i l a r  jobs i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  t h e  
workers b e n e f i t  from a v a r i e t y  of c o s t l y  wel fare  programs f a r  i n  
excess  of s tandard  customs i n  t h e  country.  Other cons ide ra t ions  a r e  
a l s o  taken t o  t h e  employees. For i n s t ance ,  s p e c i a l  inducements a r e  
1)  J .  Thoburn, Mul t ina t iona l s ,  Mining and Development, o p . c i t . ,  
chap te r s  5  and 6 .  
2) Tin i n  Indonesia ,  o p . c i t . .  
3) Ib id .  
provided f o r  movement of labor  t o  new mine s i t e s .  Downward 
adjustments  of t h e  labor  f o r c e  a r e  hampered by very fa r - reaching  
r u l e s  f o r  job s e c u r i t y ,  and by t h e  extremely low labor  turnover  
of about  2 % pe r  year .  I n  1980, labor  c o s t s  c o n s t i t u t e d  about 20 % 
of t o t a l  product ion and marketing c o s t s .  1 
Timah f e e l s  r e spons ib l e  f o r  providing community development 
s e r v i c e s  i n  t h e  a r e a s  of i t s  ope ra t ion ,  even i n  t h e  absence of 
l e g a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  f o r  it t o  do so.  For example, t h e  company supplements 
t h e  l o c a l  pub l i c  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  f inanc ing  housing p r o j e c t s ,  i n  supplying 
medical and educa t iona l  s e r v i c e s ,  i n  r e p a i r i n g  roads and subs id i z ing  
household e l e c t r i c i t y .  The company's support  of t h e  n a t i o n a l  government's 
r eg iona l  p o l i c i e s  involves  maintenance of u n p r o f i t a b l e  ope ra t ions  i n  
a r e a s  with l i t t l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  economic p o t e n t i a l ,  and cons ide ra t ion  of 
r e g i o n a l  development i s s u e s  along with expected p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i n  ranking 
p o t e n t i a l  investment p r o j e c t s .  
The s o c i a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  a r e  c o s t l y  t o  Timah. I n  t h e  management's 
view, t h e  company's c o s t s  might be reduced by about 15 %, i f  it d i d  
no t  accept  s o c i a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  beyond what i s  mandatory f o r  a  p r i v a t e  
L 
co rpora t ion  ope ra t ing  i n  t h e  country.  
An i n t e r e s t i n g  development i n  T i m a h ' s ~ ~ e r a t ~ o n s  i s  t h e  engagement 
of l o c a l  en t r ep reneur s  con t r ac t ed  t o  ope ra t e  small  d e p o s i t s  l oca t ed  
away from t h e  major product ion cen te r s .  Some 10-15 % of t o t a l  ou tput  
o r i g i n a t e s  from such ope ra t ions .  The management claims t h a t  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  
f o r  employing p r i v a t e  c o n t r a c t o r s  who o p e r a t e  f o r  a  p r o f i t ,  i s  t h a t  
1 )  In te rv iews  with management of Timah. 
2) I b i d .  
such an arrangement simplifies and reduces the need for control 
in Timah. It can also be seen as a measure to avoid part of the 
social costs discussed above, and as a means of increasing the 
flexibility of overall operations, for instance in terms of labor 
mobility or production techniques. An additional reason may be to 
take advantage of Chinese mining expertise, since ethnic Chinese 
cannot be directly employed by Timah. 1 
While managerial inexperience and lacking technical competence 
are unlikely to be a contributory factor to Timahfs elevated cost 
levels, a lax approach to cost control could explain, along with 
the expensive social obligations, why the company comes out so 
unfavorably in an international comparison. One reason for the 
easy-going attitude to cost minimization may be the very considerable 
job security enjoyed by the managers. All of the half-dozen persons 
with whom I held interviews, had been with the company for 20 years 
or more. Another likely reason might be that with the high profits 
generated by the company the government has not been sufficiently 
insistent on maximum feasible cost reductions. Finally, control of 
costs will be more difficult with the unclearly defined multi- 
purpose objective function pursued by Timah. 
Table 5.6 also permits a scrutiny of the development of costs 
over time, as distinct from the cost level at each time. ~estrictin~ 
attention for a moment to the 1971-1978 period, it may be noted that 
the production costs in Indonesia as reported to the ITC rose by 
no more than 15 % in real terms, as compared to a 21 Z increase for 
1) Private communication with John Thoburn. 
the international average. Timah's costs, as reported in its 
own accounts do not appear to have risen at all in that period. 
The above-average performance in terms of cost change over time 
is explained in considerable measure by a large-scale shift of 
production in the course of the 1970's from on-shore to off-shore 
installations. An additional explanation could be that at least in 
the early 1970's the company was still recovering ground lost in 
the upsetting period after national takeover. 
1979 and 1980 have been exceptional with regard to cost develop- 
ments. In 1979, the Indonesian cost levels as reported to the ITC 
fell in absolute terms, and remained below the international average 
both in that and the following year. Two factors outside Timah's 
control explain this favorable development. First, the Indonesian 
currency was devalued by 50 % in November 1978. And second, domestic 
fuel prices were not permitted to rise in 1979 and 1980 in consequence 
of the sharp increase in international petroleum prices. In these two 
years therefore, Timah's international competitiveness was significantly 
improved by an increase of the implicit fuel subsidies. In 1980, the 
company's costs might have been 7-8 % higher, if it had paid the 
1 international price for the fuel it used. 
The cost data discussed in the preceding paragraphs do not permit 
a confirmation that Timah's policy of full capacity utilization has 
been rational in terms of the profit maximization objective. Average 
total costs excluding the export tax have remained substantially below 
prices throughout the 1970's. Variable costs in the short run are 
1) Interview with management of Timah. 
assessed by the management at less than 40 % of total average 
costs excluding the export tax. Labor costs are considered a 
fixed item. And the export tax, although varying with output, 
should not be included in costs for the purpose of determining 
capacity utilization when the tax receiving government is the 
owner. In 1972, tin prices at 427 centsllb in constant 1981 
dollars were at their lowest for the decade studied. In that year, 
average variable costsin Indonesia, taken at 40 % of total average 
- - 
cost as reported to the ITC, were only 130 centsllb in constant 
1981 dollars. It is possible that marginal production units within 
Timah had variable costs above price, but they could not have 
accounted for a significant share of output. Hence, at least during 
the 1970's the policy of utilizing full capacity cannot have deviated 
much from a rational pursuit of profit maximization by the government. 
Investments and ca~acity ex~ansion 
----------------- ---- --- ------ 
As noted earlier in this section, there has not been any clear- 
cut policy with regard to investments and expansion of Timah's capa- 
city. Overall gross investments in the 10-year period 1969-1978 have 
been quite small. At $ 134 million, they were only two thirds as large 
as the after tax profit in the period. On average gross investments 
amounted to 7 X of the overall funds employed by Timah, and could 
therefore not have greatly exceeded the amount of depreciation. Hence, 
the expansion of the company's production must have consisted in the 
main of the rehabilitation of existing but inactive installations. 
In the Indonesian National 5-year plan which ends in 1984, expansion 
of Timah's output has been set at 4 % per year. 
Indonesia has a very favorable potential for further 
growth of the tin industry. While its share of world output 
in 1980 was only 14 %, the country's resenres constituted close 
1 
to 25 % of the world total. Given the industry's ability to 
make sizable fiscal contributions and yet to generate quite 
substantial returns on the invested capital, one may wonder why 
the government and its company have not pursued a more aggressive 
investment policy to expand Timah's production even faster. Such 
a policy would certainly have contributed to a better attainment 
of the company's long run profit maximization objective. 
The public ownership of Timah may provide an explanation to 
the relatively slow growth of this corporation, despite its 
impressive record in terms of fiscal contributions and profits. 
Thus, in an effort to bring about economic diversification or a 
better satisfaction of basic needs, the government may have desired 
to restrict the growth of the tin and oil sectors, in favor of 
manufacturing and agriculture, despite the lower returns on invest- 
ments in the latter activities. The high petr~lew income earned 
through most of the 1970's would have permitted the government to 
afford such policies. 
Another explanation has to do with the slow growth of tin 
demand and the geographical concentration of its production. Thus, 
there may exist a tacit understanding among the four major producing 
countries to keep output in line with demand growth, in a joint effort 
to maintain the favorable tin prices. 
1) P.C.F. Crowson, Non-fuel Minerals Data Base, Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, London 1980. 
The distinguishing features of Indonesia's state-owned 
tin industry 
The experiences of Timah and its state-owned predecessors 
since 1950 do provide some support to the hypotheses about state- 
enterprises in international mineral markets, formulated at the 
end of the preceding chapter. 
The above account of what happened to Indonesian tin in the 
first 17 years of nationhood provides a clear-cut illustration of 
the thesis that nationalization involves a heavy setting-up and 
learning cost. The managerial deficiences of that period and the 
inability to expand or even maintain capacity would be typical of 
the inexperienced state enterprise discus.sed in chapter 4. However, 
the extreme financial drain of the industry by the government would 
appear somewhat exceptional in an international context. So would 
the brave effort to launch a technically complex venture of forward 
integration long before the managerial and technical resources had 
been consolidated. 
The operations of Timah in the 1970's also support the hypothesis 
that state enterprises operate at higher cost levels than would private 
firms in similar circumstances. The excessive number of employees and 
the far-reaching social obligations pursued by this enterprise, along 
with the relatively lax attitude of management and government with 
regard to cost minimization provide an ample illustration of the point. 
Though costs appear elevated in relation to the minimum attainable, 
they are quite low in comparison with tin prices. This is mainly a 
reflection of Indonesia'a very favorable resource base with regard 
t o  t h i s  m a t e r i a l .  I n  a l l  l i k e l i h o o d ,  t h e  marginal c o s t  of 
Timah's ope ra t ions  has no t  exceeded p r i c e  f o r  any l eng th  of 
t ime dur ing  t h e  per iod  s i n c e  1969, f o r  which c o s t  d a t a  a r e  
a v a i l a b l e .  Hence, t h e  po l i cy  of maximum f e a s i b l e  u t i l i z a t i o n  
of capac i ty  pursued by t h i s  company has  probably been r a t i o n a l  
i n  terms of t h e  p r o f i t  maximization o b j e c t i v e .  Circumstances of 
t h e  Indonesian c a s e  s tudy have t h e r e f o r e  not .been  conducive t o  
t e s t i n g  t h e  hypothesis  t h a t  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  l e s s  f l e x i b l e  
than  p r i v a t e  f i rms  i n  a d j u s t i n g  capac i ty  u t i l i z a t i o n  t o  p r i c e  
and market demand. 
Na t iona l i za t ion  of Indones ia ' s  t i n  d i d  indeed break up 
e x i s t i n g  cha ins  of v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  wi th  Dutch process ing  
u n i t s ,  and so ,  f o r  a time a t  l e a s t ,  expanded t h e  arms-length s a l e s  
of t i n  concent ra tes .  The es tab l i shment  of a smel te r  i n  t h e  country 
i n  t h e  l a t e  1960's r e e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  of t h e  
Indonesian t i n  i ndus t ry ,  a t  l e a s t  p a r t  of t h e  way. But while  t h e  
former Dutch ope ra t ions  included some t i n - r e l a t e d  f a b r i c a t i n g  and 
manufacturing a c t i v i t i e s ,  processing wi th in  Timah does not  proceed 
beyond smelt ing.  
The hypothes is  t h a t  s t a t e  ownership w i l l  r e a l l o c a t e  investments  
and capac i ty  growth t o  c o u n t r i e s  with p a r t i c u l a r l y  f avo rab le  resource  
p o t e n t i a l  i s  not  borne out  by t h e  s t o r y  of Timah. The reason may be 
e i t h e r  t h a t  Indones ia ' s  o i l  r i c h e s  i n  t h e  1970's have permi t ted  t h e  
government t o  neg lec t  t h e  earn ings  p o t e n t i a l  of t i n ,  o r  t h a t  inves t -  
ment i n  capac i ty  growth has been r e s t r i c t e d  by a t a c i t  inter-goyern- 
mental agreement between t h e  f o u r  lead ing  producing c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  
o b j e c t i v e  being t o  maintain t h e  f avo rab le  t i n  p r i c e s .  
Appendix 5 .1  
Persons interviewed i n  Indonesia  
PT Tambang Timah 
Ir. M. Simatupang, D i rec to r  Research and Development 
Mr. Kantakusumah Kusyaman, Head Marketing Div is ion  
M r .  K a r i m  L a t i e f ,  Head Training Div is ion  
Mr. Asyik Ramly, Head Mining Divis ion  
Iman Mohammed Ismu,Head Research and Planning Divis ion  
PT Riau Tin Mining 
M r .  C.B.C. Valk, General Manager 
PT Broken H i l l  P r o ~ r i e t o r v  Indonesia  
M r .  C. Mirach, Publ ich Re la t ions  Manager 
Minis t ry  of Mines and Energy 
D r .  Soetaryo S i g i t ,  Sec re t a ry  General 
D r .  J .A .  K a t i l i ,  Di rec tor  General 
Minis t ry  of Finance 
D r .  Dono Iskandar ,  Head Bureau of Planning 
Other 
P ro f .  Mohd S a d l i ,  Former Minis te r  of Mines and Energy 
M r .  M. Subroto,  D i rec to r  General Minis t ry  Mines and Energy, 
r e t i r e d  s i n c e  1973. 
D r .  Ralph Beals ,  Harvard Unit ,  Advisor t o  Min i s t e r  of Finance 
M r .  H. Roden, IMF Resident Representa t ive  
CHAPTER 6. THE STATE IRON ORE INDUSTRY IN VENEZUELA 
The antecedents to nationalization 
Iron ore has been mined in Venezuela since the early 1950's. The 
opening of the Venezuelan production units constituted one of the 
first instances in a wholesale locational shift of the world iron 
ore industry in the 1950's and 1960's from the depleting iron ore 
deposits in the U.S. and Western Europe, to the much richer resources 
of Latin America, Western Africa and Australia that had become 
economically accessible in that period as a result of revolutionary 
developments in bulk transport techniques. The mines are located 
in the Guayana region, close to Puerto Ordaz at the confluence of 
the Orinoco and Caroni rivers. At the time of their establishment, 
this was an undeveloped and sparsely populated area. The foreign 
investors, in collaboration with the government, had to build up 
extensive infrastructural facilities for the iron ore operations. 
1) The data upon which the analysis is based have been obtained from 
material published in Venezuela and elsewhere, as quoted, and, above 
all from a series of personal interviews which included a number of 
office holders in the Ministries of Planning (Cordiplan) and Energy 
and Mines and in Ferrominera, the state iron ore enterprise, conducted 
during a two-week visit to Venezuela in November 1982. Appendix 6.1 lists 
the persons interviewed. A particularly valuable source is a detailed 
memorandum on the state owned iron ore company, prepared by Janet Kelly 
Escobar, and entitled "Ferrominera Orinoco", Stencil, Dec., 1979. 
To a t t r a c t  workers t o  t h i s  " f r o n t i e r "  a r e a ,  t h e  companies had t o  
provide housing,  commissar ies ,  s choo l s  and h o s p i t a l s ,  and t o  o f f e r  
s a l a r i e s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  above t h e  average i n  o t h e r  p a r t s  of Venezuela. 
The mines were run  as two s e p a r a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  owned by U.S. S t e e l  
and Bethlehem S t e e l  (of t h e  U.S.) r e s p e c t i v e l y .  T h e i r  e s t ab l i shmen t  
had been mot iva ted  by a d e s i r e  t o  s e c u r e  t h e  s t e e l  companies' raw 
m a t e r i a l  supply.  I n  t h e i r  e a r l y  l i f e ,  t h e  Venezuelan u n i t s  f unc t i oned  
I 
a s  "capt ive"  mines,  w i t h  p r a c t i c a l l y  t h e  e n t i r e  o u t p u t  consumed w i t h i n  
each of t h e  f i rms .  The expansion of p roduc t ion  i n  t h e  l a t e  1950 's  l e d  
t o  an i n c r e a s e  i n  arms-length sales. I n  t h e  196OVs,  about  a t h i r d  of t h e  
1 
o u t pu t  came t o  be s o l d  t o  o t h e r  s t e e l  companies, predominant ly  i n  Europe. 
It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  genuine p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of t h e  i r o n  
o r e  mining a c t i v i t i e s  i n  Venezuela du r ing  t h e  pe r i od  of f o r e i g n  
ownership. U n t i l  t h e  mid-1960's t h e  dec l a r ed  p r o f i t s  of t h e  two 
f i rms  were determined by t h e  admin is te red  p r i c e s  t h a t  were app l i ed  
t o  t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  s a l e s .  I n  t h e  subsequent  decade,  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
was dependent upon t h e  r e f e r e n c e  p r i c e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  govern- 
ment i n  an e f f o r t  t o  a s s u r e  Venezuela of i t s  "proper" s h a r e  of t h e  
2 
m i n e ra l  r e n t .  According t o  Gomez, t h e  dec l a r ed  p r o f i t s  a f t e r  t a x  
v a r i e d  between 10.2  and 40.2 pe r cen t  on c a p i t a l  inves tment  i n  t h e  y e a r s  
between 1957 and 1968, w i th  an unweighted average e q u a l  t o  22 p e r c e n t .  
I n  1975, t h e  i r o n  o r e  mines were n a t i o n a l i z e d ,  and have been run  s i n c e  
1976 by a s i n g l e  state-owned e n t e r p r i s e ,  CVG Ferrominera  Orinoco CA. 
1 )  H. Gomez, "Venezuela 's  I r o n  Ore Industry" ,  i n  R.F. Mikese l l  e t  a l ,  
Foreign Investment i n  t h e  Petroleum and Minera l  I n d u s t r i e s ,  Johns 
Hopkins 1971. 
2) Gomez, o p . c i t .  
Table 6.1 provides data for Venezuela's production and exports from 
1955, when the industry had acquired significance, and until the 
present.1 Venezuela's share of the world total is also given. 
The immediate impulse to nationalize the iron ore industry was 
given by the euphoria following the Opec price increases in 1973/1974 
and the simultaneous general commodity price boom. The more basic 
reasons were internal to Venezuela, and had to do with arrangements 
in the petroleum industry. 
After renegotiations undertaken in the 1940ts, the major petro- 
leum concessions in Venezuela were timed to expire in 1983: The 
uncertainty about the government's intentions after that date resulted 
in an increasing reluctance among the private petroleum companies, 
from the early 1970's onwards, to maintain existing installations, 
or to commit funds to create new capacity. Unwilling to accept a 
gradual dismantling of the country's petroleum capacity, the govern- 
ment decided that the industry had to be nationalized even before the 
expiry of the concessions in force. 
The petroleum industry is vital to the Venezuelan economy. To mini- 
mize the risk of costly mistakes in the nationalization procedure, it 
was decided that the iron ore industry should be nationalized first. 
In this way the government would gain some of the experience needed 
for an efficient takeover of petroleum. As things turned out, the 
intention to nationalize the two iron ore producers was announced in 
1974, and the actual takeover was completed by January 1975. The 
petroleum industry was nationalized in the following year. The 
officially stated goals to nationalize the iron ore industry included 
a desire to appropriate the full mineral rent, to place Venezuelan 
nationals in the highest managerial positions, to increase national 
value added by forward processing of the ore into pellets or bri- 
quettes and to assure the raw material supply to the nascent domestic 
steel industry. 3 
1) Except where specially indicated, all tonnages in this chapter refer 
to actual weight. 
2) This and the next paragraph are based on an interview with Argenis 
Gamboa, retired president of Corporacion Yenezolana de Guayana, which 
is the formal owner of CVG Ferrominera. Gamboa was the person mainly 
responsible for carrying out the iron ore nationalization. 
3) J. Kelly Escobar, "Ferrominera Orinoco", Stencil, Dec., 1979. 
Table 6.1 Venezuela in the World I.ron Ore Industry 
Million tons 
Iron ore production Iron ore exports 
World Venezuela V's share % World Venezuela V's share % 
Sources: 1955-1975 from UNCTAD, 'Iron Ore: features of the world market, 
Statistical Annexl,TD/B/IPC/IRON ORE 12lAdd.1, 8 Aug 1977. 
1976-1981 from Mining Annual Review, several issues. 
Though they held exploitation concessions valid for many years into 
the future, the foreign companies did not contest legally the govern- 
ment's right to nationalize. Negotiations were held to establish 
the foreign owners' compensation as well as other terms in connec- 
tion with the government's takeover. 
The Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana (CVG), a public regional development 
corporation, was to take over the assets, and was made responsible 
for conducting the negotiations. The agreement finally reached 
based compensation payments on the net book value of assets, to be 
paid with interest not exceeding 7 % per annum, over the ten years 
following nationalization. 
The negotiations also led to the establishment of several other 
agreements with the foreign owners, viz; 
(a) a three-year management and technical assistance contract, 
assuring the continued presence of practically all key foreign 
personnel for a period after takeover, and including a training 
component to speed up the transition to a fully Venezuelan manage- 
ment, 
(b) an agreement with U.S. Steel to assist with equipment purchases 
and with ore marketing in Europe, 
(c) long run delivery contracts to the former principals, of 
virtually unchanged quantities of iron ore for several years 
following nationalization. Thus, U.S. Steel agreed to take about 
11 million tons per year over the 7-year period 1975-1981. Bethlehem 
Steel committed itself to purchase about 3.3 million tons annually 
over the 3-year period 1975-1977* Prices in these contracts were 
set equal to the price for Mesabi non-Bessemer ore delivered in 
Pittsburgh or Lower Lake Erie, subject to an agreed minimum. 1 
12 The Mesabi price is a CIF quotation reflecting the special 
conditions that characterize the U.S. iron ore market. A combina- 
tion of transfer pricing decisions internal to the U.S. Steel 
companies, and of the structure of the U.S. tax system has kept 
this price at levels substantially above the import prices in 
Europe (Kelly Escobar op. cit .) . 
Contributing to the speedy and smooth completion of the takeover 
negotiations was the fact that in 1974, the year when they took 
place, the world steel industry was experiencing a strong boom, 
of which no end was perceived. The primary concern of the U.S. 
steel companies at the time was to secure their raw material 
supply from Venezuela. Maintenance of their ownership position 
was a secondary consideration. Having satisfied their supply 
needs through the long-run delivery contracts discussed above, 
they were less unwilling to agree to the other terms of the natio- 
nalization sought by the Venezuelan government. 
The far-reaching collaboration between the old and new owners in 
the managerial, technical and marketing fields aroused some poli- 
tical criticism. It was felt that the continued foreign presence 
and involvement diluted national control, one of the key aims of 
nationalization. The response of CVG was that close collaboration 
with the former owners was of key importance, to prevent a loss in 
output and productivity in the period following the ownership 
transE'er. 
The establishment and operations of Ferrominera 
After a one-year interim period, responsibility for the state owned 
iron ore activities was shifted from CVG itself to a fully owned 
subsididary, CVG Ferrominera Orinoco CA, established for this purpose 
in December 1975. The present section analyzes Ferrominera and its 
operations from the time it was set up until the present. The 
discussion begins by looking at the mechanisms through which the 
owners can control and influence Ferrominera's performance and at 
the goals that the company is supposed to pursue. I then study 
Ferrominera's record in terms of production and sales. Finally, I 
scrutinize its results, taxpayments and investment performance. 
As noted, Ferrominera is a fully owned subsidiary of CVG. The 
latter is a public regional development corporation. Apart from 
iron ore operations, CVG's subsidiaries include steel, aluminum, 
hydroelectricity and other activities. Formally, all responsibi- 
lities for Ferrominera are entrusted with CVG which constitutes 
the shareholders' assembly and appoints the president and board 
in the iron ore enterprise. In reality, the lines of overall direc- 
tion are more complex. For instance the Mknistry of energy and mines is 
entrusted with the task of ensuring that Ferrominera adheres to the 
provisions of Venezuela's mining law. The Ministry of Planning.(Cordiplan) 
is responsible for integrating the iron ore activities with the 
national development plan. Long run policies and major investments 
of Ferrominera are determined in regular meetings between the presi- 
dent and management of this enterprise on the one hand, and represen- 
tatives of the two Ministries on the other. Were dis%reements to 
arise, it is envisaged that they would be settled by the Ministry of 
the Secretary of the Presidency, the formal principal of CVG. Still 
other public bodies would be involved if Ferrominera required external 
capital additions, which it has not so far. In practice, it seems that the 
political involvement in Ferrominera's day-to-day activities has been 
quite limited. The company's president along with the top management 
appear to have been left in peace in running the company since the 
time of its establishment. The non-involvement of politicians may 
be explained by the manipulating skills of the company's presidents, 
enabling them to pursue their own ideas by playing off the different 
political interests against each other. But it could also be because 
of unanimity between the management and the political institutions 
concerned with regard to the goals and policies that the company 
should pursue. 
A unanimity of opinions on the goals to be pursued by Ferrominera 
does indeed emerge from my interviews. Thus, it is invariably 
stated, both by the managers in the enterprise and by the responsible 
Ministry officials, that profit maximization is not a goal of the 
company. There is general consensus on the need to avoid losses, 
and to earn some profits, possibly so as to cover the company's 
own investment requirements. Over and above that, however, there 
is no urge to generate surpluses. 
A second goal on which there appears to be universal agreement is 
assurance of raw material supply to the domestic steel industry. 
This goal, presumably meaning that deliveries to satisfy domestic 
needs should have priority over export deliveries, has not had any 
practical implications so far. In all years since nationalization, 
the company's capacity has been more than sufficient to satisfy 
both the internal and export market demand without any constraint. 
A third goal for Ferrominera, widely professed by the persons inter- 
viewed is that of promoting regional development in the Guayana 
region. The foreign-owned iron ore companies took upon themselves 
important regional development tasks both out of necessity, because 
a buildup of infrastructure and social facilities was an indispen- 
sable requirement for efficient iron ore extraction, and because 
they wanted to appear as 'good corporate citizens' . In the 1970' s 
and 19801s, the Guayana region is reasonably well endowed in these 
respects. Hence, continued regional development endeavors are less 
of a pressing prerequisite for iron ore production. However, the 
transfer of ownership to CVG, the regional development corporation, 
has greatly added to the importance of such endeavors in the company's 
preoccupations, even when they do not improve the efficiency of iron 
ore operations. One of the managers pointed out that since the 
ultimate purpose of Ferrominera's profits over and above the company's 
own financial needs is precisely regional development, it did not 
really matter much whether the development expenditure was financed 
by the profits declared by the company or was included as part of 
the overall costs incurred by the company. 
Chart 6.1 provides a general background to the world iron ore market 
in which Ferrominera has been operating. Iron ore prices in inter- 
national trade, when measured in constant dollars, have been falling 
persistently since the late 1950's. The weak development in the 
1960's is primarily explained by the introduction of large-scale 
and low-cost supply from Latin America, Western Africa and Australia. 
The further sharp fall in the latter half of the 1970's has been due 
t o  a  depress ion  i n  demand caused by t h e  worldwide c r i s i s  i n  t h e  
s t e e l  indus t ry .  
Chart  6.1 I r o n  O r e  p r i c e s ,  cons tan t  1981 US d o l l a r s  pe r  ton  
( B r a z i l i a n  d e l i v e r i e s  CIF North Sea P o r t s ,  68 % Fe) 
A s  appears from t a b l e  6.1,  product ion a s  w e l l  a s  expor t s  of i r o n  o re  
i n  Venezuela reached t h e i r  peak i n  t he  1970f s ,  and have s e t t l e d  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  lower i n  subsequent years .  To an important e x t e n t ,  
t h i s  is the  consequence of t he  exceedingly weak i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i r o n  
o re  market a f t e r  t h e  mid-1970's. The f i g u r e s  show t h a t  world produc- 
t i o n  and world expor t s ,  too ,  have dec l ined  s i n c e  t h a t  time. However, 
a c l o s e r  s c r u t i n y  of t he  numbers r e v e a l s  t h a t  Venezuela's ou tput  and 
s a l e s  f e l l  by much more, w i t h  a consequent d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  count ry ' s  
s h a r e  i n  world product ion and exports .  It is  contended i n  t h e  
fol lowing d i scuss ion  t h a t  t h e  l o s s  i n  sha re s  i s  s t rong ly  r e l a t e d  t o  
t h e  change i n  ownership t h a t  occurred i n  1975. 
Table 6.2 providing the  d e t a i l s  of Venezuelan i r o n  o r e  d e l i v e r i e s ,  
i s  an i n s t r u c t i v e  background t o  t h i s  d i scuss ion .  It i s  immediately 
c l e a r  from t h e  t a b l e  t h a t  t h e  important market l o s s  occurred i n  t h e  
U.S. where p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  s a l e s  have been based on t h e  long run  
c o n t r a c t u a l  agreements wi th  U.S. S t e e l  and Bethlehem S t e e l .  It w i l l  
Table 6.2 Ferrominera,  I r o n  Ore D e l i v e r i e s ,  m i l l i o n  tons  
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
U.S. 15.5 11.2 9.8 6.3 6.2 4.8 3.9 5.4 1.2 
Europe 10.8 8.2 7.5 5.5 6.6 8.2 7.7 7.0 5.4 
To ta l  expor t s  26.3 19.4 17.3 11.8 12.8 13.0 11.6 12.4 6.6 
Venezuela 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 2.8 2.9 3.9 
Tota l  26.5 19.6 17.4 12.0 13.3 13.7 14.4 15.3 10.5 
Notes: (1) Sa l e s  f o r  1974 and 1975 p e r t a i n  t o  t h e  predecessors  of 
Ferrominera,  and a r e  g iven  f o r  comparison. 
(2) The European f i g u r e  inc ludes  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  amounts exported 
t o  La t in  America. 
(3) The d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  f i g u r e s  of t a b l e s  6.1 and 6.2 i s  
p a r t l y  due t o  t h e  use  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  and n a t i o n a l  s t a t i s -  
t i c a l  sources r e spec t ive ly .  Product ion i n  t a b l e  6.1 r e l a t e s  
t o  crude o r e  output  a t  t h e  mine; d e l i v e r i e s  i n  t a b l e  6.2 
r e f e r  t o  f i n a l  products  so ld .  The processing t o  o b t a i n  
t h e  l a t t e r  w i l l  r e g u l a r l y  involve some l o s s  i n  weight.  
Sources: 1974 and 1975, Hier ro  y Otros Datos E s t a d i s t i c o s  Mineros, 
Ano 1980, Minis t ry  of Energy and Mines, Caracas. 
1976-1982, f i g u r e s  provided by  erro om in era's accounts  
department. 
be recalled that in 1974 these two companies had made commitments to 
buy about 14 million tons of ore per year between 1975 and1977 and 
around 11 million tons from 1978 till 1981. As the world steel 
depression became apparent, the former owners coerced Ferrominera 
to renegotiate the purchase contracts. The new agreements involved 
a lowering of the prices to equal the average U.S. East Coast compe- 
titive import price, and a substantial reduction of volumes. Thus, 
from 1977 onwards, the quantities bought by the U.S. were less than 
half of those envisaged in the original contracts. 1982 was an 
extremely difficult year for the world iron ore industry. In that 
year, the first after the expiry of the contracts, Venezuelan sales 
to the U.S. fell to the disastrously low figure of 1.2 million tons. 
In 1982, negotiations were in process to establish a new long run 
contract with U.S. Steel, covering possibly a period of 12 years. 
with annual deliveries of around 5 million tons. Bethlehem Steel has 
declined the Venezuelan offers of continued supply pointing to the 
low utilization of its steel capacity and to commitments to purchase 
iron ore from Canada and Liberia. 
There are strong reasons for the claim that the reduced U.S. interest 
in Venezuelan supply is largely explained by the nationalization. As 
appears from table 6.3, imports of ore from Venezuela to the U.S. 
declined sharply after nationalization, not only in absolute amounts, 
but also in relation to total demand in and total imports into the 
U.S. There is little doubt that with continued U.S. ownership, 
Venezuelan iron ore would have been afforded a substantially higher 
priority in the U.S. market. 
The negative impact of ownership change is confirmed by the compara- 
tively much better ~erfomance in the European market. Venezuela's 
share of sea-borneimports into Western Europe was 7.3 % in 1970 and 
5.4 Z in 1979.' Only in the short run did European sales suffer more 
severely from nationalization, and this was importantly due to a 
1) J. Husgen, "Sea Transport and Handling of Iron Ore", paper delivered 
at Third Bulk Handling and Transport Conference, Amsterdam, May 1981. 
Table 6.3 Demand and Supply of Iron Ore in the U. S. 
Million tons of Fe content 
1974 1978 
Demand 
SUPP ly 
Domes tic 
Imported net 
(of which Venezuela) 
Venezuela' s share, percent of 
Demand 11.3 5.2 
Net imported supply 32.4 20.2 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals in the U.S. Economy, 
several issues. 
statement by the President of the country that in the long run the 
national enterprise would not export at all. The management of Ferro- 
minera eventually succeeded in convincing the President that continued 
competition in international markets was essential to assure domestic 
supply at low cost over time. However, the uncertainty about longer 
run availability of Venezuelan ore, initially created by this statement, 
caused a reluctance among European customers to continue their purchases, 
and it took some persuasion by the company's marketing arm before this 
reluctance had been overcome. 
Around half of the Venezuelan sales to Europe has been delivered 
under annually renewable contracts. Most of the remaining quantities 
have been sold under contracts specifying quantities for between 5-7 
years, with prices renegotiated each year. In practice, there is 
little difference between these two contractual forms, since the 
annual contracts are regularly renewed. Some small quantities have 
been sold in the European spot market. These are no plans to change 
the current marketing arrangements in Europe. 
Like its foreign-owned predecessors, Ferrominera has been a price 
taker in the European market. Since many years, the CIF price level 
in Europe has been determined annually through the outcome of German 
negotiations, first with Sweden and more recently with Brazil, after 
that country took over the former Swedish role as leading ore 
exporter to Europe. Acceptance of this price level has assured Vene- 
zuela of a share in the market even in periods of low demand, since 
the buyers have been interested in diversifying their sources of 
supply. The buyers' urge to diversify would weaken if some sources of 
supply were cheaper than others. Hence, a unilateral Venezuelan price 
increase would involve Ferrominera in a severe risk of losing sales. 
In a competitive market, Ferrominera might have considered accepting 
lower prices to assure fuller capacity utilization. This could have 
been a rational profit maximizing policy given the very low variable 
costs of operation, fluctuating between $ 1.8 and 2.4 per ton (17-25 % 
of total cost) during the 1977-1981 period. However, with the oligo- 
polistic structure that has characterized the international iron ore 
market, such a policy would have been self-defeating since other pro- 
ducers would undoubtedly have responded by matching price reductions. 
The period covered by table 6.2 records the emergence of a large domestic 
market for Ferrominera. Deliveries to the national steel industry were 
insignificant until 1978, because through that period, the country's 
major steel producer, Sidor, was itself operating a smaller iron ore 
mine (Cerro San Isidoro). In 1980 and 1981, sales in Venezuela attained 
close to 3 million tons per year, and rose further to almost 4 million 
tons in 1982. 
Prices for domestic sales have been determined at negotiations bet- 
ween Ferrominera and Sidor, the state-owned steel enterprise. The two 
firms are sister companies, both owned by CVG,' and with several inter- 
locking directorships. Sidor is in close proximity of Ferrominera's 
port facilities. Hence, the costs for transport from the port are in- 
significant. Initially, the price levels for deliveries to Sidor were 
set close to the FOB price received by Ferrominera for sales to Europe. 
In more recent years, Sidor has paid somewhat more than the European 
FOB price. Given the high transport cost to Europe, the delivered 
domestic price was substantially below the delivered price to Europe. 
1) Sidor is part-owned by Fondo de Inversiones de Venezuela, FIV, an 
investment finance agency of the government. 
Table 6.4 P r i c e s  f o r  Venezuelan I r o n  Ore ~ e l i v e r i e s  
U.S. d o l l a r s  p e r  t o n  
E s t .  
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
C IF U.S. 
Europe 
FOB U.S. 
Europe 
S idor  11.7 12.2 11.3 11.1 13.7 14.4 14.4 
Weighted average p r i c e  14.5 14.0 11.6 11.7 13.2 14.5 14.0 
rece ived  excluding ocean 
sh ipping  
Source: Ferrominera.  
Ferrominera has  been For tuna te  i n  s t a r t i n g  i t s  l i f e  w i th  own c a p i t a l  
c o n s t i t u t i n g  a , v e r y  l a r g e  p ropor t i on  of i t s  t o t a l  ba lance ,  and v i r t u a l  
absence of long run  debt  t o  o u t s i d e r s .  The company's c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e  
appears  i n  t a b l e  6.5.  A very  l a r g e  p a r t  of t h e  long run  deb t  c o n s i s t s  
of loans  from t h e  employees' p rovident  fund. 
Table 6 .5  A S m a r y ' o f  Ferrominera 's  C a p i t a l  S t r u c t u r e  
Mi l l i on  U.S. d o l l a r s  
19 76 1978 1980 1982 (Sept . )  
Shor t  run  debt  6 8 8 4 145 138 
Long r u n  deb t  3 2 39 6 4 74 
Own c a p i t a l  214 218 210 232 
To ta l  balance 314 34 1 419 444 
Source: Ferrominera.  
As is evident from table 6.6, Ferrominera has been persistently 
successful in attaining one of its goals, namely to generate some 
profits. In 1976, profits before tax provided a return of 4.5% on 
the company's own capital. The return fell to below 3 % in 1977, 
and was quite insignificant in the following years. The major 
reason behind the weak and deteriorating profitability is the world- 
wide depression in the iron ore industry, resulting in low capacity 
utilization and low, and falling, realprice levels. Ferrominera's 
ability to avoid losses since its establishment has been greatly 
facilitated by its favorable capital structure and low interest 
payments . 
Table 6.6 Ferrominera, Summary Profit and Loss Account 
Million U.S. dollars 
Gross sales 351.7 232.6 228.7 250.0 311.7 361.7 224.4 
Minus transport charges 98.1 67.4 86.2 104.8 130.0 153.4 83.9' 
Net sales 253.6 165.2 142.5 145.2 181.7 208.3 140.5 
Costs: Personnel 77.0 47.4 47.9 54.3 81.3 86.6 62.0 
Materials & services 43.0 36.2 42.7 42.2 49.8 55.0 55.1 
Depreciation 10.4 10.9 9.7 11.4 13.1 15.0 12.9 
Interest paid 0 0.4 4.7 8.7 11.8 15.6 11.8 
Other costs, net 26.5 11.2 5.2 7.9 25.0 33.1 (6.8) 
Total costs 156.9 106.1 110.2 124.5 181.0 205.3 135.0 
Profits before tax 96.7 59.1 32.3 20.7 0.7 3.0 5-5 
Profits tax payments 56.3 34.9 19.6 14.8 0.6 1.7 4.2 
Profits after tax 40.4 24.2 12.7 5.9 0.1 1.3 1.3 
Dividends 0 0 13.8 14.0 0 0 0 
Source: Ferrominera. 
The cost figures require several comments and some elaboration. The 
sharp variation in the 'other costs' item is primarily due to the 
losses incurred by Ferrominera through its part-ownership in a high- 
iron briquette plant,where briquettes containing 85 % Fe were pro- 
duced through a natural-gas based direct reduction process. This 
plant, the first of its kind worldwide, has been a perennial loss- 
maker since it started operating in 1971. The unfavorable results 
have been primarily due to technical problems that prevented the 
plant from attaining anywhere near its designed capacity. The in- 
stallations were closed down in 1977 for redesigning and opened 
again in 1980, only to be permanently closed in 1982. The net 
losses incurred by Ferrominera on the operations of the briquette 
plant were $20.1 million in 1976, $3.7 million in 1979, $10.3 million 
in 1980 and $12.4 million in 1981. 
The exceptionally high personnel expenditure in 1976 is explained in 
the main by the expensive management contracts with the former owners 
and can be seen as a temporary setting-up cost that was overcome in 
the following year. 
While 1976 was exceptional in terms of personnel costs, the level of 
these costs throughout the period studied, at more than 40 % of total 
cost, has been very high for a mining operation. To some extent this 
is a legacy from the time when the mines were established. As noted 
earlier, at that time labor had to be attracted to Guyana by high 
wages and a miscellany of company-provided social facilities. Once 
introduced, these special benefits have continued both under private- 
foreign and public-national ownership, despite the infrastructural 
and social developments in the Guayana region. After nationalization, 
CVG has pressured Ferrominera to reduce wages and other employee 
benefits to levels more in line with those offered by its other sub- 
sidiaries, e.g. the steel and aluminum companies. Ferrominera's 
profitability and the other companies' losses explain why these 
pressures have not had much impact so far. In 1981, Ferrominera's 
costs for providing fringe benefits like subsidized housing, hospi- 
tals, schools and a commissary to its employees amounted to $ 17.5 
million, 20 % of overall personal costs, and almost six times the 
net profit declared in that year. 
Table 6.7 Labor P r o d u c t i v i t y  i n  Venezuelan I ron  Qre Mining 
E s t .  
No. of employees 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
i n  i r o n  o r e  
mining 3248 3335 3372 3657 3868 4012 3814 3814 4222 4440 3809 3300 
Tons produced 
pe r  employee 6219 5547 6850 7219 6411 4661 3592 3540 3624 3626 4069 3606 
Labor p r o d u c t i v i t y  
Index1971-73=100 100 89 110 116 103 75 58 57 58 58 66 58 
Source: H ie r ro  y o t r o s  d a t o s ,  o p . c i t .  and Table  6.1. 
Another exp l ana t i on  t o  t h e  h igh  l abo r  c o s t  h a s  been t h e  sha rp  f a l l  
i n  l abo r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  a f t e r  t h e  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n .  The developments 
dep i c t ed  i n  Table  6.7 a r e  l e s s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  inexper ience  of t h e  
new management t h a t  took over  a f t e r  t h e  d e p a r t u r e  of t h e  f o r e i g n  
owners, than t o  t h e  combination of f a l l i n g  ou tpu t  on t h e  one hand, 
and s o c i a l  and l e g a l  p r e s su re s  a g a i n s t  r educ t i ons  of t h e  l abo r  f o r c e  
s o  long a s  t h e  company genera ted  p r o f i t s ,  on t h e  o t h e r .  
Company o f f i c i a l s  c la im t h a t  t h e  f a l l  i n  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  dep i c t ed  
i n  Table  6.7 i s  exaggerated by t h e  t r a n s f e r  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
r i v e r  dredging o p e r a t i o n s  t o  Ferrominera i n  1976. By adding some 
200 employees t o  t h e  company's p a y r o l l ,  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  expanded i t s  
t o t a l  l abo r  f o r c e  t o  j u s t  above 4000. 
The p r o f i t  squeeze exper ienced by Ferrominera s i n c e  1980 has  l e d  t o  
f o r c e f u l  a c t i o n s  t o  t r i m  c o s t s .  A s  mentioned above, t h e  B r i q u e t t e  
p l a n t  was c lo sed  i n  1982, reducing t h e  l abo r  f o r c e  by about 300. I n  
t h e  same y e a r ,  t h e  dredging ope ra t i ons  were t r a n s f e r r e d  ou t  of t h e  
company, reducing employment by ano the r  200, and r e l i e v i n g  Ferro-  
minera of an exces s ive  p ropo r t i on  of t h e  t o t a l  c o s t s  f o r  keeping 
t h e  r i v e r  nav igab l e .  
Along wi th  e f f o r t s  t o  c u t  o u t  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s l a c k  i n  o t h e r  a r e a s ,  
t h e  management succeeded i n  reducing t h e  t o t a l  l a b o r  f o r c e  from 
4440 a t  t h e  end of 1980 t o  3300 l a t e  i n  1982. The c o s t  r e d u c t i o n s  
enabled t h e  company t o  almost break even i n  t h e  l a t t e r  yea r .  But 
t h e  sharp  cu r t a i lmen t  i n  volume produced kep t  l abo r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  low, 
d e s p i t e  t h e  s i z a b l e  r educ t i on  i n  l abo r  f o r c e .  
Ferrominera is liable to a royalty equal to 1 2 of the value of pro- 
duction at the mine, and, like other companies in Venezuela, to a 
60 X profits tax. The royalty is included in the operating costs. 
Following the legacy established during the time of foreign owner- 
ship, the profits for the purpose of profits tax are determined on 
the basis of a posted price for iron ore, set by the government each 
year. Since nationalization, however, the government has followed 
the recommendations of Ferrominera in setting the posted price, and 
there is little difference between accounting profits and taxable 
profits. The amounts of profits tax paid by Ferrominera also appear 
in Table 6.6. 
No clear-cut dividends policy has been fcillowed. Dividends have 
been declared only twice, but the payments of dividends constituted 
yure accounting transactions aimed at reducing the claims of Ferro- 
minera on CVG, that arose from indemnifications of former owners, 
initially charged to the iron ore company. 
Investment ~erformance and ~roduction ca~acity 
__--------- -------------- ------------ ---- 
Ferrominera has undertaken a very small volume of investments during 
its existence. Gross investments in the 6-year period 1976-1981 
amounted to $ 94 million, only marginally above the $ 83 million 
depreciated in the corresponding years. The investment costs over 
and above the amounts depreciated were financed from retained 
profits. 
Two major investment projects have been completed. The first con- 
sisted in the establishment of crushing and screening facilities at 
the harbor in Puerto Ordaz, aimed at satisfying the product require- 
ments of the European customers. The second was the construction 
of railway transport facilities between the harbor and the nearby 
steelworks of Sidor, in response to the increase in domestic deliv- 
eries. 
There have been no investments to increase Ferrominera's production 
capacity, and the level of current capacity is under some dispute. 
With the low levels of output, there has been a gradual reduction 
of equipment at the mines, instituted by not replacing worn-out 
items. The average age of the equipment in use is quite high. 
Output could certainly be raised substantially by increasing the 
number of hours worked. But major and time-consuming investments 
in new equipment would be required to attain the peak production of 
26-27 million tons per year, that was reached in 1974 and 1975. 
With the wholesale shift in export market orientation, away from the 
US and towards Europe, mine production at the earlier peak levels 
would be pointless without additional processing facilities. For 
while the former US owners continue to buy the crude mine product, 
and have it undergo further tre_atment in their own processing 
installations, the European customers have over time become incres- 
ingly discriminant in their demand for graded material like fines or 
lumps of detailed specification. The growing importance of the Euro- 
pean market along with the exacting requirements for product quality 
in that market provides the rationale for Ferrominera's investment 
in the crushing and screening facilities discussed above. The theo- 
retical capacity of these facilities is about20 million tons, and 
may be lower in practice, since full capacity utilization has never 
been tested. The capacity to process, rather than the capacity to 
mine, may therefore come to constitute the effective constraint in 
Ferrominera, when the market for iron ore recovers from its present 
depression. 
A striking feature emerging from the interviews with the government 
officials is the absence of ambition to assure a continuing important 
role for Ferrominera in the international iron ore market, and the 
management of the company seems to have resigned to accepting this 
view. There is certainly a desire that the market should recover, 
and permit a fuller utilization of existing capacity. But there are 
no plans envisaged for expanding, or even modernizing the exporting 
capacity. Yet, investments in modernization appear indispensable 
to maintain Ferrominera's international competitiveness. This comes 
out most clearly in a comparison of the company's ocean shipping 
facilities with those of CVRD, the state owned Brazilian iron ore 
giant. 
Venezuelan iron ore is transported by rail to the harbor at Puerto 
Ordaz, which is located 340 kilometers inland along the Orinoco 
river. There it is transferred onto ocean-going vessels for transport 
to North American and European harbors. River conditions permit the 
entry of ore ships no greater than 60-80,000 tons. These can be 
fully loaded only in high waters during the rainy season. In the 
dry season the ships have to leave Puerto Ordaz half-full in order 
to get through the shallow passages of the river. 
In the 1950fs, the typical ships used by the world iron ore industry 
had a capacity of 10-15,000 tons. At that time, the newly established 
bulk transport facilities in Venezuela were well ahead of the rest 
of the world in terms of scale and efficiency. But while the rest 
of the world experienced revolutionary changes in these fields in 
the decades that followed, the basic design of the Venezuelan 
installations has remained the same. In 1980; more than one quarter 
of Brazilian iron ore exports to Europe was transported on ships 
above 200,000 tons. Three quarters of the total were shipped on 
carriers of 100,000 tons or more,loaded and unloaded in tailor- 
1 
made harbor installations on both sides of the Atlantic. Ferrominera's 
non-participation in the ongoing technological revolution has gradually 
weakened its international competitiveness. To avoid uneconomic 
head-on competition with the Brazilian exporter, Ferrominera has 
been increasingly concentrating its saLes in Europe to ports in 
the UK, Belgium or Italy that have not yet been rebuilt to receive 
the giant ore carriers. As Brazil continues an aggressive policy 
of expanding and modernizing its iron ore delivery capacity, and 
as further ports in Europe and North America are equipped with 
modern unloading facilities, continued inaction on the part of 
Ferrominera will inevitably lead to its gradual fade-out from the 
international market. 
Large-scale investments in an ocean harbor and in a railway connecting 
the harbor, with the mines are urgently required if Ferrominera is to 
play a significant and lasting role in the international iron ore 
1) J. Husgen, "Sea Transport and Xandling of Iron Ore", paper delivered 
at Third Bulk Handling and Transport Conference, Amsterdam, play 1981. 
The U.S. East Coast is lagging behind Western Europe in building harbors 
that can receive the biggest bulk carriers. 
market. Mining and processing capacity would probably also have to 
be expanded, to warrant such infrastructural expenditure. Additional 
investments in marketing would then also be needed to enable the 
company to sell the increasing volumes. 
No such plans are in sight. The management appears to be resigned 
to a future in which deliveries to the domestic steel industry become 
Ferrominera's main business, and where exports assume an increasingly 
marginal role. 
The motivations to the lacking international ambitions have not been 
clearly formulated. One frequently expressed argument is that the 
country's iron ore should be saved for future national needs. Given' 
the size of Venezuela's proved ore reserves and the virtual certainty 
that the reserve base will increase in response to future exploration 
efforts, this argument does not sound particularly convincing. Current 
estimates put reserves at over 2.100 million tons with an average Fe 
1 
content of around 60 %. This is enough for 80 years' exploitation 
at the present full capacity, and for 50 years if capacity is in- 
creased to 40 million tons per year. A more sophisticated version 
of the same argument is that exploitation for the benefit of foreigners 
of a wasting resource like iron ore is not worthwhile at the price 
levels that have prevailed in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Under- 
lying this proposition may be some notion of an intrinsic value of 
the ore in the ground which is not fully paid for by current prices, 
or, more pragmatically, that at present prices it does not pay to 
invest in expanded capacity. Those who argue along this line apparently 
disregard the likelihood of rising demand and price, once the steel 
depression has been overcome. 
In my opinion, the major explanation behind the unambitious attitudes 
to Ferrominera's future international role has to be sought at a 
higher national level. The petroleum sector has provided the govern- 
ment with huge profits and export earnings. The potential of iron 
ore in these respects is incomparably smaller. In distinction from 
Brazil, which lacks oil export revenues, the Venezuelan government 
can afford to neglect the iron ore export potential. This along with 
1) Hierro y Otros Datos, op.cit. 
the insufficiency of Ferrominera's own earnings to cover the costs 
of a thorough infrastructural overhaul and expansion seem to me to 
be the main reasons for the company's defensive attitude with regard 
to its future role in export markets. 
The distinguishing features of iron ore mining under state ownership 
This concluding section draws together the material presented in the 
present chapter, so as to bring out in a succinct way those consequences 
of state takeover and those distinguishing features emergent under 
state ownership that, if common in many nationalized iron ore enter- 
prises, will have an important impact on the international market. 
The establishment of state ownership has been coincidental with the 
start of a prolonged depression in the world iron ore market. In 
discussing what happened with Ferrominera, one must be cautious in 
distinguishing between the developments due to state takeover and 
those caused by the slack in world demand. 
Nationalization usually involves a setting-up and learning cost. 
The size of this cost depends, among other things, on the economic 
sophistication of the nationalizing country and on the arrangements 
under which the takeover takes place. Venezuela belongs to the 
economically most advanced countries in the third world. In the 
1970's its per capita income and educational attainment measured 
by enrollment in tertiary training institutions, were about twice as 
1 
high as in Brazil and Mexico. The foreign iron ore miners had 
promoted a number of Venezuelans into high level managerial positions. 
For these reasons the qualified manpower availability was less of a 
constraint than in many other nationalizations of mineral activities 
in developing countries. Great care was taken at the time of take- 
over to assure a smooth transfer of the managerial responsibility by 
elaborate management contract arrangements with the former owners. 
The ability to produce iron ore was not significantly affected by 
the ownership transfer. The temporary additional cost of running 
the operations with the help of a management contract was noted 
earlier in the text. I conclude that the losses in efficiency due 
to managerial inexperience were small and of short duration. 
1) World Bank, World Development Report 1982. 
Typically of a state enterprise, Ferrominera has adopted a mixed 
set of goals with no clear-cut trade-offs among them. Those of the 
company's managers who joined the industry while it was still foreign- 
owned, point out that decision-making has been slowed down after 
nationalization because the various controlling organs require more 
complex procedures and implicitly threaten to expose the management 
to public accountability for the decisions taken. The implication 
of demoting profit maximization and promoting social and regional 
development as corporate goals, along with the new decision-making 
procedures and arrangements for public control, is less cost efficiency 
and higher cost levels than would normally occur under private owner- 
ship. 
Nationalization involved a rupture of the security of captive markets 
enjoyed by Venezuelan iron ore in the U.S. market. The drastic cut 
in the U.S. demand for deliveries from Venezuela was partly a result 
of the worldwide steel depression, but in large measure also due 
to a lower priority afforded to the Venezuelan supply by the U.S. 
steel companies. The rupture, while painful to Ferrominera, widened 
the potential non-captive supply, thereby contributing in some 
limited measure to the price stability in the formerly extremely 
1 
narrow non-captive market. 
Although its marginal costs have remained far below the prices received, 
Ferrominera has sharply cut its capacity utilization in response to 
the decline in U.S. demand. No attempt has been made to increase the 
company's European market share through aggressive pricing. A price 
cut by one seller would have led to matching price cuts by all others 
with everybody worse off than before. A warning example is the attempt 
by Canadian Quebec Cartier in the late 1970's to double its sales to 
Germany to 2 million tons by cutting the price. After signing the 
contract, the German buyers first used the agreement as a bargaining 
point with other sellers, to obtain lower prices. Having succeeded in 
that task, they refused to accept the increased volume of deliveries 
from the Canadian mine. It is probable that a private profit maximizing 
company would have behaved no different from Ferrominera in the oligo- 
1) For a further discussion of this point see chapter 8. 
2) Information from Ferrominera's sales division, confirmed by Malmexport AB. 
polistic conditions characterizing the European iron ore supply. 
Ferrominera's unwillingness to increase sales by lower prices was 
reinforced by the government's conception of iron ore as a valuable 
resource that should be saved for national needs and not wasted on 
low-priced exports. 
Alternative explanations can be offered for the absence of invest- 
ments to increase Ferrominera's production capacity. The most 
straightforward one, equally applicable to public and private enter- 
prises, is that when capacity is underutilized due to a slack in 
demand, investments will be directed towards reduction of costs, 
and not towards capacity expansion. In both types of enterprises, 
investments also tend to decline when profits are low. An alternative 
explanation is that the investment performance has resulted from 
the government's desire to integrate Ferrominera vertically with the 
national economy while reducing its role as exporter. The invest- 
ment in transport facilities for domestic deliveries and the absence 
of investments in expanding or modernizing the export capacity fit 
this explanation. The present interpretation of the investment be- 
havior, if correct, would be somewhat unusual for state mineral 
enterprises. It presupposes a national balance of payments that is 
strong enough to permit the government to neglect the export 
potential of its mineral enterprise. It is too early to judge which 
of the explanations presented here has the greatest validity. Only 
after a period of strong international iron ore demand and higher 
prices will it be possible to determine the driving forces behind 
Ferrominera' s investment policies. 
Appendix 6.1 
Persons interviewed in Venezuela 
Ferrominera: 
----------- 
Garnet Sankarsingh, Manager Administration 
Gabriel Medialdea, Manger Operations 
Diogenes Chollett, Deputy Manager, Sales 
Cesar Alvarez, Superintendent of Mines, Piar Division 
Eduardo Boccardo, Public Relations Department 
14aritza Izaguirre, Minister of State 
Carlos Vargas, Director of Planning 
Ministry of Energy and Mines: 
------- -------- ---------- 
Conception de Moreno, Director of Planning 
Carlos J. Salaverria, Advisor Mining Department 
Rafaelo Borghes, Mining Department, Projects Division 
Other: 
----- 
Argenis Gamboa, Private Consultant, Former President of CVG 
Janet Kelly Escobar, Professor, Instituto de Estudios 
Superiores de Administration 
George Kastner, - 11 - 
Enrique Viloria, Advisor, Petroven de Venezuela 
a 
The geographical  a r e a  t h a t  now c o n s t i t u t e s  Zambia has  been a  very 
important  copper producer  s i n c e  t he  e a r l y  19301s,  when product ion 
s t a r t e d  on a  l a r g e  s c a l e .  Over t he  p a s t  50-year period,Zambian 
copper output  has  c o n s t i t u t e d ,  on average,  about one t e n t h  of 
t h e  world t o t a l .  Conversely,  from 1932 onwards, t h e  economy 
of Zambia has been completely dominated by t h e  copper i n d u s t r y .  
For i n s t a n c e ,  between 1964 and 1970, t h i s  i n d u s t r y ' s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
t o  GDP, government revenue and expor t  proceeds averaged 44 %, 
59 % and 95 % r e s p e c t i v e l y .  With t h e  lower r e a l  copper p r i c e s  
t h a t  p r e v a i l e d  between 1971 and 1980, t h e  average c o n t r i b u t i o n  
of t he  copper f i rms f e l l  t o  20 2 ,  16 % and 93 % r e s p e c t i v e l y .  2  
Even a t  t k s e  lower l e v e l s ,  t he  dominance of copper and i t s  
byproduct c o b a l t  i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy i s  overwhelming. I n  
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  t h e  Zambian dependence on one i n d u s t r y  
and one product  i s  q u i t e  extreme. 
1) The d a t a  upon which t h e  fo l lowing  a n a l y s i s  i s  based have been 
obtained from m a t e r i a l  publ ished i n  Zambia and elsewhere,  a s  quoted,  
and, above a l l  from a s e r i e s  of persona l  i n t e rv i ews  du r ing  a  two- 
week v i s i t  t o  Zambia i n  January 1983. These included r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
of t h e  Nat ional  Commission f o r  Development Planning;  t h e  Minis t ry  
of Mines; ZIMCO, t h e  s t a t e  i n d u s t r i a l  ho ld ing  company; and a  number 
of members of t h e  management team i n  t h e  Zambia Consol idated Copper 
Mines (ZCCM), t he  60 % state-owned s o l e  copper producing company i n  
t h e  country.  Appendix 7.1 l i s t s  t he  persons in te rv iewed.  
2) Zambian Mining Yearbook, 1973, 1980. 
The e a r l y  developments of Zambian copper  have been d e s c r i b e d  
I i n  d e t a i l  e l s e w h e r e ,  and w i l l  n o t  b e  d i s c u s s e d  h e r e .  At t h e  t i m e  
of Zambia's independence i n  1964, t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  copper  i n d u s t r y  
- 
was c o n t r o l l e d  by B r i t i s h ,  South A f r i c a n  and US i n t e r e s t s ,  and 
managed by two groups ,  t h e  Anglo American Corpora t ion  Group and t h e  
Rhodesian S e l e c t i o n  T r u s t  Group. 2 
Copper p r i c e s  r o s e  s h a r p l y  abou t  t h e  t i m e  of independence,  and 
remained h i g h  f o r  a lmos t  t e n  y e a r s  ( s e e  c h a r t  7 . 1 ) .  I n  1965, 
Rhodesia went ahead w i t h  i t s  U n i l a t e r a l  D e c l a r a t i o n  of Independence.  
T h i s  l e d  t o  a c l o s u r e  of t h e  b o r d e r  w i t h  Zambia, and t h e  copper  
i n d u s t r y  exper ienced  v e r y  s e v e r e  t r a n s p o r t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r  s e v e r a l  
y e a r s  u n t i l  t h e  Tanzanian r a i l w a y  had been completed a t  t h e  end of 
t h e  decade.  To a s s u r e  u n i n t e r r u p t e d  o p e r a t i o n s ,  i n v e n t o r i e s  i n  t h e  
companies were  a s t r o n o m i c a l l y  i n c r e a s e d ,  and over  a p e r i o d  copper  
had t o  b e  a i r - l i f t e d  t o  Dar-es-Salaam. D e s p i t e  t h e  ensu ing  h i g h e r  
c o s t s , t h e  y e a r s  a f t e r  independence were  v e r y  p r o f i t a b l e  t o  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  
and i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  government revenue w e r e  q u i t e  h i g h .  
Beginning i n  1969, t h e  government took  s e v e r a l  s t e p s  
which have g r a d u a l l y  extended i t s  ownership and c o n t r o l  o v e r  
t h e  copper  i n d u s t r y .  Two major  m o t i v a t i o n s  l a y  behind t h e  
d e s i r e  t o  n a t i o n a l i z e :  
( a )  P u b l i c  ownership of t h e  means o f  p r o d u c t i o n  was i n  
l i n e  w i t h  t h e  s o c i a l i s t  p o l i t i c a l  ph i losophy  g e n e r a l l y  
pursued by t h e  government. 
- 
1 )  See f o r  i n s t a n c e  S. Cunningham, The Copper I n d u s t r y  i n  Zambia; 
F r i n, P r a e g e r  1981. 
2 ' )  A . D .  McMahon, Copper, A  M a t e r i a l s  Survey,  US Bureau of Mines, 
Washington DC 1965. 
Table  7 .1 .  Zambia i n  t h e  World Copper I n d u s t r y  
M i n e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  c o p p e r  
World Zambia Zambia's s h a r e  
thousand thousand of  world ,  
tons  t ons  p e r  c e n t  
1 ) Pre  1 iminary 
Source: Zambian p roduc t i on  1969-1982 from ZCCM; 
Other  f i g u r e s  from M e t a l l g e s e l l s c h a f t ,  Metal S t a t i s t i c s .  (Annual) 
(b )  The copper  s e c t o r  was s o  impor tan t  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
economy t h a t  f o r e i g n  ownership and c o n t r o l  was cons ide r ed  
p o l i t i c a l l y  i n t o l e r a b l e .  Na t iona l  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  copper  
i n d u s t r y  was s een  a s  a  nece s sa ry  p r e r e q u i s i t e  f o r  genuine 
economic and p o l i t i c a l  independence.  
Subs id i a ry  mo t iva t i ons  f o r  an  expanded s t a t e  involvement inc luded  t h e  des i rc  
t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  Zambian s h a r e  of t h e  mine ra l  r e n t  gene ra t ed  by 
t h e  copper  i n d u s t r y ,  t o  expand t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  Zambians 
i n  t h e  management o f  t h e  copper  companies, and t o  make t h e  i n d u s t r y  
more respons ive  t o  n a t i o n a l  needs .  
The fo l l owing  have been t h e  main s t e p s  i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  
p roce s s  : 1 
I n  1970, t h e  government a cqu i r ed  51  % of t h e  e q u i t y  i n  t h e  
copper  i n d u s t r y .  The takeover  invo lved  a r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  of  t h e  
i n d u s t r y  i n t o  two c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  v i z  Nchanga Conso l ida ted  Copper 
Mines Ltd (NCCM) and Roan Conso l ida ted  Copper Mines Ltd (RCM). 
The government e q u i t y  was u l t i m a t e l y  h e l d  through t h e  Zambia 
I n d u s t r i a l  and Mining Corpora t ion  (ZIMCO), a  100 % government 
owned ho ld ing  company e n t r u s t e d  w i th  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  
c o o r d i n a t i n g  t h e  government ownership i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  
Payment f o r  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  had t h e  form of i n t e r e s t  bea r i ng  bonds.  
The former  owners, Anglo American Corpora t ion  and Roan S e l e c t i o n  
T r u s t  Ltd (RST) remained m i n o r i t y  sha r eho lde r s ,  and were e n t r u s t e d  
w i t h  t h e  manager ia l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  cont inued o p e r a t i o n s ,  through 
e l a b o r a t e  management c o n t r a c t  arrangements .  
1)  Government of Zambia, Th i rd  Nat iona l  Development P l an  1979-1983, 
Lusaka,  Oct.  1979; Zambia Mining Yearbook 1980; and ZCCM Annual 
Report  1982. 
I n  1974, a f t e r  a  premature  redemption of t h e  bonds i s s u e d  
i n  payment f o r  t h e  i n i t i a l  e q u i t y  t a k e o v e r ,  t h e  government can- 
c e l l e d  t h e  management c o n t r a c t s  w i t h  Anglo American and RST. 
A s  a  r e s u l t ,  NCCM and RCM became self-managing companies,  w i t h  
t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e s  a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  government. About t h e  same 
t ime,  t h e  government a l s o  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  Metal  Market ing 
Corpora t ion  o f  Zambia L t d  (MEMACO), 100 % owned by ZIMCO, and 
e n t r u s t e d  w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of marke t ing  t h e  e n t i r e  o u t p u t  
o f  NCCM and RCM. 
I n  1979, t h e  government i n c r e a s e d  i t s  e q u i t y  s h a r e  i n  NCCM 
and RCM from 51 % t o  j u s t  above 60 %. T h i s  came about  a s  a  
r e s u l t  of a  convers ion  i n t o  e q u i t y  o f  government l o a n s  ex tended  
t o  t h e  companies,  t o  pe rmi t  con t inued  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  d i f f i c u l t  
p e r i o d  of low copper  p r i c e s  s i n c e  1975. I n  compliance w i t h  t h e  
companies '  a r t i c l e s  of a s s o c i a t i o n ,  t h e  p r i v a t e  f o r e i g n  e q u i t y  h o l d e r s  
were g i v e n  t h e  o f f e r ,  b u t  d e c l i n e d ,  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  a d d i t i o n a l  
c a p i t a l  t o  keep t h e i r  e q u i t y  s h a r e  unchanged. 1 
I n  1982, f i n a l l y ,  t h e  government merged t h e  two companies 
i n t o  a  s i n g l e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  Zambia Conso l ida ted  Copper Mines L t d  
(ZCCM), i n  which i t  r e t a i n e d  a  60 % e q u i t y  h o l d i n g .  The l a s t  
s t e p  d i d  n o t  i n v o l v e  any i n c r e a s e  i n  government ownership o r  
c o n t r o l  of t h e  copper  i n d u s t r y .  
1 )  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  J. Mapoma, D i r e c t o r  General  o f  Zimco. 
The o p e r a t i o n s o f  Zambia's coDper i n d u s t r y  s i n c e  1970 
The p r e s e n t  s e c t i o n  a n a l y z e s  i n  some d e t a i l  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  
o f  Zambia's copper  i n d u s t r y  s i n c e  t h e  government took o v e r  
m a j o r i t y  ownership .  I s t a r t  by look ing  b r i e f l y  a t  t h e  way 
t h e  government e x e r c i s e s  i t s  m a j o r i t y  r i g h t s  i n  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  
i n d u s t r y  and i n  s e t t i n g  i t s  g o a l s .  Some of  t h e  c a u s e s  of t h e  
s t a g n a n t  p r o d u c t i o n  and s a l e s  s i n c e  1970 a r e  t h e n  examined. 
The end of t h e - s e c t i o n  i s  devoted t o  a  s c r u t i n y  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  
r e c o r d  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  c a p i t a l  composi t ion,  c o s t s ,  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
and inves tments .  
D i r e c t i o n  and p r o f e s s e d  g o a l s  
-------------- --------- ---- 
The d i r e c t i o n  and g o a l s  of t h e  Zambian copper  i n d u s t r y  i n  
t h e  p o s t - n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  p e r i o d  have been shaped t o  a  consider-  
a b l e  degree  by t h r e e  i n t e r t w i n e d  c i rcumstances .  F i r s t ,  a s  
a l r e a d y  d i s c u s s e d ,  t h e  i n d u s t r y  i s  o f  overwhelming importance 
t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy. Second, i n  1964, when t h e  c o u n t r y  ga ined  
i t s  independence,  q u a l i f i e d  Zambian manpower was v i r t u a l l y  non- 
e x i s t e n t .  At t h a t  t ime ,  t h e r e  was a t o t a l  of 89 n a t i o n a l s  w i t h  
u n i v e r s i t y  d e g r e e s .  Out of t h e s e ,  o n l y  t h r e e  were employed i n  t h e  
copper  i n d u s t r y .  Even i n  1970, when t h e  government took over  t h e  m a j o r i t y  
of t h e  e q u i t y ,  t h e  d e a r t h  of educa ted  and e x p e r i e n c e d  ~ a m b i a n s  was s o  
pronounced t h a t  a  reasonab le  f u n c t i o n i n g  of t h e  i n d u s t r y  was 
t o t a l l y  dependent on l a r g e - s c a l e  e x p a t r i a t e  manager ia l  and 
t e c h n i c a l  i n p u t s .  And t h i r d ,  i n  d i s t i n c t i o n  from t h e  Indones ian  
and Venezuelan c a s e s ,  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  was n o t  100 %, and s i n c e  
t h e  con t inued  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  m i n o r i t y  owners was s e e n  a s  e s s e n t i a l ,  
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  and g o a l s  of t h e  i n d u s t r y  had t o  g i v e  due cons idera -  
t i o n  t o  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  
1) I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  9.A.R. P h i r i ,  former Managing D i r e c t o r  of RCM. 
Thus, t h e  dec is ions  i n  1970 t o  n a t i o n a l i z e  only p a r t i a l l y ,  
t o  seek an amicable  agreement w i t h  t he  f o r e i g n  owners who were 
asked t o  cede p a r t  of t h e i r  r i g h t s ,  and t o  reques t  them t o  
cont inue  t h e i r  management r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  must be seen  a g a i n s t  
t h e  importance of t h e  i n d u s t r y  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy. The 
experienced fo re igne r s  had t o  s t a y  i n  o r d e r  t o  avoid  t h e  r i s k  
of wrecking t h e  boa t .  The f i r s t  s t e p  i n  t he  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  
process  had a  l i m i t e d  impact on t h e  fundamental p o l i c i e s  of t h e  
i n d u s t r y .  For t h i s  reason i t  may be app rop r i a t e  t o  s tudy  t h e  
d i r e c t i o n  and goa ls  of t h e  copper i n d u s t r y  a s  they have evolved 
a f t e r  1974, when t h e  management c o n t r a c t s  were d i scont inued  and two 
Zambian managing d i r e c t o r s  were appoin ted  by t h e  government. Even i n  
t h e  post-1974 pe r iod ,  however, t h e  t h r e e  circumstances s p e l l e d  
ou t  i n  t h e  preceding paragraph,  cont inue  t o  e x e r t  a  heavy i n f l u -  
ence on Zambian p o l i c y  formulat ion i n  t h i s  f i e l d .  
S ince  t h e i r  e s t ab l i shmen t ,  t h e  copper companies have formal ly  
been s u b s i d i a r i e s  t o  ZIMCO, t he  s t a t e  owned i n d u s t r i a l  ho ld ing  
company. I n  r e a l i t y ,  t h e  ownership r i g h t s  have u s u a l l y  been ex- 
e r c i s e d  d i r e c t l y  by t h e  government. The t h r e e  government bodies  
most immediately involved have been the  Minis t ry  of Mines, t h e  
Minis t ry  of Finance and,  t o  some e x t e n t ,  t he  Nat iona l  Commission 
f o r  Development P lanning ,  w i th  t h e  f i r s t  probably p lay ing  t h e  most 
important  r o l e .  Thus, dur ing  a  number of y e a r s ,  t h e  Min i s t e r  of 
Mines and h i s  permanent s e c r e t a r y  were chairman and member r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
on t h e  two companies' boards .  Even though a t  t imes t h e r e  has  been l e s s  
than f u l l  accord between t h e  t h r e e  government bodies  involved,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e  i n  terms of product ion expansion p l ans ,  o r  t a x  ve r sus  
dividend p o l i c y ,  t h e  o v e r a l l  coo rd ina t ion  has been assured  by 
t h e  i m p l i c i t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of t h e  Pres ident  of t h e  country i n  t h e  
formula t ion  of key p o l i c i e s ,  o r  i n  board and top- leve l  managerial  
appointments f o r  t h e  copper s e c t o r .  Involvement i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  
a f f a i r s  by t h e  h ighes t  p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y  i s  not  s u r p r i s i n g ,  
given t h e  importance of copper i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy. 
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t he  s i z e  of  t he  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  t he  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
suppor t  enjoyed by t h e i r  ch i e f  execut ives  and t h e  t e c h n i c a l  
competence of  t h e i r  s t a f f ,  has given t h e  copper i n d u s t r y  a  con- 
s i d e r a b l e  independence and freedom of a c t i o n  no t  only i n  day-to- 
day a f f a i r s ,  but a l s o  i n  longer-term po l i cy  dec i s ions .  
The goa ls  of t h e  n a t i o n a l i z e d  copper s e c t o r  have never been 
s p e l l e d  ou t  i n  a  fu l l - f l edged  manner. From d i scus s ions  w i t h  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of ZCCM and t h e  government, i t  appears  t h a t  a l though 
p r o f i t  maximization i s  a  key g o a l ,  due cons ide ra t i on  i s  
a l s o  given t o  employment. However, none of my in te rv iewees  was 
a b l e  t o  exp la in  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  meaning of t h e  employment objec- 
t i v e .  One reasonable  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  i n d u s t r y  has  
no t  been permi t ted  t o  i n t roduce  labor-saving innovat ions ,  o r  t o  
c l o s e  down i n s t a l l a t i o n s  t h a t  would r e s u l t  i n  l a rge - sca l e  l abo r  
redundancies ,  un l e s s  i t  could p r o v f d e - d t e r n a t i v e  employment 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  The g r e a t e r  importance a f forded  t o  p r o f i t  maximiza- 
t i o n  a s  compared t o  PT Timah and Ferrominera,  can be seen a s  a 
d i r e c t  consequence of t h e  d e s i r e  t o  maintain a  f o r e i g n  ownership 
involvement i n  t h e  i ndus t ry .  The fo re ign  equ i ty  ho lde r s  could 
ha rd ly  be  induced t o  s t a y  on, i f  t h e  p r o f i t  goa l  were subordinated 
t o  o t h e r  o b j e c t i v e s .  
Other o b j e c t i v e s  r e c e i v i n g  a t t e n t i o n ,  bu t  n o t  c l e a r l y  spe l l ed  
o u t  i n  ope ra t i ona l  terms,  inc lude  Zambianization of managerial  
and s k i l l e d  personnel  c a d r e s ,  and maximization of t he  i n d u s t r y ' s  
(presumably n e t )  f o r e i g n  exchange earn ings .  
The l o o s e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  goa l s  o t h e r  t han  p r o f i t  maxi- 
miza t ion ,  and t h e  absence o f  wel l -def ined  t r ade -o f f s  between 
them obvious ly  l e aves  t h e  management of  t h e  i n d u s t r y  w i t h  ve ry  
wide d i s c r e t i o n a r y  powers. 
The r eco rd  of  p roduc t i on  and exEor t s  
-------------- ---------------- ---- 
Even though copper  dominates t he  o u t p u t ,  i t  i s  no t  t h e  
s o l e  p roduc t  of  t h e  Zambian copper i n d u s t r y .  ZCCM o p e r a t e s  
a  l e a d  and z i n c  mine ( fo rmer ly  owned by NCCM), and s e v e r a l  byproduct 
me t a l s  i nc lud ing  c o b a l t ,  se lenium,  gold and s i l v e r  a r e  e x t r a c t e d  
i n  t h e  copper  o p e r a t i o n s .  Coba l t  i s  by f a r  t h e  most important  
among t h e  byproduc ts .  Zambia's p roduc t ion  of t h i s  me t a l  
i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  has  accounted f o r  around 10 % of  t h e  world  
t o t a l .  Table  7.2 g i v e s  a  summary of  t h e  volume and v a l u e  of  
t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p roduc t s  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  1979 and 1980 have 
n o t  been i nc luded  because t h e  e x c e p t i o n a l l y  h i gh  c o b a l t  p r i c e s  
i n  t h e s e  two y e a r s  g i v e  a  d i s t o r t e d  p i c t u r e  of  t h i s  me t a l ' s  
importance i n  t o t a l  s a l e s .  I t  w i l l  be s e e n  t h a t  copper  normal ly  
accounts  f o r  90 % o r  more of  o v e r a l l  p roduc t i on  va l ue .  Given 
t h e  dominance o f  copper ,  t h e  fo l lowing  account  i s  h e a v i l y  con- 
c e n t r a t e d  on t h i s  meta l .  
Domestic consumption of r e f i n e d  copper  i n  Zambia i s  ve ry  
s ma l l .  I t  reached a  maximum of  4000 tons  i n  1974, and has  
hovered between 2000 and 3000 tons  p e r  y e a r  i n  t h e  l a t e  1970 's .  
1 Th i s  corresponds t o  0 . 5  % o r  l e s s  of  o u t p u t .  Except f o r  
i nven to ry  v a r i a t i o n s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e r e  cannot  be  any s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f f e r e n c e  between p roduc t i on  and expo r t s  i n  t h e  Zambian copper 
i n d u s t r y .  
1 )  M e t a l l g e s e l l s c h a f t ,  Metal  S t a t i s t i c s  1982. 
Table  7 .2  The Zambian Copper I n d u s t r y :  Output and S a l e s  Value of Meta l s  
Copper 
Coba l t  
Lead and z i n c  
Other  m e t a l s  
T o t a l  
1 )  Based on c u r r e n t  s e l l i n g  p r i c e s  
Source:  Republ ic  of Zambia Monthly D i g e s t  o f  S t a t i s t i c s  
~ a n u a r y / M a r c h  1982. 
ZCCM, Annual Report  1982. 
Annual average  
1974-78 
As i s  a p p a r e n t  from t a b l e  7.1, p r o d u c t i o n  o f  copper  i n  Zambia 
r o s e  from 300,000 tons  i n  1950 t o  a  peak of 755,000 tons  i n  1969, 
when t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  n a t i o n a l i z e  was t a k e n .  Th is  was i n  p a r a l l e l  
w i t h  world  o u t p u t .  At t h e  t ime of  t a k e o v e r ,  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  
c o n t i n u e d  o u t p u t  expansion were viewed q u i t e  o p t i m i s t i c a l l y .  A 
long-term p r o j e c t i o n  p u b l i s h e d  i n  Zambia's F i r s t  N a t i o n a l  Develop- 
ment P l a n  (1966-1970) a r r i v e d  a t  a  p r o d u c t i o n  l e v e l  i n  1976 of 
1 .2  m i l l i o n  t o n s .  The Second N a t i o n a l  Development P l a n ,  p u b l i s h e d  
i n  1972, s e t  t h e  1976 p r o d u c t i o n  o b j e c t i v e  a t  900,000 t o n s ,  30 % 
h i g h e r  t h a n  a c t u a l  o u t p u t  i n  1972. Th is  more d e t a i l e d  f o r e c a s t  
was a r r i v e d  a t  a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  f o r e i g n  managements 
of t h e  two copper  companies, and t a k i n g  t h e  p lanned  inves tments  i n  
t h e  copper  s e c t o r  i n t o  account .  
Year end ing  
000 t o n s  
6  74 
1 . 7  
62 
- 
- 
Share  of 
v a l u e  1 > 
p e r  c e n t  
9  2  
3  
4  
1 
100 
March 1981 
000 tons  
598 
1 . 3  
44 
- 
- 
March 1982 
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v a l u e  1 > 
p e r  c e n t  
89 
5  
2  
4  
100 
000 tons  
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2 . 3  
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- 
- 
Share  of 
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I n  a c t u a l  f a c t ,  t h e  1969 p r o d u c t i o n  peak was never  a g a i n  
a t t a i n e d .  The a b s o l u t e  o u t p u t  l e v e l s  s i n c e  t h a t  y e a r  show a 
f a l l i n g  t r e n d .  The r e s u l t  has  been a s i g n i f i c a n t  d e c l i n e  i n  
Zambiaf s s h a r e  o f  world  o u t p u t .  
The c a s u a l  o b s e r v e r  might conclude t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a  c a u s a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  on t h e  one hand, and t h e  
s h a r p  tu rnaround  i n  t h e  o u t p u t  growth t r e n d  on t h e  o t h e r ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
s i n c e  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  f u t u r e  p r o d u c t i o n  expansion looked s o  
f a v o r a b l e .  I n  a l l  l i k e l i h o o d  such a r e l a t i o n s h i p  does e x i s t .  
A c l o s e r  s c r u t i n y ,  however, r e v e a l s  s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s ,  comple te ly  
u n r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  t a k e o v e r ,  which c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  s h a r p  
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n  o u t p u t  performance.  These w i l l  be  p r e s e n t l y  
ana lyzed .  
The f i r s t  f a c t o r  was t h e  s e r i o u s  a c c i d e n t  a t  t h e  M u f u l i r a  
mine i n  September 1970, which reduced p r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  s h o r t  run  
by a lmos t  100,000 t o n s  p e r  y e a r .  P r i o r  t o  t h e  a c c i d e n t ,  t h e r e  
were advanced p l a n s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h i s  mine 's  c a p a c i t y  from 165,000 
t o n s  p e r  y e a r ,  a t t a i n e d  i n  1969, t o  190,000 t o n s  by 1973. The 
a c c i d e n t  r e s u l t e d  i n  a  change o f  mining methods,  and t h e  fo rmer  
c a p a c i t y  expansion p l a n s  had t o  be  r e v i s e d  on t e c h n i c a l  grounds.  
A r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  change was t h a t  by 1976-1977, when r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  
had been completed,  o u t p u t  d i d  n o t  exceed 142,000 t o n s .  
The second f a c t o r  r e s t r a i n i n g  o u t p u t  expans ion ,  was a  g radua l  
r e a l i z a t i o n ,  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  1 9 7 0 f s ,  t h a t  t h e  geology of  t h e  
Zambian c o p p e r b e l t  was n o t  conducive t o  economic copper  e x p l o i t a t i o n  
1 
a t  much above t h e  700,000-ton l e v e l .  Expansion beyond t h i s  l e v e l  
would r e s u l t  i n  f a s t  i n c r e a s i n g  inves tment  c o s t s  p e r  t o n  o f  
a d d i t i o n a l  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y .  The i n t r i c a t e l y  shaped underground 
1 )  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  C .  Belshaw, C o n s u l t i n g  Mining Engineer  and 
P .  Freeman, C o n s u l t i n g  G e o l o g i s t  w i t h  ZCCM. 
o r e  bod ies  cou ld  n o t  b e  e x p l o i t e d  much above c u r r e n t  r a t e s  
w i t h o u t  l a r g e - s c a l e  new inves tments  t o  c r e a t e  a d d i t i o n a l  a c c e s s  
r o u t e s .  Also,  t h e  f a s t e r  d e p l e t i o n  o f  t h e  d i s c r e t e  o r e  fo rmat ions  
would r e s u l t  i n  an uneconomically high r a t e  o f  d e p r e c i a t i o n  o f  
t h e  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e .  According t o  my i n t e r v i e w e e s ,  t h e  
l a r g e  c a p a c i t y  expansions  p r o j e c t e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  and second 
n a t i o n a l  development p l a n s  must have subsumed t h e  d i s c o v e r y  o f  
new o r e  b o d i e s  and t h e  development of new mines .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  
t h e  h i g h  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r e c a s t s  of b o t h  development p l a n s  inc luded  
t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  o u t p u t  from t h e  Lumwana d e p o s i t  o f f  t h e  copper  
b e l t ,  c o n t a i n i n g  upward o f  1 b i l l i o n  t o n s  of o r e  w i t h  abou t  0.9 % 
copper  c o n t e n t .  I n  f a c t  no l a r g e - s c a l e  economic copper  d e p o s i t s  
have been i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h e  19701s ,  and no new copper  mines have 
been opened. On c l o s e r  s c r u t i n y ,  t h e  Lumwana d e p o s i t  proved un- 
economical ,  e s p e c i a l l y  because  of i t s  v e r y  heavy i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  
investment  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  ~ e t r o s p e c t i v e l y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n s  
made i n  t h e  development p l a n s  appear  a s  g r o s s l y  o v e r o p t i m i s t i c .  
The t h i r d  f a c t o r  has  had t o  do w i t h  t h e  weakness i n  t h e  
copper  market and t h e  low p r i c e  l e v e l s  t h a t  have p r e v a i l e d  a f t e r  
1974. Char t  7 .1  d e p i c t s  t h e  development o f  copper  p r i c e s  i n  
r e a l  terms s i n c e  Zambia's independence.  It w i l l  be s e e n  t h a t  
t h e  average p r i c e  l e v e l  a f t e r  1974 has  been l e s s  t h a n  one h a l f  
o f  t h e  average a t t a i n e d  i n  t h e  p reced ing  t e n  y e a r s .  The pre- 
dominant c o n t r a c t u a l  form under which copper  from Zambia i s  s o l d  
i s  a one-year c o n t r a c t  w i t h  p r i c e s  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h o s e  o f  t h e  
London Metal  Exchange. Even though t h e  demand f o r  copper  from 
Zambia has  never  c o n s t i t u t e d  a  b i n d i n g  c o n s t r a i n t ,  ( a d d i t i o n a l  
q u a n t i t i e s  of t h e  h igh  q u a l i t y  Zambian output  could always have 
been so ld  a t  t h e  going p r i c e  on t h e  LME) t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  and a b i l i t y  
t o  expand supply was s eve r ly  dampened a f t e r  1974 by t h e  low p r i c e  
l e v e l s  which reduced p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and t h e  cash  f low requi red  f o r  
investments .  Thus, a c t u a l  c a p i t a l  expendi ture  i n  t he  1972-1976 
per iod turned  ou t  t o  be almost 20 % below p lan .  1 
Sharp reduc t ions  i n  the investment p l ans  i n  t h e  copper 
i ndus t ry  were n o t  i s o l a t e d  t o  Zambia, but  occurred worldwide. 
I n  1974, t h e  copper mining capac i ty  of t he  e n t i r e  Western World 
was p r o j e c t e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  from an a c t u a l  f i g u r e  of  6.7 m i l l i o n  
tons i n  1973 t o  9 . 1  m i l l i o n  i n  1978, o r  by 6.2 % pe r  y e a r .  The 
f a c t u a l  1978 achievement was 7.5 m i l l i o n  t ons ,  implying an annual 
growth of no more than 2.5 2 .  2 
The f a c t o r s  d i scussed  above obviously e x p l a i n  p a r t  of t h e  
discrepancy between product ion plans and a c t u a l  achievements i n  
t h e  Zambian copper i n d u s t r y ,  as  we l l  a s  of  t h e  coun t ry ' s  f a l l i n g  
sha re  i n  Western World ou tput .  But o t h e r  f a c t o r s ,  r e l a t e d  both d i r e c t l y  1 
t o  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  and t o  i nc reas ing  b u r e a u c r a t i c  c o n s t r a i n t s  i n  1 
independent Zambia a l s o  con t r ibu t ed  t o  t he se  de t r imen ta l  develop- 
ments. The l a t t e r  f a c t o r s  w i l l  be f u r t h e r  explored  both  i n  t h e  
p re sen t  and i n  the  fol lowing s e c t i o n .  Already a t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  
however, my i n a b i l i t y  t o  a s s i g n  r e l a t i v e  weights  t o  t h e  f a c t o r s  
considered should be admit ted.  I 
1) Government of Zambia, Third Nat ional  Development P l an ,  
op. c i t .  
2) M. Radetzki  and C .  Van Duyne, "The Response of Mining Inves t -  
ment t o  a  Decline i n  Economic Growth: The Case of Copper i n  t he  
19701s", Jou rna l  of Development Economics (for thcoming) .  
Chart 7.1 Copper pr ices ,  constant 1981 US cents  per lb 
- . -  
(LME Wirebars cash, annual averages) 
Source: World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends, 1982183 Edition 
The c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and c o s t  developments 
- - - -_ - - - - -  - - - - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - _ _ _  
i n  t h e  copger  i n d u s t r y  
- - - - -  - - - - -  
Most of t h e  d a t a  t h a t  w i l l  be  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  sub-sec t ion  
have been worked o u t  i n  response  t o  my r e q u e s t s ,  by t h e  accounts  
department o f  ZCCM. The 1981 and 1982 f i g u r e s  a r e  based  on t h e  
ZCCM annua l  r e p o r t  f o r  1982, and r e f e r  t o  t h e  a c c o u n t i n g  y e a r s  
end ing  31 March. A m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  f i g u r e s  f o r  e a r l i e r  y e a r s  
have been o b t a i n e d  by add ing  t o g e t h e r  t h e  accounts  o f  NCCM and 
RCM, whose account ing  y e a r s  ended on 31 March and 30 June ,  respec-  
t i v e l y .  For  s i m p l i c i t y  I r e f e r  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t o  t h e  account ing  
y e a r s  a s  end ing  i n  March, t h e  t e r m i n a l  account ing  month f o r  t h e  
b i g g e r  of t h e  two companies. The f i g u r e s ,  e x p r e s s e d  i n  Zambian 
kwacha, have been c o n v e r t e d  t o  US d o l l a r s  a t  t h e  o f f i c i a l  exchange 
r a t e s  t h a t  p r e v a i l e d  on 31 March when account ing  y e a r s  a r e  used,  
and on 3 1  December when c a l e n d a r  y e a r s  a r e  used.  The World 
Bank's US d o l l a r  Manufactur ing Uni t  Value Index CIF h a s  been 
used a s  d e f l a t o r  t o  o b t a i n  c o n s t a n t  1981 d o l l a r s .  1 
The f i r s t  s e t  o f  d a t a ,  d i s p l a y e d  i n  t a b l e  7 .3 ,  p r o v i d e s  i n f o r -  I 
mat ion  on t h e  Zambian copper  i n d u s t r y ' s  c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e .  It w i l l  
be s e e n  t h a t  t h e  state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s  s t a r t e d  t h e i r  e x i s t e n c e  I 
i n  a v e r y  s o l i d  p o s i t i o n ,  w i t h  no s h o r t  term d e b t ,  and t h e  long- 
term indeb tedness  r e p r e s e n t i n g  less t h a n  1 0  % of  t o t a l  funds  employed. 
The s o l i d i t y  remained h i g h  through t h e  h i g h  p r i c e  p e r i o d ,  b u t  beg inn ing  
i n  1975 t h e  companies s t a r t e d  t o  borrow h e a v i l y  t o  compensate f o r  
t h e  s h a r p l y  reduced cash  f low consequent  upon t h e  f a l l  i n  p r i c e s .  
While b e f o r e  1975 p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  t h e  l o a n s  were w i t h  c r e d i t  i n s t i -  
t u t i o n s  i n  Zambia, from t h e n  onwards s u b s t a n t i a l  amounts have been 
borrowed abroad.  Fore ign  borrowing amounted t o  $ 375 m i l l i o n  i n  
1976 and t o  $ 412 m i l l i o n  i n  1982. 
1 ) See c h a p t e r  1 . 

Table  7.4 p r e s e n t s  a  summary p r o f i t  and l o s s  account  f o r  
t h e  copper  i n d u s t r y .  It h a s  n o t  been p o s s i b l e  t o  s u b d i v i d e  t h e  
a g g r e g a t e d  " c o s t  o f  s a l e s "  i t e m  i n t o  a l l  i t s  major  components. 
Fur thermore,  t h e r e  i s  a  l a c k  of c o n s i s t e n c y  o v e r  t ime  w i t h  r e g a r d  
t o  d e p r e c i a t i o n .  From 1978 and onwards, d e p r e c i a t i o n  h a s  been 
charged  a g a i n s t  t h e  o p e r a t i n g  r e s u l t s  i n  accordance  w i t h  s t a n d a r d  
p rocedures  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  mining i n d u s t r y .  U n t i l  t h a t  t ime ,  
however, e x p e n d i t u r e  on replacement  of f i x e d  assets was i n c l u d e d  
i n  i t s  e n t i r e t y  i n  t h e  c o s t  o f  s a l e s  f o r  t h e  y e a r  i n  which i t  was 
i n c u r r e d .  The impact  o f  i n f l a t i o n  shou ld  b e  n o t e d  when s t u d y i n g  
t h e  f i g u r e s .  The v a l u e s  o f  t h e  e a r l y  1970 ' s  have t o  be  d i v i d e d  
by a  f a c t o r  o f  2-2.5, t o  make them comparable w i t h  t h e  v a l u e s  of 
t h e  e a r l y  1 9 8 0 ' s .  
The copper  i n d u s t r y ' s  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  h a s  been c l o s e l y  cor re -  
l a t e d  w i t h  copper  p r i c e s .  U n t i l  1975 (March) t h e  p r e t a x  p r o f i t s  
~ i e l d e d  a r e t u r n  on s h a r e h o l d e r s '  funds  o f  between 25 % and 75 %. 
S i n c e  t h e n ,  p r o f i t s  have been d e p r e s s e d  o r  n e g a t i v e  most of t h e  
t ime.  The e x c e p t i o n  i s  1980, when exp lod ing  c o b a l t  p r i c e s  enab led  
t h e  companies t o  a t t a i n  a  p re - tax  y i e l d  on s h a r e h o l d e r s f  funds  
a t  22 %. 
Tax payments o v e r  t h e  12-year p e r i o d  covered by t h e  t a b l e  
amounted t o  a  t o t a l  o f  $ 978 m i l l i o n .  Th is  c o n s t i t u t e d  46 % of n e t  
pre- tax p r o f i t s ,  cons iderab ly  below t h e  nominal 73.05 p e r  c e n t  
d e r i v e d  by a  combinat ion o f  Zambia's m i n e r a l  t a x  and c o r p o r a t e  
income t a x ,  o f t e n  quoted i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e . '  R e s t i t u t i o n  o f  
t a x e s  d u r i n g  y e a r s  of l o s s e s  h a s  r e s u l t e d  i n  t o t a l  n e t  t a x  

payments i n  t h e  1976-1982 pe r i od  of no more than  $24 m i l l i o n  (equa l  
t o  13 % of n e t  p re - tax  p r o f i t s  over  t h a t  p e r i o d ) .  Af te r - tax  p r o f i t s ,  
n e t , f o r  t h e  12 y e a r s  covered by t h e  t a b l e  amounted t o  $1326 m i l l i o n ,  
of which $542 m i l l i o n  (41 %) w a s  d i s t r i b u t e d  as div idend  t o  e q u i t y  
h o l d e r s .  The s h a r e  of  d iv idends  i n  a f t e r - t a x  p r o f i t s  d e c l i n e d  from 
43 % i n  t h e  h igh  p r o f i t  p e r i od  1971-1975, t o  29 % i n  t h e  low p r o f i t  
p e r i o d  1976-1982. 
Given i t s  agg rega t e  n a t u r e ,  t h e  summarv p r o f i t  and l o s s  
account  p r e sen t ed  i n  t a b l e  7.4 does n o t  permit  much a n a l y s i s  
w i t h  r ega rd  t o  development of c o s t s .  However, t h e  companies 
have f o r  a  long  t i m e  s e p a r a t e d  o u t  t h e  c o s t s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  
copper ,  and subdiv ided  them by s t a g e  of  p roduc t i on .  Presumably,  
t h e s e  c o s t s  do n o t  i n c l u d e  company a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a t  headqua r t e r s ,  
c e n t r a l  s e r v i c e s  f u n c t i o n s ,  s a l e s  commissions t o  MEMACO and 
i n t e r e s t  charges . '  The d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  d a t a  g iven ,  conver ted  
i n t o  c u r r e n t  US c e n t s / l b  a r e  p r e sen t ed  i n  t a b l e  7.5. Summary 
s e r i e s ,  expressed  i n  cons t an t  1981 US c e n t s f l b  a r e  a l s o  g iven .  
I n  t h e  judgment of ZCCM's  account ing d i v i s i o n ,  about  two- 
t h i r d s  of  t h e  f r e e  on r a i l  c o s t s  a r e  f i x e d  i n  a  one-year t ime 
p e r s p e c t i v e .  I t  fo l lows  t h a t  v a r i a b l e  c o s t s ,  c o n s t i t u t i n g  one- 
t h i r d  of  f r e e  on r a i l  c o s t s  p l u s  t h e  c o s t  of t r a n s p o r t ,  have 
been s u b s t a n t i a l l y  below t h e  LMX p r i c e s  ove r  t h e  p e r i o d  covered 
i n  t a b l e  7.5. On t h e i r  own, t h e  companies have no t  had any 
economic reason t o  reduce p roduc t i on  below t h e  t e c h n i c a l  c a p a c i t y  
l i m i t .  A t  mid-year 1982, i . e .  i n  t h e  1983 account ing  y e a r ,  n o t  
shown i n  t h e  t a b l e ,  copper  p r i c e s  d e t e r i o r a t e d  f u r t h e r  and s t ayed  
a t  a  h i s t o r i c a l l y  extremely low l e v e l  f o r  about  h a l f  a  y e a r .  
1 )  World Bank, "Zambia - A Bas ic  Economic Report ,  Annex I :  
Mining S e c t o r  ~ e v i e w " ,  October  14,  1977. 
Table  7.5 The Cost of Producing Zambian Copper. 
Accounting y e a r s  ending i n  March 
Copper ou tput  000 tons  745 644  7 19 690 697 666 689  648 624  537 588  592  
Current US c e n t s / l b  
Mining 14. 4 
Concentrat ing 2 . 7  
Smelt ing,  l each ing  & 
r e f i n i n g  4 . 6  
Adminis t ra t ion  and 
gene ra l  4.5  
T o t a l  c o s t  f r e e  on r a i l  26. 2 
Transport  c o s t s  (preceding 
ca lendar  y e a r )  4. 0 
Tota l  c o s t s  CIF 30. 2 
Constant 1981  US c e n t s / l b  
T o t a l  c o s t  f r e e  on r a i l  72. 8 
Transport  c o s t s  (preceding 
ca l enda r  yea r )  11 .1 
Tota l  c o s t s  CIF 83. 9 
Source: ZCCM; Zambia Mining Yearbook 
Though t h e  v a r i a b l e  c o s t s  f o r  copper  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  ZCCM a s  a  
whole remained below average  revenue i n  t h a t  p e r i o d ,  t h e  p r i c e  
proved i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  cover  t h e  v a r i a b l e  c o s t s  of some of  t h e  
p roduc ing  u n i t s  i n  t h e  company. P r o d u c t i o n  was c o n t i n u e d  a t  
f u l l  t e c h n i c a l  c a p a c i t y ,  however, bo th  due t o  t h e  s o c i a l  concern 
f o r  employment, and because  t h e  economics o f  o u t p u t  r e d u c t i o n  
w e r e u n c e r t a i n , g i v e n  t h e  e x p e n d i t u r e  t h a t  had t o  be  i n c u r r e d  f o r  
c l o s i n g  and reopening t h e  h igh  c o s t  u n i t s ,  and t h e  expec ted  s h o r t  
d u r a t i o n  of t h e  extreme p r i c e  t rough .  
The incompleteness  of t h e  d a t a  makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  draw 
any f a r - r e a c h i n g  c o n c l u s i o n s  on t h e  development of c o s t s .  The low 
c o s t  l e v e l s  i n  1977 through 1980 a r e  e x p l a i n e d  p r i m a r i l y  by a  devalua-  
t i o n  of t h e  Zambian c u r r e n c y  i n  mid-1976. The i t ems  inc luded  i n  t h e  
t o t a l  c o s t  f r e e  on r a i l ,  when measured i n  c o n s t a n t  d o l l a r  t e rms ,  in-  
c r e a s e d  by l e s s  t h a n  5 % from 1971-72 t o  1981-82. .At f i r s t  g l a n c e ,  
t h i s  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  an  i m p r e s s i v e  achievement ,  g i v e n  t h e  con t inuous  d e c l i n e  
i n  t h e  o r e  g r a d e s  mined and t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  d e p t h s  from which t h e  o r e s  
were e x t r a c t e d ,  even though t h e  d e v a l u a t i o n  was of h e l p  i n  c o n t a i n i n g  
t h e  dol lar-denominated c o s t  i n c r e a s e .  
A p o i n t  h e a v i l y  s t r e s s e d  by many of  my i n t e r v i e w e e s  t h a t  may 
have c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  a p p a r e n t l y  f a v o r a b l e  c o s t  development i s  
t h e  g r a d u a l  n e g l e c t  over  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  low copper  p r i c e s  o f  
maintenance and development e x p e n d i t u r e  i n  mines and p l a n t s .  To 
l i m i t  t h e  f a l l  i n  d e c l a r e d  p r o f i t s  o r  t o  reduce  emergent l o s s e s ,  
t h e  companies have tended t o  c u t  t h o s e  c o s t s  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  
i n d i s p e n s a b l e  i n  t h e  l o n g e r  term, cou ld  b e  d e f e r r e d  w i t h o u t  
impa i r ing  c u r r e n t  p r o d u c t i o n .  Added t o  t h e  problem of  keeping 
up maintenance and development e x p e n d i t u r e  have been t h e  r e s t r i c -  
t i o n s  of t h e  C e n t r a l  Bank i n  a l l o c a t i n g  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange 
needed by t h e  copper  f i r m s .  S ince  1975, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  i n d u s t r y  
o p e r a t e s  w i t h  an i n c r e a s i n g  pent-up spend ing  need t o  make up f o r  
t h e  accumulated n e g l i g e n c e  o f  e a r l i e r  y e a r s .  Even though i t  h a s  
n o t  been p o s s i b l e  t o  q u a n t i f y  t h e  amounts i n v o l v e d ,  t h e r e  i s  
bound t o  be a  s i g n i f i c a n t  jump i n  t h e  c o s t  l e v e l  when t h a t  n e g l i -  
gence i s  r e c t i f i e d .  
The b u r e a u c r a t i c  c o n t r o l  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange i s  a l s o  a s s e r t e d  
t o  have l e d  t o  an  inmedia te  r e d u c t i o n  i n  e f f i c i e n c y .  A l l o c a t i o n s  
o f  f o r e i g n  c u r f e n c y  have n o t  o n l y  been r e s t r i c t e d  b u t  a l s o  d e l a y e d ,  
t h e r e b y  c a u s i n g  o p e r a t i o n a l  d i s r u p t i o n s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e  th rough  t h e  
u n a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  s p a r e  p a r t s .  On many o c c a s i o n s  t h e  C e n t r a l  Bank 
d i r e c t e d  t h e  companies '  impor t s  t o  s p e c i f i c  c o u n t r i e s  by p r o v i d i n g  
on ly  a  p a . r t i c u l a r  t y p e  o f  c u r r e n c y .  The u s e  o f  exchange c o n t r o l s  
i n  t h i s  way t o  d i s c o u r a g e  impor t s  from South A f r i c a  h a s  f o r c e d  
t h e  companies t o  r e d i r e c t  t teir  purchases  t o  h igher -cos t  s o u r c e s  
i n  o t h e r  more d i s t a n t  c o u n t r i e s .  Apar t  from t h e  d i r e c t  i n c r e a s e  
i n  purchase  c o s t s ,  t h e  C e n t r a l  Bank p o l i c y  has  r e s u l t e d  i n  l o n g e r  
d e l i v e r y  t i m e s  and a  g r e a t e r  d i v e r s i t y  o f  equipment used.  T h i s  
has i n c r e a s e d  t h e  c o s t  of s p a r e  p a r t s  i n v e n t o r i e s ,  s i n c e  t h e  
a s s o r t m e n t  needed t o  keep t h e  equipment o p e r a t i o n a l  has  been 
widened, and t h e  more d i s t a n t  s o u r c e s  o f  supp ly  have n e c e s s i t a t e d  
l a r g e r  s t o c k s  o f  each  i t e m .  
Both independence and n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  have i n v o l v e d  s u b s t a n t i a l  
changes i n  t h e  l a b o r  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  copper  i n d u s t r y .  One key 
i s s u e  has  p e r t a i n e d  t o  Zambianizat ion.  Another has been t h a t  o f  
s imul taneous  s u b s t a n t i a l  d e c l i n e s  both  i n  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and 
i n  t h e  r e a l  wage b i l l .  
Table 7.6. Labor Force i n  t h e  Copper Mines 
Local terms "Expa t r i a t e  terms To ta l  
1 )  This  f i g u r e  i s  somewhat ou t  of l i n e .  Both i n  1969 and 1971 
the  number of e x p a t r i a t e s  was about 4750. 
Source: Zambia Mining Yearbooks, s e v e r a l  i s s u e s .  
The Zambian government and t h e  n a t i o n a l  management teams 
t h a t  took charge of t he  two copper companies i n  1974, have had 
an ambivalent a t t i t u d e  t o  t he  e x p a t r i a t e s  working i n  t he  i n d u s t r y .  
On the  one hand, t h e  i n d i s p e n s i b i l i t y  of t he  s k i l l s  and exper ience  
of  the  f o r e i g n e r s  t o  a s su re  e f f i c i e n t  ope ra t i on  has  always been 
admit ted.  On t h e  o t h e r ,  t h e r e  has been a  cont inuous urge t o  
reduce t h e  dependence on fo re ign  manpower, and t o  Zambianize a t  
t he  f a s t e s t  p o s s i b l e  r a t e .  A t  t imes e f f o r t s  have been launched 
t o  slow down a  fo re ign  exodus t h a t  was considered too. f a s t .  A t  
o t h e r  t imes ,  t h e  n a t i o n a l  and co rpo ra t e  p o l i c i e s  have consc ious ly  
aimed a t  speeding up t h e  process .  On some occas ions ,  both aims 
have been pursued s imultaneously . 
Expa t r i a t e s  have been depa r t i ng  i n  l a r g e  numbers eve r  s i n c e  
independence. I n i t i a l l y ,  t h e  exodus was p r i m a r i l y  motivated by 
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  unce r t a in ty  t he  fo re igne r s  f e l t  about t h e i r  own 
long-term r o l e  i n  independent Zambia. L a t e r ,  t h e  main reason 
became t h e  gradual  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n  t h e i r  c o n t r a c t  and l i v i n g  
cond i t i ons .  Under t he  circumstances,  recru i tment  of new prof  es- 
s i o n a l s  t o  r ep l ace  t h e  ones l eav ing  became d i f f i c u l t ,  and t h e  
e x p e r i e n c e  and q u a l i t y  of t h e  ones t h a t  c o u l d  be a t t r a c t e d ,  
g r a d u a l l y  d e c l i n e d .  The d e s i r e  t o  Zambianize e x p l a i n s  t h e  
absence o f  c l e a r - c u t  e f f o r t s  t o  r e a s s u r e  t h e  f o r e i g n e r s  and 
t o  s t o p  t h e  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n  t h e  remunerat ion packages o f f e r e d  
t o  them. 
By t h e  e a r l y  1970 ' s  t h e  reduced a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  s u i t a b l y  
e x p e r i e n c e d  e x p a t r i a t e s  s t a r t e d  t o  a f f e c t  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  an 
i m p o r t a n t  way. The problem h a s  been most s e v e r e  a t  t h e  ve ry  
low manager ia l  l e v e l  o f  s u p e r v i s o r s  and s k i l l e d  c r a f t s m e n .  
The v e r s a t i l e  d e p a r t i n g  e x p a t r i a t e s  have been r e p l a c e d  by young 
Zambians w i t h  l i t t l e  p r a c t i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e ,  j u s t  o u t  f rom c r a s h  
t r a i n i n g  programs t h a t  equipped them w i t h  a  v e r y  nar row range  of s k i l l s .  
To manage t h e  work r o u t i n e s ,  s u p e r v i s o r y  p o s i t i o n s  had t o  be doubled o r  
t r e b l e d  i n  many c a s e s .  A d d i t i o n a l  s u p e r v i s o r y  l a y e r s  have 
a l s o  been e s t a b l i s h e d .  Another consequence o f  t h e  change has  
been a  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  o f  equipment maintenance,  
r e s u l t i n g  i n  i n c r e a s i n g  c o s t  l e v e l s  t o  keep t h e  equipment 
working. The d i f f i c u l t i e s  j u s t  d e s c r i b e d  a r e  s a i d  t o  c o n t i n u e  
i n  t h e  e a r l y  1980 ' s .  Both Zambian and e x p a t r i a t e  i n t e r v i e w e e s  
con tend  t h a t  a  p e r i o d  o f  20-25 y e a r s  may be needed t o  b r i n g  up 
a  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  s k i l l e d  and e f f i c i e n t  Zambian c r a f t s m e n ,  super-  
v i s o r s  and t e c h n i c i a n s .  
The problems o f  Zambianizat ion have n o t  been a s  s e r i o u s  at  
h i g h e r  t e c h n i c a l  l e v e l s ,  mainly  because r e l a t i v e l y  few p o s i t i o n s  
i n  t h e s e  c a t e g o r i e s  have been Zambianized. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, 
Zambianizat ion o f  h i g h  l e v e l  commercial, a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and 
p e r s o n n e l  f u n c t i o n s  has  been q u i t e  common, and does n o t  appear  
t o  have had d e t r i m e n t a l  consequences f o r  o p e r a t i n g  e f f i c i e n c y .  
The t o p  management o f  ZCCM e x p r e s s e s  a  d e s i r e  t o  s t a b i l i z e  
t h e  number o f  e x p a t r i a t e s  working w i t h  t h e  company a t  about  
t h e  c u r r e n t  l e v e l .  To l i m i t  a  f u r t h e r  exodus,  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  
o f f e r e d  t o  e x p a t r i a t e w e r e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  improved i n  1982, t h u s  in-  
c r e a s i n g  t h e  r e l a t i v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  of employment 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i n  Zambia, f o r  t h e  p e r s o n n e l  c a t e g o r i e s  needed. 
The r e d u c t i o n  i n  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i s  shown i n  t a b l e  7.7.  
It r e s u l t s  from a  combinat ion o f  i n c r e a s e d  l a b o r  f o r c e  and 
s t a g n a n t  o r  f a l l i n g  p r o d u c t i o n .  I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  t h e  l a r g e  expan- 
s i o n  i n  t h e  number o f  employees o c c u r r e d  i n  1973 and 1974 when 
t h e  h i g h  copper  p r i c e s  undoubtedly  reduced t h e  p r e s s u r e s  t o  
c o n t a i n  c o s t s .  A f t e r  1974, t h e  employment f i g u r e  has  remained 
w i t h i n  a narrow range.  P r o d u c t i v i t y  f e l l  from 14.2 t o n s  o f  copper  p e r  
man y e a r  i n  1969-1971 t o  10.4 t o n s  i n  1980-82, o r  by 27 %. 
Three f a c t o r s  e x p l a i n  t h e  f a l l .  F i r s t  i s  t h e  lower ing  i n  o r e  
g r a d e s ,  n e c e s s i t a t i n g  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  of l a r g e r  volumes of m a t e r i a l  
p e r  t o n  o f  m e t a l .  I n  1969 43  t o n s  o f  o r e  were t r e a t e d  p e r  t o n  
o f  f i n i s h e d  copper .  I n  1981, t h e  f i g u r e  had r i s e n  t o  52 t o n s  ,' b u t  t h e  
impact of t h i s  change should have been coun te red  t o  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  e x t e n t  
by improved equipment and i n c r e a s i n g  mechan iza t ion .  Second i s  t h e  
impact o f  Zambianizat ion d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  p a r a g r a p h s .  
T h i r d  i s  t h e  s t r o n g  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  on t h e  i n d u s t r y  
a g a i n s t  l a b o r  f o r c e  r e d u c t i o n s .  The h i g h  v a l u e  a t t a c h e d  t o  
maintenance o f  employment i n  t h e  goa l  h i e r a r c h y  o f  t h e  company 
i s  c l e a r l y  r e f l e c t e d  i n  my i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  one o f  t h e  c h i e f  
e x e c u t i v e s  o f  ZCCM who s t a t e d  t h a t  p r e c i s e l y  because  o f  t h e  
importance a f f o r d e d  t o  employment, he  was n o t  s e r i o u s l y  concerned 
about  t h e  f a l l i n g  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  copper  i n d u s t r y  s i n c e  
n a t i o n a l  t a k e o v e r .  
1 )  Zambia mining yearbooks and ZCCM Annual Report 1982. 
Table  7.7 Labor P r o d u c t i v i t y  and Labor Costs  i n  t h e  Zambian Copper I n d u s t r y  
Calendar y e a r s  
T o t a l  employment 000 48.2 48.5 49.8 50.9 52.8 56.1  57.5 57.1 59.1  56.7 55.5 57.7 58.2 56.3 
Labor p r o d u c t i v i t y :  
Output of copper  p e r  
employee, tons  15.7 14.0 12.8 13.8 12.9 12.7 11.3 12.5 11.2 11.5 10.5 10.6 9.8 10.9 
T o t a l  employee 
e a r n i n g s  
c u r r e n t  d o l l a r s  
m i l l i o n  127 132 143 157 190 217 220 222 229 221 241 278 
cons t a n t  1981 
d o l l a r s  m i l l i o n  425 399 399 399 405 369 329 326 310 254 249 265 
cons t a n t  1981 
d o l l a r s ,  index  
1972 = 100 107 100 100 100 102 9 3 8 3  8 2 7 8 64 6 2 6 6 
Average employee 
ea rn ings  
a l l  employees, 
c u r r e n t  d o l l a r s  
Zambian employees, 
c u r r e n t  do1 l a r s  
a l l  employees, 
cons t a n t  d o l l a r s ,  
Index 19 72=100 
Zambian employees, 
cons t a n t  d o l l a r s ,  
Index 1972=100 
Source: Zambia Mining Yearbook, s e v e r a l  i s s u e s ;  Zambia Monthly D iges t  of S t a t i s t i c s ,  
J a n .  1977 and Jan.-March 1982; ZCCM. 
- - 
While t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  was i n c r e a s e d  o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d  con- 
s i d e r e d ,  t h e  d i r e c t  c o s t  o f  l a b o r  has  been s u b s t a n t i a l l y  lowered,  
b o t h  i n  a b s o l u t e  amounts, when e x p r e s s e d  i n  c o n s t a n t  money v a l u e s ,  
and a s  a  s h a r e  o f  t o t a l  c o s t .  Measured i n  c o n s t a n t  d o l l a r s ,  t h e  
t o t a l  employee e a r n i n g s  i n  1978-1980 were 37 % lower t h a n  i n  
1969-1971. The d i r e c t  l a b o r  c o s t s  work o u t  a t  abou t  27 % of 
t o t a l  c o s t  o f  s a l e s  i n  t h e  1972 a c c o u n t i n g  y e a r .  I n  t h e  1981 
a c c o u n t i n g  y e a r  t h e  f i g u r e  i s  o n l y  around 22 %. 
Table  7.7 a l s o  d e p i c t s  t h e  development o f  average  employee 
ea rn ings  between 1972 and 1979. The f i g u r e s  show t h a t  t h e  f a l l  
i n  l a b o r  c o s t  i s  e x p l a i n e d  o n l y  t o  a  minor  degree  by t h e  sub- 
s t i t u t i o n  of Zambians f o r  e x p a t r i a t e s .  The u n i t  c o s t  t o  t h e  companies 
e x p r e s s e d  i n  c o n s t a n t  d o l l a r s ,  f o r  h i r i n g  b o t h  Zambian and e x p a t r i a t e  
l a b o r ,  f e l l  by 49 % o v e r  t h e  7-year span covered  by t h i s  series of 
d a t a ,  and by 40 % i f  o n l y  Zambians a r e  c o n s i d e r e d .  
T h e e m p l o y e e e a r n i n g s ,  l i k e  o t h e r  c o s t  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  copper  
i n d u s t r y  have a l l  been e x p r e s s e d  i n  d o l l a r s .  T h i s  a p p e a r s  t o  be  
t h e  r e l e v a n t  approach s o  l o n g  a s  I look a t  t h e  problem from t h e  
p o i n t  of v iew of a n  i n d u s t r y  whose e n t i r e  e a r n i n g s  and most c o s t s  
a r e  i n c u r r e d  i n  c o v e r t i b l e  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c i e s .  What t h e  f i g u r e s  s a y  
i s  t h a t  i n  one impor tan t  r e s p e c t  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o s t  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  
of Zambia's copper  i n d u s t r y  was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  improved. 
What c o u n t s  from t h e  employees' p o i n t  of v iew,  o b v i o u s l y ,  i s  
t h e  r e a l  e a r n i n g s  i n  l o c a l  c u r r e n c y .  Though t h e  numbers d i f f e r  some- 
what ,  a l l  t h e  above c o n c l u s i o n s  remain unchanged. For i n s t a n c e ,  
a v e r a g e  e a r n i n g s  of a l l  employees i n  t h e  copper  i n d u s t r y  e x p r e s s e d  
i n  c o n s t a n t  kwacha, f e l l  by 35 % between 1972 and 1979. 
The r educ t ion  i n  average r e a l  wages was n o t  an i s o l a t e d  phenomenon 
f o r  t he  Zambian copper i ndus t ry ,  even though it was more dramatic 
t h e r e  than i n  o the r  a c t i v i t i e s .  The average earn ings  of a l l  employees 
i n  a l l  i n d u s t r i e s  f e l l  by 21 % between 1972 and 1979, when measured 
i n  cons t an t  kwacha. 
The s u b s t a n t i a l  reduct ions  i n  average r e a l  earn ings  of a l l  
employees i n  Zambia r e f l e c t  t he  dominance of copper i n  the  n a t i o n a l  
economy. Mainly a s  a  r e s u l t  of t h e  lower copper p r i c e s  s i n c e  the  
mid-19701s, t h e  coun t ry ' s  r e a l  per  c a p i t a  GDP dec l ined  by 21 % between 
1972 and 1979. This provides the  major explana t ion  t o  the  downward 
adjustment i n  wages and s a l a r i e s ,  no t  only of those  working i n  t he  
copper i n d u s t r y ,  bu t  of t he  e n t i r e  monetary s e c t o r  l abo r  f o r c e  
i n  Zambia . 
The investment performance 
--------------- ---------- 
The gross  c a p i t a l  expenditures  i n  the  Zambian copper i ndus t ry  
appear i n  t a b l e  7.8; One way of judging whether they a r e  high 
o r  low i s  by r e l a t i n g  them t o  the  t o t a l  funds employed by the  
indus t ry .  This i s  done i n  t he  t a b l e  f o r  t h e  per iod  of s t a t e  
ownership. The unsu rp r i s ing  f ind ing  i s  t h a t  investments were 
l a r g e  i n  t h e  per iod  of high copper p r i c e s  and p r o f i t s ,  but t h a t  
they f e l l  t o  roughly h a l f  t h e  e a r l i e r  l e v e l  a f t e r  the  p r i c e  
decl ined.  I n s u f f i c i e n c y  of investments i n  the  l a t t e r  ha l f  of 
the 1970's may e x p l a i n  the upturn i n  the  e a r l y  1980's .  Main- 
tenance of product ion may have n e c e s s i t a t e d  expanded investments .  
Hence the  recovery,  desp i t e  continued low p r i c e  and p r o f i t  l e v e l s .  
While my investment s e r i e s  s t r e t c h e s  back t o  1961, t he  one 
on c a p i t a l  funds employed does not  go beyond 1970. To ge t  an 
impression of t he  r e l a t i v e  investment e f f o r t  from the  e a r l y  19601s, 
t h e  l a s t  column a s s e s s e s  t h e  gross  investment i n  cons tan t  money 
per  ton  of copper produced i n  each year .  According t o  t h i s  measure 
it  appears  t h a t  investments were q u i t e  low u n t i l  1964, reasonably 
h igh  i n  1965-1970 and 1976-1980, and very high i n  1971-1975 and 
1981-1982. 
A number of f a c t o r s  determine the  volume of investment.  The 
most important ,  both i n  p r i v a t e  and pub l i c ly  owned e n t e r p r i s e s  i s  
probably t h e  l e v e l  of p r o f i t s .  The 1965 upward s h i f t  i n  t h e  inves t -  
ments i n  Zambian copper i s  undoubtedly explained i n  t h e  main by the  
sharp upward move i n  copper p r i c e  l e v e l s  i n  mid 1964, even though p a r t  
of i t  might have been due t o  adjustments  n e c e s s i t a t e d  by the  border  
c l o s u r e  wi th  Rhodesia, fol lowing the  l a t t e r  coun t ry ' s  u n i l a t e r a l  de- 
c l a r a t i o n  of independence. A s i m i l a r  co inc iden ta l  movement between 
p r i c e s  and investment l e v e l s ,  bu t  i n  a downward d i r e c t i o n ,  can be 
observed i n  the  mid-1970's. However, t he  d a t a  a l s o  appear  t o  lend 
some support t o  two hypotheses about s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e ,  formulated i n  
e a r l i e r  chap te r s .  
T.able 7.8. Investment Performance in the Zambian Copper 
Industry. Accounting years 
Gross investments Gross investments Gross investments, 
current constant 1981 as, a.proportion constant 1981 dollars 
dollars dollars of total funds em- per ton copper 
million million ployed, per cent produced 
Source: ZCCM 
F i r s t ,  t h e  i nc rease  i n  investments about t he  time o f  
n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  can be seen a s  a  consequence of t he  disappearance 
of p o l i t i c a l  r i s k  which u n t i l  then may have reduced t h e  w i l l i ngnes s  
of  t he  p r i v a t e  f o r e i g n  owners t o  commit investment funds.  And 
second, t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  expand output  i n  the  yea r s  fol lowing 
n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,  d e s p i t e  very s u b s t a n t i a l  i n c r e a s e s  o f  - both  
c a p i t a l  and l a b o r  r e f l e c t s  t he  c o s t  of s e t t i n g  up the  s t a t e  
e n t e r p r i s e ,  and of  g iv ing  i t  the  oppor tun i ty  t o  g a i n  t he  exper ience  
needed f o r  e f f i c i e n t  ope ra t i ons .  
The d i  s t i  ngui s e  
s t a t e  ownership 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  I explore  whether t he  e a r l i e r  p a r t s  of  t he  
p re sen t  chap te r  provide suppor t  f o r  t he  hypotheses about s t a t e  
mineral  e n t e r p r i s e  behavior ,  formulated i n  chap te r  4 .  
Would a  p r i v a t e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  e n t e r p r i s e  have behaved more 
f l e x i b l y  wi th  regard  t o  capac i ty  u t i l i z a t i o n  t han  d id  t h e  s t a t e -  
owned Zambian copper i n d u s t r y ?  There i s  only one i n s t a n c e  of a  
c lear-cut  reduc t ion  i n  u t i l i z a t i o n  of t he  t e c h n i c a l  c a p a c i t y  t o  
produce copper i n  Zambia s i n c e  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n .  This happened 
i n  1975, i n  response t o  t h e  CIPEC dec i s ion  of a  15 % product ion  
c u t  from the  preceding  yea r ,  t o  r eve r se  t h e  very sha rp  p r i c e  f a l l  
t h a t  occurred i n  the  l a t t e r  ha l f  of 1974. The implementation 
of t he  dec i s ion  was not  p a r t i c u l a r l y  e f f e c t i v e .  I n  1975, 
Zambia's ou tput  was 3 % lower than i n  1974. The predominantly 
state-owned i n d u s t r i e s  i n  Ch i l e  and Za i r e ,  two o t h e r  CIPEC 
members, reduced ou tpu t  by 8 % and 1 % r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The p r i v a t e l y -  
owned copper producers i n  t h e  US-Canada and A u s t r a l i a ,  responded 
i n d i v i d u a l l y  t o  t he  p r i c e  f a l l ,  wi thout  n a t i o n a l  o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o l l a b o r a t i o n ,  by c u t t i n g  t h e i r  1975 o u t p u t s  by an  average  o f  
11 % and 1 3  % r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
P r o d u c t i o n  i n  Zambia recovered  i n  1976, and f u l l  c a p a c i t y  
u t i l i z a t i o n  has  been main ta ined  s i n c e  t h a t  t ime .  The d e c l i n i n g  
o u t p u t  i n  t h e  l a t e  1 9 7 0 1 s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  was n o t  due t o  r e s t r i c t e d  
c a p a c i t y  u t i l i z a t i o n ,  b u t  r e s u l t e d  from a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  
p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y .  Even i n  t h e  l a t t e r  h a l f  of 1982, when r e a l  p r i c e s  
f e l l  t o  t h e  lowes t  l e v e l s  recorded  s i n c e  t h e  Grea t  Depress ion ,  
and 25 % of  Western World mine c a p a c i t y  had been moth-balled,  1 
t h e  Zambian i n d u s t r y  c o n t i n u e d  t o  produce a t  t h e  maximum tech- 
n i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e  r a t e s .  The low l e v e l  o f  v a r i a b l e  c o s t s ,  
e x p l a i n e d  t o  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  degree  by t h e  f i x e d  n a t u r e  o f  l a b o r  
c o s t s ,  p r o v i d e s  an economic r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e  Zambian i n d u s t r y ' s  
b e h a v i o r .  
While t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  of l e s s e r  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  r a t e s  of 
c a p a c i t y  u t i l i z a t i o n  i s  c e r t a i n l y  conf i rmed when t h e  state-owned 
copper  i n d u s t r y  i n  Zambia is  compared w i t h  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  
i n  North America o r  A u s t r a l i a ,  one can on ly  s p e c u l a t e  about  t h e  
behav ior  i n  Zambia, had t h e  copper  f i rms  remained i n  p r i v a t e  
f o r e i g n  hands .  Given t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  overwhelming importance t o  
t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy, i t  i s  q u i t e  c o n c e i v a b l e  t h a t  t h e  government 
would have i n t r o d u c e d  l a b o r  l e g i s l a t i o n  making l a b o r  v i r t u a l l y  
a  f i x e d  c o s t  a l s o  t o  a  p r i v a t e  copper  p roducer .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  
t o  avo id  t h e  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  s t r a i n  o f  c a p a c i t y  shut-down, 
t h e  government cou ld  have o f f e r e d  s e l e c t i v e  s u b s i d i e s  t o  t h e  
owners,  t o  a l l e v i a t e  t h e  r i s k  of impending mine c l o s u r e s .  S e l e c t i v e  
s u b s i d i e s  and t a x  exemptions a r e  used p r e c i s e l y  f o r  t h i s  purpose  
1 )  Anthony Bi rd  A s s o c i a t e s ,  "Copper Ana lys i s" ,  London, June  1983. 
by t h e  government of South Af r i c a  i n  t h e  19801s ,  t o  keep t h e  p r i v a t e l y  
owned Anglo-American go ld  mines i n  u n i n t e r r u p t e d  o p e r a t i o n  when go ld  
1 
p r i c e s  f a l l .  S i m i l a r  government a c t i o n  might w e l l  have coerced  o r  
induced a p r i v a t e l y  owned copper  i n d u s t r y  i n  Zambia t o  ma in t a in  
p roduc t ion  a t  f u l l  c a p a c i t y  l e v e l s  throughout  t h e  pe r i od  of low 
p r i c e s .  
The f i g u r e s  on c a p i t a l  expend i t u r e  p r e sen t ed  i n  t h e  
p reced ing  s e c t i o n  do lend  some s uppo r t  t o  t h e  hypo the s i s  - t h a t  
inves tments  w i l l  be h i g h e r  under s t a t e  ownership than  under 
p r i v a t e  f o r e i g n  ownership i n  a  s i t u a t i o n  where t h e  f o r e i g n  
owners f e e l  exposed t o  p o l i t i c a l  r i s k .  However, t h e  importance 
of t h i s  f a c t o r  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  determine w i t h  t h e  d a t a  t h a t  a r e  
a v a i l a b l e .  I n  t h e  Zambian c a s e ,  t h e  copper p r i c e  c e r t a i n l y  
appears  a s  a  f a r  more impor tan t  de te rminan t  of  investment  l e v e l s  
than t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between p r i v a t e  f o r e i g n  and p u b l i c  n a t i o n a l  
ownership. 
The ana l y se s  of t h e  p r eced ing  pages a r e  a l s o  consonant 
w i t h  t h e  hypo t he s i s  t h a t  t akeovers  by s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i nvo lve  
a  s u b s t a n t i a l  s e t t i ng - up  and l e a r n i n g  c o s t  which may have t o  
be i n c u r r e d  o v e r  q u i t e  an extended p e r i o d  of  t ime. The wide ly  
admi t ted  l o s s  of e f f i c i e n c y  due t o  Zambianization t h a t  fol lowed 
n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,  and t h e  co inc idence  of s t a g n a n t  o r  f a l l i n g  
p r oduc t i on  on t h e  one hand a n d . i n c r e a s e d  l a b o r  and c a p i t a l  
i n p u t s  on t h e  o t h e r ,  p o i n t  i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n .  
Higher c o s t  l e v e l s  i n  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  a r e  n o t  on ly  a 
temporary phenomenon, accord ing  t o  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on t h e  s u b j e c t  
t h a t  was surveyed i n  e a r l i e r  c h a p t e r s .  The mix ture  and u n c l a r i t y  
1 )  I n t e r v i ew  wi t h  C .  Belshaw and P.  Freeman of ZCCM. 
of goa ls  i n  state-owned i n d u s t r i e s  t y p i c a l l y  r e s u l t  i n  perma- 
nen t ly  l e s s  p r e s s u r e  t o  minimize c o s t s ,  a s  compared t o  p r i v a t e  
profit-maximizing u n i t s .  Concern about employment and about 
provid ing  s o c i a l  ameni t ies  t o  the  employees and t o  t he  communities 
where they l i v e  i s  s t r o n g l y  emphasized by t h e  management of t h e  
Zambian copper i n d u s t r y .  Log ica l ly ,  p r o f i t s  ought t o  have been h igher  
i f  the  i n d u s t r y  had not  taken these  s o c i a l  o b j e c t i v e s  upon 
i t s e l f . .  There need be no th ing  a n t i - s o c i a l  i n  a  pure p r o f i t -  
maximizing goal  f o r  t he  Zambian copper ope ra t i ons .  The h ighe r  
p r o f i t s  t h a t  would emerge i n  the  absence of  wide s o c i a l  respon- 
s i b i l i t i e s  could be spen t  i n  t h e i r  e n t i r e t y  by the  government 
t o  promote s o c i a l  development i n  the  way i t  thought most u s e f u l .  
I n  f a c t ,  the  copper i n d u s t r y  does not  appear as a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
app rop r i a t e  t o o l  f o r  employment c r e a t i o n ,  given i t s  high  c a p i t a l  
i n t e n s i t y .  Yet i t  cont inues  t o  be e n t r u s t e d  wi th  (or  t akes  upon 
i t s e l f )  s o c i a l  o b j e c t i v e s  a p a r t  from the  p r o f i t  maximization 
goa l .  I n  one execu t ive ' s  op in ion ,  t h e  reason f o r  t h i s  p u r s u i t  of  
broader  goals  i s  t h a t  a l though not  an app rop r i a t e  t o o l ,  the  
i ndus t ry  may neve r the l e s s  be a  more e f f i c i e n t  instrument  than 
the  government i t s e l f ,  i n  accomplishing some of  t he  s o c i a l  
o b j e c t i v e s .  
It would fol low from the  above arguments t h a t  s t a t e  owner- 
s h i p  has r e s u l t e d  i n  h ighe r  c o s t s  i n  the  product ion  of  copper ,  
temporar i ly  because of t h e  c o s t s  of  s e t t i n g  up the  s t a t e  en t e r -  
p r i s e  and of g iv ing  i t  the  oppor tun i ty  t o  l e a r n  and g a i n  exper ience ;  
permanently because t he  wider  goals  l e s sen  t h e  p r o f i t  maximization/ 
c o s t  minimizat ion focus .  While t he  f e a t u r e s  l ead ing  l o g i c a l l y  
t o  h igher  cos t  l e v e l s  can a l l  be i n f e r r e d  from the  e a r l i e r  ana lyses ,  
i t  is  not  p o s s i b l e  t o  show i n  a  c lear -cu t  way t h a t  c o s t s  h a w  
a c t u a l l y  increased  i n  the  pe r iod  s i n c e  the  government took a 
m a j o r i t y  ownership p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  But t hen ,  t h e  
a v a i l a b l e  c o s t  d a t a  a r e  rough and incomplete .  Fur thermore,  one 
cou ld  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  extended pe r i od  of h igh  copper  p r i c e s  j u s t  
p reced ing  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  l e d  t o  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
s l a c k  t h a t  would have been suppressed  i n  t h e  low p r i c e  p e r i o d ,  
had t h e  p r i v a t e  owners remained, but  t h a t  was no t  under  t h e  new 
l e s s  cost -conscious  ownership.  
A l l  t h e  conc lus ions  formulated above, w h i l e  reasonably  
suppor ted  by t h e  d a t a  and arguments p r e sen t ed  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  
remain u n c e r t a i n .  I end t h e  s e c t i o n  w i th  a f u r t h e r  c avea t  t o  
t he  hypothes ized  d i s t i n c t i o n s  between s t a t e  and p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  
The t a b l e  below compares t h e  p rog re s s  of t h e  Zambian copper  
i n d u s t r y  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  s t a t e  ownership w i t h  t h a t  of  Phelps  
Dodge, a  l e a d i n g  copper  producer  i n  t h e  US. The r ea son  f o r  choosing 
Phelps  Dodge among US copper producing f i r m s  i s  t h a t  Anaconda and 
Kennecott  have been merged w i th  petroleum c o r p o r a t i o n s  wh i l e  i n  
o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  copper  accounts  f o r  a r e l a t i v e l y  l i m i t e d  
s h a r e  of t o t a l  t u rnove r .  ' I n  many r e a d e r s  ' view,  t h e  proposed comparison 
may seem f a r - f e t ched .  The two f i r m s  d i f f e r  cons ide r ab ly  from each 
o t h e r  i n  many r e s p e c t s .  Most impor t an t l y ,  w h i l e  copper  mining,  
smel t ing  and r e f i n i n g  dominates complete ly  i n  t h e  Zambian i n d u s t r y ,  
a lmost  one h a l f  of Phe lps  Doge's s a l e s  stem from manufactur ing.  Yet ,  
1) T.T. Tomimatsu, The US Copper I ndus t ry :  A P e r s p e c t i v e  of 
F i n a n c i a l  H ea l t h ,  US Bureau of Mines I C  8836, 1980, Tab le  9 .  
The pe r iod  under s c r u t i n y  i s  d iv ided  i n  t h e  t a b l e  i n t o  t he  
high-price  pe r iod ,  ending i n  1974, and t h e  low-price per iod  
covering t h e  subsequent y e a r s .  I f  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  e f f i c i e n c y  
i n  t he  state-owned copper i ndus t ry  i n  Zambia has s u f f e r e d  from 
the  temporary se t t ing-up  c o s t s  fol lowing n a t i o n a l  takeover  of 
e q u i t y  and management, and from t h e  permanently reduced p re s su re  
t o  minimize c o s t s ,  t hen  the  Zambian f i rms should have experienced a  
more severe  r e l a t i v e  p r o f i t  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  than Phelps Dodge from t h e  
e a r l y  t o  t h e  l a t e  1970 ' s .  
A f i r s t  s c r u t i n y  of t he  f i g u r e s  does indeed sugges t  t h a t  
t h i s  was t h e  ca se .  Zambian s a l e s  i nc reased  much l e s s  and t h e  
p r o f i t  be fo re  t a x  d e t e r i o r a t e d  much more than i n  Phelps Dodge. 
I n  t h e  e a r l y  per iod  the  Zambian i n d u s t r y ' s  pre-tax r e t u r n  on 
shareholders  ' funds was twice a s  high a s  i n  Phelps Dodge, but 
i n  t he  l a t t e r  yea r s  t he  Zambian copper companies ended up wi th  
a  r e t u r n  on equ i ty  much below t h a t  recorded by t h e  US f i rm.  
The argument so f a r  has  a b s t r a c t e d  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Zambian 
copper i s  s o l d  a t  LME quo ta t i ons ,  whi le  t h a t  of Phelps Dodge i s  
t y p i c a l l y  t r a n s a c t e d  a t  domestic US p r i c e s  over which producers  
have had a  cons ide rab l e  leverage .  The average l e v e l s  f o r  t h e  LME 
p r i c e s  and f o r  t h e  US producer d e l i v e r e d  p r i c e s  a s  r epo r t ed  by 
Metals Week (reproduced i n  Phelps Dodge's Annual Report) a r e  
given i n  t h e  t a b l e .  It w i l l  be seen t h a t  when measured i n  reAl 
te rms ,  t h e  LME p r i c e  has  experienced a  much sharper  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  
than the  US p r i c e .  
I n  t h e  t h r e e  bottom rows of t h e  t a b l e  I a d j u s t  f o r  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  p r i c e s  r ece ived ,  by r e c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  Zambian 
s a l e s ,  p r o f i t s  be fo re  t a x  and p r o f i t  r a t e s ,  on t h e  hypo the t i ca l  
assumption t h a t  a l l  c o s t s  remained a s  they were, bu t  t h a t  a l l  copper 
with  Phe lps  Dodge 
Zambian Copper Indus t ry  Phe lps  Dodge 
account ing yea r s  ending ca l enda r  y e a r s  
March 
Shareholders  funds a t  t h e  
end of each p e r i o d ,  
m i l l i o n d o l l a r s  1113 
S a l e s ,  m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  52 80 7511 
P r o f i t  be fo re  t a x ,  
m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  1965 184 
Average annual p r o f i t  
be fo re  t a x  f o r  t h e  
pe r iod  i n  p e r  c en t  of 
sha reho lde r s  ' funds 
a t  end of p e r i o d  35 
Tax payments m i l l i o n  
d o l l a r s  954 
Tax payments a s  X of 
p r o f i t  4  9  
P r o f i t  a f t e r  t a x  
m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  1011 
Average annual  p r o f i t  
a f t e r  t a x  f o r  t h e  pe r iod  
i n  p e r  cen t  of share-  
h o l d e r s '  funds a t  t h e  
end of p e r i o d  18 
Average p r i c e ,  LME (Zambia) 
and US producer  de l i ve r ed  p r i c e  
(Phelps  Dodge) , c t s / l b  
c u r r e n t  d o l l a r s  67.2 
1981 cons t an t  d o l l a r s  163.0 
Hypothe t ica l  f i g u r e s  f o r  
Zambian i n d u s t r y ,  assuming 
s a l e s  a t  US p r i c e s ;  
S a l e s ,  m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  4636 
P r o f i t  be fo re  t a x ,  
m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  1320 
Average annual  p r o f i t s  
be fo re  tax f o r  t h e  
p e r i o d  i n  p e r  cen t  of 
sha reho lde r s '  funds a t  
end of pe r iod  24 
Source: ZCCM; Phelps Dodge Annual Reports 1979 and 1981. 
s a l e s  had been made a t  t h e  average  p r i c e s  r e c e i v e d  by US producers .  
The p i c t u r e  t h a t  t h e n  emerges s u g g e s t s  q u i t e  s i m i l a r  s a l e s  growth 
f o r  t h e  s u b j e c t s  under  s t u d y ,  and a  r e d u c t i o n  by two t h i r d s  
i n  t h e  b e f o r e  t a x  r a t e  o f  p r o f i t  from t h e  h igh-pr ice  t o  t h e  
low-price p e r i o d  f o r  t h e  Zambian i n d u s t r y  a s  w e l l  a s  f o r  Phe lps  
Dodge. The r e s u l t s  may be regarded a s  an  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
Zambian state-owned f i r m s  d i d  n o t  e x p e r i e n c e  a  l o s s  i n  e f f i c i e n c y  
o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d  under  s t u d y ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  developments i n  
a  l e a d i n g  US-based p r i v a t e  copper  m u l t i n a t i o n a l .  
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PART 111. CONCLUSIONS 
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS. GENERALIZATIONS AM) PROSPECTS 
This  concluding chap te r  draws togehter  t h e  va r ious  arguments 
developed e a r l i e r  i n  t h e  book. The major f i nd ings  a r e  summarized, 
t h e  hypotheses a r e  r e i t e r a t e d  and confronted with t h e  empir ica l  
evidence contained i n  t h e  c a s e  s t u d i e s ,  and t e n t a t i v e  conclus ions  
a r e  formulated. Though t h e  empir ica l  base suppor t ing  t h e  conclu- 
sions is narrow and no t  always s t rong ,  an at tempt  is  made t o  gene- 
r a l i z e  t h e  f i n d i n g s  beyond t h e  empir ica l  ground covered, t o  
encompass world minera l  markets i n  genera l .  The v i s t a  i s  a l s o  
extended i n  t ime. Thus, p a s t  t r ends  a r e  combined wi th  t h e  hypo- 
t h e s e s  and conclus ions  about t h e  p re sen t  i n  an e f f o r t  t o  d e r i v e  
some i n s i g h t s  about t h e  f u t u r e  prospec ts  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  mineral  
markets i n  which an important  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  presence has  become 
a permanent f e a t u r e .  
The growth of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  
Work on t h e  p re sen t  book was s t a r t ed  on t h e  premise t h a t  
s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  had become an  important f a c t o r  i n  developing 
c o u n t r i e s '  mineral  i n d u s t r i e s .  While b i t s  and p ieces  of evidence 
t o  support t h e  claim of a f a s t  growing s t a t e  owned mineral  s e c t o r  
abound, I was unable t o  f i n d  any sys temat ic  and reasonably gene ra l  
evidence t o  support  t h e  above premise. 
The d e t a i l e d  d a t a  presented i n  chapter  3 c o n s t i t u t e  my own 
a t tempt  t o  measure t h e  e x t e n t  and growth of s t a t e  ownership i n  t h e  
minera l  s e c t o r .  Table 8.1 prov5des a summary of t h e  p re sen t  s t a t u s  
in the three most important non-fuel mineral industries. 
An important conclusion that emerges from the analyses of chap- 
ter 3 is the blurred nature of the state enterprise concept. The 
features that characterize state enterprises are the result of state 
control over the corporate activity. However, the degree of control 
is far from always uniformly related to the extent of state owner- 
ship. Given the difficulties in defining the concept and establish- 
ing the degree of control, empirical measurements of the size of the 
state enterprise sector are invariably based on the magnitude of 
the governments' equity ownership. Even with this simplification, 
the prevalence of state enterprise can be measured in at least three 
different ways, i.e. (a) as all production capacity in which the 
government has significant equity ownership; or (b) in which govern- 
ment has majority ownership; or (c) as that production capacity 
which is proportional to the government equity holding in each 
production unit. Table 8.1 demonstrates that the differences be- 
tween the three measures can be quite substantial. 
State enterprise in the mineral industries of the Western World 
is much more prevalent in developing than in industrialized countries, 
even though the latter have significant ownership positions in some 
minerals, e.g. aluminum and iron ore/steel. When state enterprise is 
measured as the capacity proportional to the government equity holding, 
the figures suggest that roughly one half of the non-fuel mineral 
industries in developing countries are government owned. The figure falls 
to about one third when the entire Western World is considered. These 
measurements clearly indicate that state owned enterprises constitute a 
very important factor in world mineral markets. 
Public ownership of the mineral industries on a large scale 
in the Western World is a new phenomenon. As recently as the 
Table  8 . 1  A Summary of Government Ownership P o s i t i o n s  i n  Three:&jor Mineral  I n d u s t r i e s  1981 I 
Aluminum ( a c t u a l  we igh t )  Copper (metal  con ten t )  I r o n  o r e  ( a c t u a l  weight)  2  
Mining Ref in ing  Smelt ing Mining Smelt ing Ref in ing  
Western World 
T o t a l  c a p a c i t y  000 t o n s ,  92,500 30,790 14,040 7,820 8,780 9,120 
of which 
Capac i ty  w i t h  s i g n i f i c a n t  
g o v t .  ownership % 45.3 24.2 22.8 40.5 30.6 25.9 
Capaci ty  w i t h  m a j o r i t y  
gov t .  ownership % 23.2 13.2 19.4 34.7 29.7 24.3 
Capaci ty  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  
gov t .  e q u i t y  ho ld ing  % 27.8 15.1  18.5 32.4 26.1 21.6 
Developing Co u n t r i e s  
T o t a l  c a p a c i t y  000 t o n s ,  54,000 , 6,530 2,190 4,120 3,340 2,580 
of which 
Capaci ty  w i th  s i g n i f i c a n t  
gov t .  ownership % 71.1 54.9 60.3 73.0 75.5 82.6 
Capac i ty  w i t h  m a j o r i t y  
govt .  ownership % 33.3 12.3 45.6 62.0 7  2.9 77 .O  
Capac i ty  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  
gov t .  e q u i t y  h o ld in g  % 41.1 21.1 44.7 57.8 64.0 67.6 
1 )  F igu re s  f o r  aluminum r e f e r  t o  1980. 
2) The f i g u r e s  f o r  i r o n  o r e  a r e  based on p roduc t i on  and no t  on capac i t y .  
Source: Tables  3 .1  through 3.7.  
mid-19501s, s t a t e  involvement i n  t h i s  s ec to r  ou t s ide  the  S o c i a l i s t  
coun t r i e s  was i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  A t  t h a t  t ime, t h e  mineral  i n d u s t r i e s  
of Af r i ca ,  Asia and La t in  America were completely dominated by p r i -  
v a t e l y  owned mul t ina t iona l s  from t h e  leading i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  market 
economies. The emergence and growth of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  has  been 
prompted by a  v a r i e t y  of f a c t o r s ,  bu t  a  major one has been the  p o l i t i -  
c a l  independence and economic emancipation of t h e  t h i r d  world. ~ e t w e e n  
I960 and 1975.a  s u b s t a n t i a l  proport ion of t h e  t o t a l  mineral  i ndus t ry  
i n  developing coun t r i e s  was na t iona l i zed .  The motivat ions f o r  take- 
over included claims t h a t  t h e  c o l o n i a l  arrangements with the  p r i v a t e  
mul t ina t iona l s  l e f t  l i t t l e  b e n e f i t  t o  t h e  newly independent na t ions ;  
convic t ions  t h a t  economic independence was impingent upon government 
c o n t r o l  of key economic s e c t o r s  l i k e  minera ls ;  and widespread socia-  
l i s t  p o l i t i c a l  phi losophiesaccording t o  which the  major means of 
production should be pub l i c ly  owned. Viewed i n  t h i s  l i g h t ,  t h e  
emergence of t he  s t a t e  owned mineral  s e c t o r  i n  developing c o u n t r i e s  
can t o  a  l a r g e  ex ten t  be seen as a  one-time adjustment i n  t h e  wake 
of economic independence. 
My a n a l y s i s  suggests  t h a t  the  phase of f a s t  growth has now 
ended, and t h a t  t he  propor t ion  of s t a t e  ownership i n  Western World 
mineral  a c t i v i t y  w i l l  no t  expand much above cu r ren t  l e v e l s .  Several  
f a c t o r s  a r e  support ive of t h i s  conclusion.  F i r s t ,  a s  j u s t  noted,  
t h e  adjustment t o  r e c t i f y  t h e  former unfavorable co lon ia l  condi t ions  
t h a t  prevai led  i n  developing coun t r i e s  has probably come t o  an end. 
Rela t ionships  between governments of developing coun t r i e s  and mult i -  
n a t i o n a l  mining f i rms  i n  the  e a r l y  1980's appear much l e s s  c o n f l i c t -  
r idden than  10 o r  20 years  e a r l i e r .  The governments a r e  anxious t o  
maintain t h e i r  involvements i n  t h e  mineral  a c t i v i t i e s ,  but  n o t n e c e s s a r i l y  
to expand them above present levels. New projects are typically 
launched as joint ventures with one or several multinationals, with 
the government holding an important equity position, but not necessarily 
a majority one. Second, it would appear that in the 1980's socialism 
is less in vogue in the developing countries than it was in the late 
1950's and 1960fs, immediately after a majority of the countries in 
Africa and Asia gained independence. Over time ideology has come to play 
a lesser role and the ability to deliver the desired results has attained 
increased importance in the choice of ownership forms in the mineral 
industries. A third factor is the increasing sophistication of the private 
sector entrepreneurship and management in developing countries. The second 
and third factors in combination can be expected to lead to a greater role 
for private national enterprises in the continued expansion of the mineral 
sector activity in developing countries whose governments continue to 
have inhibitions to foreign ownership in base industries. The governments 
of industrialized countries appear disillusioned about the weak profit I 
performance of the mineral industries that they already own. Fighting 1 
their swelling budget deficits, they would be reluctant to expand their ~ 
ownership positions, both because of the expenditure that further acquisi- 
tions would involve, and to restrict their obligations to provide subsidies 
for future losses. In industrialized countries too, large scale expansion 
of state ownership in minerals is unlikely. 
The above does not imply that the public ownership positions in mineral 
industries in industrialized and developing countries will be dismantled. 
But even though some limited expansion in the Western World state owned 
share may take place as a result of the continuing shift of mining and mineral 
1 processing towards developing countries, the arguments suggest that the 
1) For evidence of such a shift see M. Radetzki, "Has political risk 
scared mineral investments away from developing countries?", World 
Development No. 1, 1982. 
fast growth of the state-owned share is now over. The tentative 
conclusion is that in the 1980's and 1990's the expansion of state 
enterprise in Western World mineral industries will not be much 
different from the overall growth of the mineral sector. Hence, 
the functioning of the international mineral markets will continue 
to be conditioned by the presence of an increasingly mature group 
of state-owned mineral producers representing a substantial but 
relatively static share of world supply. 
The difficulty of hypothesis testing 
The basic premise of this book is that the emergence and 
growth of state enterprise does affect the international mineral 
markets in important ways. The major objective for undertaking 
the work has been to clarify what will happen to such market 
variables as supply, cost, price and investment, when state 
enterprise is introduced on a large scale. 
A number of hypothetical conclusions about the market im- 
pact of state enterprises have been formulated in earlier chap- 
ters. They will be reiterated again and further discussed in 
the following section. Before doing so, however, I want to 
emphasize the tentative nature of most of these conclusions, 
and point to the severe difficulties in undertaking unequivocal 
empirical tests of their validity under present circumstances. 
The subject matter of the present study is seriously Gnder- 
researched. This is clearly apparent from recent works on inter- 
national commodity markets. The presence of state enterprises is 
certainly admitted in such works, but the particular behavioral 
features of these enterprises are typically neglected. Thus, the 
analyses of price and international supply regularly assume un- 
modified profit maximization behavior among all agents. 1 
One consequence of lacking earlier research in this area 
is that there is a serious dearth of data on state mineral 
enterprises in developing countries. Such data are required to 
confirm or refute the tentative conclusions about these enterprises' 
behavioral characteristics. The case studies presented earlier 
in the book provide a very narrow sample which is hardly adequate 
for formal testing, and quite weak as a base for informal genera- 
lizations. Many more similar studies would be needed to provide 
a firmer ground for the conclusions. It should be noted that a 
mere multiplication of case studies would not overcome one diffi- 
culty that emerged in my own work. In many cases, company records 
have not been properly kept during the period of serious opera- 
tional disruption that has often followed nationalization. Among 
the cases presented here, this is most evident from the Indo- 
nesian study, where most operational data for the state owned 
tin enterprise prior to 1966 are simply not available. This 
difficulty will remain even if the number of case studies is 
multiplied. 
The tentative conclusions about market impact subsume a 
clear-cut distinction in the behavioral characteristics between 
private and state-owned firms. But as noted in chapter 3 and in 
the preceding section, reality is much more blurred. A large part 
of the enterprises classified as state-owned will neither 
1) See for instance D.L. McNicol, Commodity Agreements and Price 
Stabilization, Lexington 1978; F.G. Adams and S.A. Klein, editors 
Stabilizing World Commodity Markets, Lexington 1978; and B.P. Bosworth 
and R.Z. Lawrence, Commodity Prices and the New Inflation, Brookings 1982. 
be fully controlled nor fully owned by governments, and their 
behavior is likely to be somewhere between the two extremes 
posited in chapter 4. In addition, there is the problem that 
the growth of the state mineral enterprise universe has been 
coincidental with. important changes in many countries of the 
social environment in which the private multinationals live 
and act. These changes have had an influence on the behavior 
of the private firms. In all likelihood the behavioral 
characteristics of private corporations have been shifted in 
some respects towards those of the state firms. This is certainly 
true of the employment policies. The freedom of the private multi- 
national mining companies to fire workers in developing countries 
is much-more circumscribed in the 1980's than it was in the 1950's. 
For these reasons, the distinction between the state-owned and 
private multinational firms will be much less sharp than would 
appear from the archetype discussions in chapter 4. 
Finally, there is the difficulty that follows from the dynamics 
in the emergence of the state enterprise phenomenon. The tentative 
conclusions on market impact are based on the premise that state 
mineral enterprises can be divided into the mature and the inexperienced 
category, each with its own behavioral characteristics, and that 
the inexperienced firms undergo a maturing process at a speed 
that is difficult to determine. Given the recency of the wave 
of nationalizations through which a majority of the present state 
mineral enterprises were set up, a large part of this enterprise 
universe is still involved in the transition process towards 
maturity. In this circumstance, it will be problematic to determine 
the fluid and changing behavioral characteristics of the aggregate 
state mineral enterprise universe at each point in time. 
All the ambiguities in behavioral patterns described in the 
preceding paragraph make empirical tests of market impacts much 
more complex and uncertain than would appear from the analysis 
of chapter 4, where three categories of mineral firms each with 
a clear cut set of characteristics were identified, viz. (i) the 
private; (ii) the mature state owned; and (iii) the inexperienced 
state owned. While this simple categorization was instructive 
in bringing out the major implications of the emergence and 
growth of state enterprise, it should be clear that the real 
world developments are less distinct and determinant. 
The market impact of state enterprise proliferation 
Below I present a set of tentative conclusions on the 
market impact of the spread and growth of state-owned mineral 
enterprises. Though these conclusions follow logically and 
unambiguously from the behavioral assumptions about state 
ecterprise, their nature remains tentative until formal empiri- 
cal tests of their validity can be performed. More research and 
data collection are a necessary but not always sufficient con- 
dition for undertaking such tests. The empirical support for 
the conclusions that is presently available has an informal and 
qualitative character. 
The first conclusion is that the establishment of state 
mineral enterprises has temporarily led to lower output levels 
and higher prices than what would have prevailed with the old 
ownership patterns. 
The setting up and learning costs after nationalization 
appear starkly in the portrait of the Indonesian tin industry 
(chapter 5), and are apparent also in the Zambian copper case 
(chapter 7). The loss of world market share is clearly evident 
in all three case studies contained in the book. The problems 
in maintaining full capacity utilization in the years after 
nationalization, and the difficulties to expand capacity, 
lasting for a decade or more following state takeover, are 
probably quite general phenomena in the mineral industries 
of developing countries. The logical consequence of this develop- 
ment is clear. Since the nationalizations and their consequences 
1 
were by and large unexpected by the industry, and given the long 
gestation period for new investments in the mineral sector, the 
shortfall in supply after the state enterprises were set up, could 
not be immediately compensated by the private industry. Hence 
prices must have attained higher levels than they would have in 
the absence of the nationalizations, until such compensation be- 
came possible or the nationalized firms acquired the ability to 
undertake investments in capacity expansion. With time, as the 
new state enterprises gained experience and improved the efficiency 
of their operation, costs would have declined and capacity expansion 
would be resumed. However, even the mature state mineral corporations 
have costs that are higher than the private multinational mining 
firms in similar circumstances. 
1) R. Vernon, Two Hungry Giants, The US and Japan in the Quest for 
Oil and Ores, Harvard University Press 1983. 
P
The e m p i r i c a l  v e r i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  temporary p r i c e  consequences 
of n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  i s  d i f f i c u l t  because s t a t e  t akeover  h a s  been 
spread  i n  t ime  and because of t h e  many o t h e r  p r i c e  a f f e c t i n g  
f a c t o r s  t h a t  may have been s imul taneous ly  a t  work. However, t h e  
e x c e p t i o n a l l y  h igh  copper p r i c e s  i n  t h e  1964-1974 p e r i o d ,  can 
be  a s c r i b e d  i n  some deg ree  t o  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  of Ch i l e ,  Peru ,  
Z a i r e  and Zambia t o  expand c a p a c i t y  a f t e r  p a r t i a l  o r  t o t a l  na- 
t i o n a l i z a t i o n s  of t h e i r  i n d u s t r i e s ,  and t h e  ensu ing  c o n f l i c t s  
between t h e  f o u r  governments and t h e  mining m u l t i n a t i o n a l s .  1  1 
The average  copper p r i c e  i n  t h e  1964-1974 p e r i o d  was $ 1 .85 / l b  
( c o n s t a n t  1981 d o l l a r s ) ,  60% above t h e  $ 1.15/ lb  ave r age  t h a t  
 reva ailed i n  t h e  p reced ing  11 y e a r s .  A s  argued i n  t h e  work j u s t  
quoted,  t h e  s h i f t  t o  t h e  h ighe r  p r i c e  was r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  f o u r  CIPEC c o u n t r i e s '  annual  ave r age  o u t p u t  expansion 
between 1960 and 1974 was reduced t o  2.7%, from an  annua l  6.2% 
i n  t h e  1950-1960 p e r i o d  (Western World ou tpu t  r o s e  by a n  annua l  
average  of 4.7% between 1950 and 1960, and by 4.0% between 1960 
and 1974). 
The second conc lu s ion  i s  t h a t  t h e  emergence of s t a t e  e n t e r -  
p r i s e s  has  permanently s t a b i l i z e d  o u t p u t  and d e s t a b i l i z e d  p r i c e s  
i n  m ine ra l  marke t s .  While t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e  s t a t e  m ine ra l  
f i r m s '  unwi l l i ngnes s  t o  reduce  c a p a c i t y  u t i l i z a t i o n  i n  response  
t o  f a l l i n g  demand h a s  been exp lored  i n  some d e t a i l  i n  c h a p t e r  
4 ,  t h e  t h r e e  c a s e  s t u d i e s  do n o t  p rov ide  a c l e a r - c u t  con f i rma t ion  
f o r  t h e  conc lus ion .  The Indones i an t i n  d e p o s i t s  a r e  low-cost, and 
1) For  a d i s c u s s i o n  s e e  M Rade tzk i ,  Long Term Copper Produc t ion  
Options of t h e  Developing Count r ies ,  Na tura l  Resources  Forum No 1 ,  
the tin prices have been so high throughout the period of state 
ownership that full capacity utilization would in all probability 
have been rational even if the industry had been operated by private 
interests. The Venezuelan iron ore producer did contract capacity 
utilization after 1975, but this development was more due to the 
market disruptions following nationalization than a conscious measure 
aimed at maximizing profits in the wake of falling prices. Only the 
Zambian case provides some support for the thesis that state firms 
are less flexible than private ones in terms of downward adjustments 
of capacity utilization. The case study shows that Zambian copper 
output in 1975 fell much less than in several countries with pre- 
dominantly private ownership. 
Formal testing of the conclusion is difficult to perform. 
Defining output instability as the percentage deviation in output 
from its five-year moving average, L S Powers concludes that 
developing countries have on average had a somewhat lesser in- 
stability than industrialized countries for copper, aluminum, 
I tin and ironlsteel in the 1950-1977 period. She hypothesises 
that this difference might have to do with the greater state 
involvement in these industries in developing countries. How- 
ever, the Powers analysis is far too general to catch the issue 
presently in focus. First, there is no attempt to pick out the 
countries and periods during which the respective mineral indust- 
ries were under public ownership. Second, the output instability 
1) L.S. Powers, "Instability in the Copper, Aluminum, Tin and 
Iron and Steel Markets", Materials, No. 3, 1981. 
measure provides  an aggregate  r e f l e c t i o n  of a l l  t h e  f o r c e s  t h a t  
induce output  changes, and does no t  i s o l a t e  t h e  impact of p r i c e  
v a r i a t i o n s  on output .  And t h i r d ,  a s  admitted by Powers, t h e  method 
used y i e l d s  a h igh  measure of i n s t a b i l i t y  f o r  c o u n t r i e s  which 
have experienced a f a s t  step-wise output  i nc rease ,  a s  new p r o j e c t s  
have gone i n t o  product ion.  This  i n s t a b i l i t y  obviously has  nothing 
t o  do wi th  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  a d j u s t  e x i s t i n g  capac i ty  t o  changing market 
c ircumstances.  
I d e a l l y ,  a t e s t  t o  v e r i f y  t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  s t a t e  minera l  en t e r -  
p r i s e s  a r e  l e s s  f l e x i b l e  than  p r i v a t e  f i rms i n  terms of downward 
capac i ty  adjustments  t o  f a l l i n g  demand would r e q u i r e  d e t a i l e d  s e t s  of 
d a t a  on c a p a c i t y  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  f i rms  o r  a t  l e a s t  i n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s  
a t  each po in t  i n  time. This would permit a de te rmina t ion  of t h e  e x t e n t  
of v a r i a t i o n  i n  capac i ty  u t i l i z a t i o n  over  time. Though c a p a c i t y  is a 
vague and f l u i d  concept ,  t h e r e  a r e  occas iona l  s t u d i e s  of minera l  i n d u s t r i e s  
t h a t  provide d e t a i l e d  capac i ty  f i g u r e s  f o r  an i n d i v i d u a l  year .  Such s t u d i e s  
enabled me t o  cons t ruc t  t a b l e s  3.1-3.6 i n  chap te r  3. But t o  my knowledge, 
comprehensive d a t a  of t h i s  k ind ,  covering a long per iod  of t ime have not  
been publ ished.  
My own, no t  very  succes s fu l  a t tempt  a t  v e r i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  hypothes is ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  l i k e  t h a t  of Powers, r e l i e s  on v a r i a t i o n s  i n  ou tpu t .  I n  t a b l e  
8.2 I compare s i x  copper producing coun t r i e s  where t h e  i n d u s t r y  i s  pre- 
dominantly pub l i c ly  owned, wi th  s i x  o t h e r s  i n  which ownership i s  almost 
exc lus ive ly  i n  p r i v a t e  hands. The coun t r i e s  included accounted 
f o r  over  80 % of Western World copper mine product ion i n  r ecen t  
years .  Only t h e  period from 1974 and onwards i s  covered. I n  t h e  
1964-1974 decade, copper p r i c e s  were so high t h a t  hard ly  any 
mines f a i l e d  i n  covering t h e i r  v a r i a b l e  c o s t s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  
recency of many n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s  would cause problems wi th  t h e  
state-owned country group i f  t h e  period of a n a l y s i s  were extended 
back f a r  beyond 1974. 
The t a b l e  shows percentage decreases  of output  over t h e  
preceding year  f o r  each country.  Unweighted averages of t h e  
decreases  f o r  each country group a r e  a l s o  given.  Increases  i n  
output  a r e  ignored on t h e  presumption t h a t  they a r e  dominated 
by expansion of capac i ty  which i s  not  a  concern i n  t h e  present  
i nves t iga t ion .  
The average annual downward adjustment f o r  t h e  whole period 
i s  indeed g r e a t e r  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  group (- 3.0%) than i n  t h e  pub l i c  
group (- 2.4%). On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  pub l i c  group shows l a r g e r  
downward adjustments  i n  f o u r  out  of t he  n i n e  yea r s .  A c l o s e r  
s c ru t iny  of t h e  f i g u r e s  r e v e a l s  Zai re  and Zambia a s  t h e  two 
coun t r i e s  i n  t h e  pub l i c  group t h a t  con t r ibu ted  most t o  t h e  down- 
ward adjustment f i g u r e s  over t h e  period s tudied .  Fur ther  a n a l y s i s  
demonstrates t h a t  demand and p r i c e  condi t ions  played a  minor r o l e  f o r  
t h e  output  reduct ions  i n  these  two coun t r i e s .  P o l i t i c a l  upheavals 
i n  the  Shaba province provide t h e  main explanat ion  f o r  t h e  recorded 
output  reduct ions  i n  Zai re .  And, a s  noted i n  chapter  7,  t he  almost 
p e r s i s t e n t  negat ive  f i g u r e s  f o r  Zambia r e f l e c t  a  f a l l i n g  t r end  
i n  production capac i ty .  
A study of nega t ive  dev ia t ions  from t r end  ins t ead  of down- 
ward adjustments  from the  preceding year  w i l l  so lve  t h e  Zambian 
'Countries with predominant 
~ u b l i c  owners hi^ 
Table 8 . 2  Downward Adjustment i n  Copper ~ i n e  Production; percentage change over preceding year 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
-8 .2  -2 .8  Chile 
Finland 
Mexico 
Yugoslavia 
Zaire 
Zanibia 
Unweighted average 
Countries with predominant 
private ownership 
Australia 
Canada 
Philippines 
South Africa 
Sweden 
u S 
Unweighted average 
Copper prices  constant 
1981 US cents / lb  
Source: Metal lgesel lschaft  
problem j u s t  no ted ,  b u t  w i l l  i n s t e a d  in t roduce  two o t h e r  complica- 
t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  method runs  i n t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  
experienced by Powers, where h igh  step-wise ou tpu t  growth g i v e s  
r i s e  t o  nega t ive  t r e n d  dev ia t i ons .  I n  my m a t e r i a l  t h i s  comes o u t  
most s t a r k l y  i n  t h e  c a s e  of Mexico. Output i n  t h a t  count ry  jumped 
upward i n  1980 when t h e  l a r g e  La Caridad mine went i n t o  product ion .  
A s  a r e s u l t  Mexico experienced s i z a b l e  nega t ive  d e v i a t i o n s  from 
t r e n d  ou tpu t  i n  t h e  1975-1979 pe r iod ,  which obviously had l i t t l e  
t o  do wi th  demand and p r i c e  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  market.  The u s e  
of dev i a t i ons  from t r e n d  a l s o  h i t s  a g a i n s t  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  t h a t  i n  
f i v e  ou t  of t h e  twelve c o u n t r i e s  s tud i ed ,  t h e  computed t r e n d s  over  
t h e  per iod  i n  focus  (ob ta ined  on t h e  b a s i s  of l e a s t  square devia-  
t i o n )  a r e  no t  s i g n i f i c a n t .  The s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t r e n d s  might be  
improved by der iving themfrom d a t a  f o r  a  longer  per iod  of t i m e .  
This  t oo  appears  t o  be  prob1ematic;given t h e  sharp and sudden 
dece le ra t ion  i n  world economic growth about 1974, and t h e  ensuing 
kink i n  t h e  t r e n d  expansion of copper demand and supply. 
Some of t h e  problems d iscussed  h e r e  could be  overcome by 
concen t r a t i ng  a t t e n t i o n  on t h e  y e a r s  of s i g n i f i c a n t  p r i c e  f a l l s ,  
t h e  r a t i o n a l e  be ing  t h a t  downward output  ad jus tments  i n  o t h e r  y e a r s  
cannot  have been caused by f a l l i n g  demand and p r i c e .  The p r i c e  
s e r i e s  given i n  t a b l e  8.2 shows 1975, 1978, 1981 and 1982 a s  t h e  
y e a r s  t h a t  warrant  s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n .  Even then ,  t h e  compl ica t ions  
of p o l i t i c a l  upheaval i n  Za i re  and f a l l i n g  t r e n d  i n  Zambia remain. 
Furthermore t h e r e  i s  t h e  three-year  c y c l e  of l abo r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
i n  t h e  US, which caused s t r i k e s  and s i z a b l e  ou tput  r educ t ions  i n  
1974, 1977 and 1980. I n  a l l  c e r t a i n t y  t h e  downward adjustment  of 
output in the US to the fall in prices in 1975 would have been 
much stronger in the absence of the strike-induced contraction of 
1974. Similarly, the downward adjustments in response to the price 
falls of 1978 and 1981 appear to have been implemented beforehand, 
by the strikes of 1977 and 1980. Finally, even when one concentra- 
tes on the years when prices fell, a key factor in the inter-country 
variation in downward adjustments of output will be the level of 
variable costs in each country's copper industry. Thus, the low 
costs in Australia as compared to Canada probably provide the 
major explanation to the lesser output adjustments in the former 
country. Cost levels probably also explain the variation in Chile's 
experience. Production was cut in 1975 and 1978 but not in 1981 and 
1982 because dollar costs had been substantially reduced in the latter 
years by exchange rate adjustments. While instances of this kind 
can be provided, it is hardly feasible to isolate the impact of 
cost levels on the flexibility of capacity adjustments in each 
country, because of the deficient quality of the data on cost levels. 
The above discussion shows some of the intricacies that will 
be encountered as one tries to verify the difference in output 
flexibility between state-owned and private mineral enterprises. 
There is a near-certainty that formal aggregate measurements of 
this difference will be heavily distorted by the circumstances 
explored in the preceding paragraphs. 
The difficulties of verifying and quantifying the impact of 
state enterprise proliferation on output flexibility over the 
business cycle point to the even greater difficulty in formally 
establishing the relationship between the emergence of state 
enterprises and price instability. The logic in support of such a 
relationship is clear. But the empirical data and the analytical tools 
available at the present time are not conducive to the establish- 
ment of a definitive proof that the proliferation of state mineral 
enterprises on a large scale has destabilized international mineral 
markets. Hence, my conclusion in this respect remains' tentative. 
The third conclusion is that the emergence of state mineral 
enterprises has permanently reduced the extent of vertical inte- 
gration. This in turn has substantially widened and stabilized 
some formerly very thin arms-length narkets, e.g. those for iron 
ore and bauxite. 
Exanples of nationalizations leading to broken vertical inte- 
gration chains abound. Such breaks have been the rule in all cases 
where the nationalized units belonged to vertically integrated 
multinationals whose forward mineral processing facilities were 
located in their home countries. The Indonesian and Venezuelan 
cases provide clear-cut instances of such breaks. New mineral 
projects in developing countries, set up as joint ventures between 
the government and one or several multinationals, initially typically 
involve only mining. Even when the crude product is exported to one 
of the joint venturers, the vertical link with the foreign proces- 
sing plant will be incomplete, since the other part owners will 
want a say in the commercial arrangements, and market-related 
prices have to be used to establish the 'true' profitability of 
the venture. 
The conclusion that a widening of formerly narrow arms-length 
markets will stabilize the prices in such markets follows from 
general economic reasoning. Both buyer and seller can accept extreme 
price l e v e l s  without  endangering t h e  v i a b i l i t y  of t h e i r  ope ra t ions ,  
so long a s  t he  volume of t r a n s a c t i o n s  a t  t hese  p r i c e s  c o n s t i t u t e s  
a very small  share  of t h e i r  t o t a l  market exposure. But t h e  p r i c e  
swings w i l l  be subdued a s  t h e  arms-length market i s  expanded, s ince  
buyers a s  wel l  a s  s e l l e r s  w i l l  endanger t h e i r  very  ex i s t ence  by t h e  
p r i c e  extremes when the  t r a n s a c t i o n s  involve a s i z a b l e  share  of t o t a l  
t r a d e .  Hence, they w i l l  become inc reas ing ly  r e l u c t a n t  t o  accept  t h e  
f u l l  range of p r i c e  v a r i a t i o n s .  
Reduced p r i c e  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  an  expanding arms-length market 
does not  n e c e s s a r i l y  imply a g r e a t e r  s a l e s  p r i c e  s t a b i l < t y r f o r  an 
ind iv idua l  mineral  producer.  For while t h e  p r i c e  swings i n  t h e  
arms-length market subdue, they may neve r the l e s s  va ry  much more 
than t h e  p r i c e  movements under t h e  cap t ive  market arrangements.  
The i n s t a b i l i t y  of t h e  p r i c e s  t h a t  a producer r ece ives  may there-  
f o r e  well  i nc rease  a s  he t r a n s a c t s  a growing share  of h i s  output  
i n  t h e  arms-length market.  
Formal v e r i f i c a t i o n s  of t h e  conclusion t h a t  p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y  
improves a s  marginal arms-length methods a r e  widened, s u f f e r  from 
problems s i m i l i a r  t o  those  d iscussed  e a r l i e r  i n  t h e  s e c t i o n .  It i s  
q u i t e  poss ib l e  t h a t  t h e r e  has  i n  f a c t  been an inc rease  i n  i n s t a b i -  
l i t y  i n  such markets d e s p i t e  t he  s t a b i l i z i n g  impact of market 
widening. This  could come about because f a c t o r s  l i k e  t h e  more com- 
p l e t e  synchronizat ion of t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  bus iness  cyc l e  i n  t h e  
19701s, o r  t he  l e s s e r  w i l l i ngness  of t h e  growing state-owned s e c t o r  
t o  c u t  capac i ty  u t i l i z a t i o n  i n  response t o  f a l l s  i n  demand have 
had a s t ronge r  impact on p r i c e  v a r i a t i o n s  than t h e  s t a b i l i z i n g  
consequences of market widening. A f u r t h e r  problem i s  t h a t  t h e  
p r i c e  movements i n  marginal arms length  markets i n  t h e  period 
prior to the vertical integration ruptures are incompletely documen- 
ted. There is very little systematic evidence of market prices for 
internationally traded iron ore before 1960, apart from the series 
for Swedish sales to Western Europe, which is somewhat special 
because of the close and long standing relationship between the 
supplier and the buyers. In the case of bauxite even in the early 
1980,'s there is only scattered evidence of arms-length pricing. 
Thus, the two bauxite price series compiled by the World Bank in 
1982 are (a) the US import price, which must presumably mainly 
reflect the accounting prices of the US aluminum multinationals 
and (b) a series derived from Jamaican production and transport 
costs, which strictly speaking is not a price series at all. 1 
The conclusion that the emergence of state mineral enter- 
prises in developing countries will lead to a permanent reduction 
of vertical integration must be further justified. The rationale 
for this conclusion is that although the ruptured international 
vertical integration will be replaced to some degree by more 
forward processing undertaken by the state mineral company in 
the home country, the extent of this national vertical integra- 
tion is unlikely to match the former levels attained under the 
multinational arrangements. This is primarily because of the 
strong commercial advantages in locating certain stages of 
mineral-cum-metal production close to the final consumers in 
industrialized countries. There have been some instances of 
the state mineral enterprises in developing countries going 
multinational by investing in processing facilities abroad. 
1) World Bank, 'Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities' 
Report No 814/82, July 1982, For official use only 
Examples include Codelco in Chile, Gecamines in Zaire and ZCCM 
in Zambia which have acquired important ownership positions in 
~rench and West German copper fabricating plants. These instances 
notwithstanding, the social roles that state mineral enter- 
prises in developing countries are regularly given to play, would 
tend to make them more nationally oriented and hence less prone to 
go multinational than the large private mining concerns. These ar- 
guments provide a justification for the claim that the reduced 
degree of vertical integration caused by the establishment of 
state enterprises will remain a permanent feature. 
The fourth and final conclusion is that the emergence of a 
state enterprise sector will lead to a relocation of investments 
in favor of mineral rich developing countries which for various 
reasons have been out of favor with the mining multinationals. 
In the longer run this should lead to a more economical global 
allocation of mining activities worlwide, and to alowering of 
average and marginal costs of production. However the lowering 
of costs postulated here will be decimated or possibly even 
nullified by the additional costs incurred by mature state mine- 
ral firms in their pursuit of non-profit objectives, and by the 
generally lesser pressure to minimize costs in such firms. 
The market impact implied in this conclusion will probably 
take the longest to work itself out. The relocation of investments 
will start to occur only after the state mineral firms have matu- 
red and developed a capacity to carry out investments. As noted 
before, this stage may not be reached until 10-20 years after natio- 
nalization in each case. Hence, it will probably take until the 
1990's, before the market impact implied in this conclusion will 
become visible. 
The four tentative conclusions about market impact follow 
generally from the behavioral assumptions for state mineral enter- 
prises derived from the analyses in earlier chapters. Obviously 
there will be other, less general market impacts from the prolife- 
ration of state enterprises. Two examples may suffice as illustra- 
tions. First it can be reasonably hypothesized that the very high 
corporate concentration that prevailed in the bauxite/aluminum industry 
under the multinational regime will be reduced when state enterprises 
take over a significant share of the market. However, for minerals 
where country concentration happens to be greater than the initial 
corporate concentration, the introduction of state ownership, en- 
compassing all the units operating in a country, would have the reverse 
impact. Second, in some cases nationalization of a mineral industry 
in selected countries could create enmities with the remaining private 
corporations that would effectively hinder international cartel action 
for a long time, while in others state involvement could constitute 
the very trigger for cartelization. 
It may be instructive to end by summarizing the general impli- 
cations for international mineral markets from the recent emergence 
and growth of state mineral enterprise in developing countries. The 
tentative conclusions formulated above suggest the following market 
consequences. There will be a period of higher costs and prices 
as the newly set-up state owned industries learn and acquire 
experience. Th.e lesser flexibility of state mineral enterprises 
to adjust capacity utilization to shifts in demand will gene- 
rally stabilize output and destabilize prices over the business 
cycle. The establishment of the state owned sector will reduce 
the extent of vertical integration in mineral industries world- 
wide, thereby widening some formerly narrow arms-length markets, 
and stabilizing prices in such markets. After the state owned mineral 
firms have matured and acquired the competence to invest in new 
capacity, there will be a gradual relocation of global invest- 
ments in the direction of mineral rich developing countries that 
have been out of favor with the private multinationals on fiscal 
or political grounds. The favorable cost impact of this investment 
shift will be decimated or nullified by the generally lower pro- 
duction cost efficiency in state-owned mineral enterprises. 
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